They consider that a single stochastic element in a decision process suffices to make the decision process “free will”, even if the stochastic element (to the extent it’s stochastic) by definition wouldn’t have any causal connection to a person’s motivation or values?
Indeterministic choices can have a connection to the agents values that is not deterministically causal.
Take 6 things you like doing write them on small pieces of paper, and glue then to a die. However the die lands
it will not be against your values. Is that “causal connection”? Maybe, in a broad sense. however, only strict predetermination of the undermined is excluded. That is not enough to bring about complete separation of
inderministic choices and values.
People I’ve argued with on the internet regarding free will tend to believe the opposite, that non-deterministic free will somehow imbues more meaning to their choices, though expressed as in the above paragraph it would clearly imbue less meaning to their choices. (something’s meaning is the extent and the ways it’s connected to things we value, and random elements aren’t)
Since the above is not in fact a problem, inderrministic freedom does lend more meaning to choices. if it is true elements of the future world can be traced back to my decisions in a way that stops there—whereas under determinist I am just one link in a very long chain.
I didn’t say it was. I said that as each person is part of the universe, therefore “everything determined by the person is determined by the universe”.
Okay, I said I wasn’t gonna respond again, but I’d like to give you one last hypothetical, and then ask you a question regarding it.
Alice and Bob are taken by aliens and each (separately) given 4 choices arranged in a 2x2 table. Column A, Row 1: Carl is promoted to a significantly higher-paying position that he’ll also be enjoying more Column A, Row 2: Carl is (unknowingly to him) implanted with a well-designed artificial heart which will be sure to secure his health against all heart-related issues. Column B, Row 1: Carl is demoted to a significantly lower-paying position that will also be enjoying less. Column B, Row 2: Carl is (unknowingly to him) implanted with a badly-designed artificial heart which will be sure to worsen his health in regards to heart-related issues.
“Choose Column and Row for the action you want to take” say the Aliens. “Of the ones you choose, please state also which column or row that will be Definite, and which will be Stochastic” ″What do you mean by ‘definite’ and ‘stochastic’?” ask both Alice and Bob. ”We’ll definitely do something in the element which you pronounce Definite, but there’s only a 55% chance we’ll go with the element you deem Stochastic—we’ll be flipping a non-fair coin to determine that one with your choice corresponding to just the more likely side”.
Alice does her calculation. Her values and ethics all deterministically argue in favor of giving primary importance to Column A (the ‘good’ results) -- she’s definite about that, nor can she imagine a recognizable self of hers that would choose column B against a random individual. Then she calculates with significantly less certainty that A2 (the better heart cell) seems better than the A1 cell (the better job cell). “For ‘Definite’, I pick column A, For ‘Stochastic’ I pick row 2 -- In short the better heart with 55% probability, and the better job with 45% probability ” she tells the aliens. ”Apologies”, the aliens say, “but the coin went the other way than your preference. and we’ll have to do A1 instead—give Carl the better job instead of the better heart.”
Bob does his calculation. He has very strong ethics against people messing with other people’s bodies against their will. Even being given unfairly a worse job pales in comparison to the gross aversion Bob has against unconsented medical procedures. So with great definity following deterministically from Bob’s values Bob chooses “Row 1” as his primary column. He’s significantly less certain about column 1 or column 2. Promoting or Demoting a random individual he’s not aware of—either could be judged fair or unfair if he had knowledge about Carl which he doesn’t. With some uncertainty he goes for A1 rather than B1. “For Definite I choose Row 1 (the jobs row). For Stochastic I choose Column A—in short give him the better job.” ″Congratulations, the unfair coin we flipped went with your choice. A1it’ll be.”
So, after a decision process with both stochastic and deterministic elements, Alice and Bob both ended up causing the selection of A1. But Alice had “A” as the deterministic element, and Bob had “1″ as the deterministic element.
Now here’s my question: If you had to estimate their characters, values and personalities, wouldn’t you be able to attribute more meaning to the Deterministic element, instead of the one left to partial randomness? The partially random element would indeed completely mislead you in regards to Alice’s decision process.
“if it is true elements of the future world can be traced back to my decisions in a way that stops there—whereas under determinist I am just one link in a very long chain.”
You assign good connotations to “stops there” and bad connotations to “one link in a very long chain”. But when I speak about “meaning”, I don’t mean ‘good meaning’ or ‘bad meaning’, I mean the amount of measurable information we can derive from the choice in question. Meaning as a metric which could theoretically be measurable in bits. And there’s 0 bits of information that can be derived from a truly random element. But from “one link in a very long chains” we can derive bits of information about both the past and the future—what the person may have likely done in the past, what they’re likely to choose in the future.
Now here’s my question: If you had to estimate their characters, values and personalities, wouldn’t you be able to attribute more meaning to the Deterministic element, instead of the one left to partial randomness? The partially random element would indeed completely mislead you in regards to Alice’s decision process.
I don’t see how any of that is relevant to FW. Firstly, you are not contrasting deterministic decision making by an individual with stochastic decision making by an individual; the stochastic
decision is supplied by someone else. It is not a roll of one’s personal die, with ones personal
values pasted onto its sides. The selection of choices is arbitrary and unconnected with Alice and Bob’s values.
Secondly, your notion of meaning, or information content is one that hinges on how much information
an external observver csn get out of someone’s else’s choice. That is quite orthogonal to the issue of whether FW makes your choices more meaningful to you.
Perhaps you think determinstic decisions are expressive of an individual’s psychology, because they can be predicted from an individuals psychology. But if you can predict someone’s decisions, why should they believe that have nonetheless made a free choice?
You assign good connotations to “stops there” and bad connotations to “one link in a very long chain”. But when I speak about “meaning”, I don’t mean ‘good meaning’ or ‘bad meaning’, I mean the amount of measurable information we can derive from the choice in question. Meaning as a metric which could theoretically be measurable in bits. And there’s 0 bits of information that can be derived from a truly random element. But from “one link in a very long chains” we can derive bits of information about both the past and the future—what the person may have likely done in the past, what they’re likely to choose in the future.
But if you can predict someone’s decisions, why should they believe that have nonetheless made a free choice?
Someone being free is always understood to mean something roughly equal to “able to act according to one’s own desires”, it doesn’t mean “unpredictable”.
But it is not obvious where the border lies between brainwashing/indoctrination and simply sharing information. If we are discussing a mutual acquaintance (let’s call her Alice) and I tell you that she did some not nice action yesterday, you may have a desire to shun her the next time you two meet. Is that desire “your own”?
One could say that it is because you simply used your knowledge of her past actions to decide for yourself that you should shun her. On the other hand, one could say that I basically am controlling your actions, because me telling you what I said has affected your actions.
You can very easily yourself make lots of other borderline cases like this, and in fact they come up in real life very often. Consider the case where parents “indoctrinates” their kids with their religion. When the kid grows up to follow that religion, was it the kid’s own choice? Again, we find that the distinction is not complete. If the kid had not been raised to that religion, he likely would not be following it. But this is how most people in the world got their religion. I doubt that you go around to everyone and say that deep down they don’t really believe in it… But that is a separate discussion.
Anyway, what I am trying to say, is that for every desire one has originated, their likely was some (external) reason why they have that desire. Like me telling them how nasty Alice had been, or their parents telling them that god exists. (And maybe Alice was nasty, or maybe she wasn’t maybe god doesn’t exist or maybe he does, but that has no relevance.) In any case, that desire was caused by the outside factor, which shows that it is not very meaningful to try to separate out which desires where caused by outside factors. (As they all are to some extent or another.)
But it is not obvious where the border lies between brainwashing/indoctrination and simply sharing information.
Lots of borders aren’t obvious. Why should that present a special problem in this case?
One could say that it is because you simply used your knowledge of her past actions to decide for yourself that you should shun her. On the other hand, one could say that I basically am controlling your actions, because me telling you what I said has affected your actions.
Anyway, what I am trying to say, is that for every desire one has originated, their likely was some (external) reason why they have that desire.
I don’t see why I should regard a desire as being originated when it also has some deterministic external cause.
If, OTOH, if a “reason” is just an influence, or partial cause, then it is compatible with partial origination.
I don’t see why I would have to do either. I need both the internal disposition to shun her, and the information. It is not either/or.
Indeterministic choices can have a connection to the agents values that is not deterministically causal. Take 6 things you like doing write them on small pieces of paper, and glue then to a die. However the die lands it will not be against your values. Is that “causal connection”? Maybe, in a broad sense. however, only strict predetermination of the undermined is excluded. That is not enough to bring about complete separation of inderministic choices and values.
Since the above is not in fact a problem, inderrministic freedom does lend more meaning to choices. if it is true elements of the future world can be traced back to my decisions in a way that stops there—whereas under determinist I am just one link in a very long chain.
That’s a non sequitur.
Okay, I said I wasn’t gonna respond again, but I’d like to give you one last hypothetical, and then ask you a question regarding it.
Alice and Bob are taken by aliens and each (separately) given 4 choices arranged in a 2x2 table.
Column A, Row 1: Carl is promoted to a significantly higher-paying position that he’ll also be enjoying more
Column A, Row 2: Carl is (unknowingly to him) implanted with a well-designed artificial heart which will be sure to secure his health against all heart-related issues.
Column B, Row 1: Carl is demoted to a significantly lower-paying position that will also be enjoying less.
Column B, Row 2: Carl is (unknowingly to him) implanted with a badly-designed artificial heart which will be sure to worsen his health in regards to heart-related issues.
“Choose Column and Row for the action you want to take” say the Aliens. “Of the ones you choose, please state also which column or row that will be Definite, and which will be Stochastic”
″What do you mean by ‘definite’ and ‘stochastic’?” ask both Alice and Bob.
”We’ll definitely do something in the element which you pronounce Definite, but there’s only a 55% chance we’ll go with the element you deem Stochastic—we’ll be flipping a non-fair coin to determine that one with your choice corresponding to just the more likely side”.
Alice does her calculation. Her values and ethics all deterministically argue in favor of giving primary importance to Column A (the ‘good’ results) -- she’s definite about that, nor can she imagine a recognizable self of hers that would choose column B against a random individual. Then she calculates with significantly less certainty that A2 (the better heart cell) seems better than the A1 cell (the better job cell). “For ‘Definite’, I pick column A, For ‘Stochastic’ I pick row 2 -- In short the better heart with 55% probability, and the better job with 45% probability ” she tells the aliens.
”Apologies”, the aliens say, “but the coin went the other way than your preference. and we’ll have to do A1 instead—give Carl the better job instead of the better heart.”
Bob does his calculation. He has very strong ethics against people messing with other people’s bodies against their will. Even being given unfairly a worse job pales in comparison to the gross aversion Bob has against unconsented medical procedures. So with great definity following deterministically from Bob’s values Bob chooses “Row 1” as his primary column. He’s significantly less certain about column 1 or column 2. Promoting or Demoting a random individual he’s not aware of—either could be judged fair or unfair if he had knowledge about Carl which he doesn’t. With some uncertainty he goes for A1 rather than B1. “For Definite I choose Row 1 (the jobs row). For Stochastic I choose Column A—in short give him the better job.”
″Congratulations, the unfair coin we flipped went with your choice. A1it’ll be.”
So, after a decision process with both stochastic and deterministic elements, Alice and Bob both ended up causing the selection of A1. But Alice had “A” as the deterministic element, and Bob had “1″ as the deterministic element.
Now here’s my question: If you had to estimate their characters, values and personalities, wouldn’t you be able to attribute more meaning to the Deterministic element, instead of the one left to partial randomness? The partially random element would indeed completely mislead you in regards to Alice’s decision process.
You assign good connotations to “stops there” and bad connotations to “one link in a very long chain”. But when I speak about “meaning”, I don’t mean ‘good meaning’ or ‘bad meaning’, I mean the amount of measurable information we can derive from the choice in question. Meaning as a metric which could theoretically be measurable in bits. And there’s 0 bits of information that can be derived from a truly random element. But from “one link in a very long chains” we can derive bits of information about both the past and the future—what the person may have likely done in the past, what they’re likely to choose in the future.
Now I’m hopefully done.
I don’t see how any of that is relevant to FW. Firstly, you are not contrasting deterministic decision making by an individual with stochastic decision making by an individual; the stochastic decision is supplied by someone else. It is not a roll of one’s personal die, with ones personal values pasted onto its sides. The selection of choices is arbitrary and unconnected with Alice and Bob’s values.
Secondly, your notion of meaning, or information content is one that hinges on how much information an external observver csn get out of someone’s else’s choice. That is quite orthogonal to the issue of whether FW makes your choices more meaningful to you.
Perhaps you think determinstic decisions are expressive of an individual’s psychology, because they can be predicted from an individuals psychology. But if you can predict someone’s decisions, why should they believe that have nonetheless made a free choice?
And what’ that got to do with free choice?
Someone being free is always understood to mean something roughly equal to “able to act according to one’s own desires”, it doesn’t mean “unpredictable”.
Act on desires one happens to have, or act on desires one has originated?
Can you try to say what the difference is? At this point I think you are tying yourself up in semantic knots.
An obvious objection to “one is free if one is able to act according to ones desires” is that ones desire mught be implanted, eg brain washing
But it is not obvious where the border lies between brainwashing/indoctrination and simply sharing information. If we are discussing a mutual acquaintance (let’s call her Alice) and I tell you that she did some not nice action yesterday, you may have a desire to shun her the next time you two meet. Is that desire “your own”?
One could say that it is because you simply used your knowledge of her past actions to decide for yourself that you should shun her. On the other hand, one could say that I basically am controlling your actions, because me telling you what I said has affected your actions.
You can very easily yourself make lots of other borderline cases like this, and in fact they come up in real life very often. Consider the case where parents “indoctrinates” their kids with their religion. When the kid grows up to follow that religion, was it the kid’s own choice? Again, we find that the distinction is not complete. If the kid had not been raised to that religion, he likely would not be following it. But this is how most people in the world got their religion. I doubt that you go around to everyone and say that deep down they don’t really believe in it… But that is a separate discussion.
Anyway, what I am trying to say, is that for every desire one has originated, their likely was some (external) reason why they have that desire. Like me telling them how nasty Alice had been, or their parents telling them that god exists. (And maybe Alice was nasty, or maybe she wasn’t maybe god doesn’t exist or maybe he does, but that has no relevance.) In any case, that desire was caused by the outside factor, which shows that it is not very meaningful to try to separate out which desires where caused by outside factors. (As they all are to some extent or another.)
Lots of borders aren’t obvious. Why should that present a special problem in this case?
I don’t see why I should regard a desire as being originated when it also has some deterministic external cause. If, OTOH, if a “reason” is just an influence, or partial cause, then it is compatible with partial origination.
I don’t see why I would have to do either. I need both the internal disposition to shun her, and the information. It is not either/or.