I get what you mean, but I also see some possibly important differences between the hypothetical example and our world. In the imaginary world where oppression has increased and someone writes an article about loyalty-based moral progress, maybe many other ethicists would disagree, saying that we haven’t made much progress in terms of values related to (i), (ii) and (iii). In our world, I don’t see many ethicists refuting moral progress on the grounds that we haven’t made much progress in terms of e.g. patriotism or loyalty to the family or desert.
Moreover, in this example you managed to phrase oppression in terms of loyalty, but in general you can’t plausibly rephrase any observed trend as progress of values: would an increase in global steel production count as an improvement in terms of… object safety and reliability, which leads to people feeling more secure? For many trends the connection to moral progress becomes more and more of a stretch.
I get what you mean, but I also see some possibly important differences between the hypothetical example and our world. In the imaginary world where oppression has increased and someone writes an article about loyalty-based moral progress, maybe many other ethicists would disagree, saying that we haven’t made much progress in terms of values related to (i), (ii) and (iii). In our world, I don’t see many ethicists refuting moral progress on the grounds that we haven’t made much progress in terms of e.g. patriotism or loyalty to the family or desert.
Moreover, in this example you managed to phrase oppression in terms of loyalty, but in general you can’t plausibly rephrase any observed trend as progress of values: would an increase in global steel production count as an improvement in terms of… object safety and reliability, which leads to people feeling more secure? For many trends the connection to moral progress becomes more and more of a stretch.