And yet it seems really quite easy to conceive of a p zombie. Merely claiming that consciousness is emergent doesn’t change our ability to imagine the presence or absence of the phenomenon.
Not too long ago, it would also have been quite easy to conceive of a world in which heat and motion were two separate things. Today, this is no longer conceivable. If something seems conceivable to you now, that might just be because you don’t yet understand how it’s actually impossible. To make the jump from “conceivability” (a fact about your bounded mind) to “logically possible” (a fact about reality) is a misstep, and a rather enormous one at that.
But clearly we do have such a reason: that we are conscious, and know this fact through direct experience of consciousness.
By stipulation, you would have typed the above sentence regardless of whether or not you were actually conscious, and hence your statement does not provide evidence either for or against the existence of consciousness. If we accept the Zombie World as a logical possibility, our priors remain unaltered by the quoted sentence, and continue to be heavily weighted toward the Zombie World. (Again, we can easily get out of this conundrum by refusing to accept the logical possibility of the Zombie World, but this seems to be something you refuse to do.)
The claim is that we know consciousness is real due to our experience of it.
This exact statement could have been emitted by a p-zombie. Without direct access to your qualia, I have no way of distinguishing the difference based on anything you say or do, and as such this sentence provides just as much evidence that you are conscious as the earlier quoted statement does—that is to say, no evidence at all.
The fact that this knowledge is causally inefficacious does not change its epistemic value.
Oh, but it does. In particular, for a piece of knowledge to have epistemic value to me (or anyone else, for that matter), I need to have some way of acquiring that knowledge. For me to acquire that knowledge, I must causally interact with it in some manner. If that knowledge is “causally inefficacious”, as you put it, by definition I have no way of knowing about it, and it can hardly be called “knowledge” at all, much less have any epistemic value.
Allow me to spell things out for you. Your claims, interpreted literally, would imply the following statements:
There exists a mysterious substance called “consciousness” that does not causally interact with anything in the physical universe.
Since this substance does not causally interact with anything in the physical universe, and you are part of the physical universe, said substance does not causally interact with you.
This means, among other things, that when you use your physical fingers to type on your physical keyboard the words, “we are conscious, and know this fact through direct experience of consciousness”, the cause of that series of physical actions cannot be the mysterious substance called “consciousness”, since (again) that substance is causally inactive. Instead, some other mysterious process in your physical brain is occurring and causing you to type those words, operating completely independently of this mysterious substance. Moreover, this physical process would occur and cause you to type those same words regardless of whether the mysterious epiphenomenal substance called “consciousness” was actually present.
Nevertheless, for some reason you appear to expect me to treat the words you type as evidence of this mysterious, causally inactive substance’s existence. This, despite the fact that those words and that substance are, by stipulation, completely uncorrelated.
...Yeah, no. Not buying it, sorry. If you can’t seeing the massive improbabilities you’re incurring here, there’s really not much left for me to say.
Not too long ago, it would also have been quite easy to conceive of a world in which heat and motion were two separate things. Today, this is no longer conceivable.
But it is conceivable for thermodynamics to be caused by molecular motion. No part of that is (or ever was, really) inconceivable. It is inconceivable for the sense qualia of heat to be reducible to motion, but that’s just another reason to believe that physicalism is wrong. The blog post you linked doesn’t actually address the idea of inconceivability.
If something seems conceivable to you now, that might just be because you don’t yet understand how it’s actually impossible.
No, it’s because there is no possible physical explanation for consciousness (whereas there are possible kinetic explanations for heat, as well as possible sonic explanations for heat, and possible magnetic explanations for heat, and so on. All these nonexistent explanations are conceivable in ways that a physical description of sense datum is not).
By stipulation, you would have typed the above sentence regardless of whether or not you were actually conscious, and hence your statement does not provide evidence either for or against the existence of consciousness.
And I do not claim that my statement is evidence that I have qualia.
This exact statement could have been emitted by a p-zombie.
See above. No one is claiming that claims of qualia prove the existence of qualia. People are claiming that the experience of qualia proves the existence of qualia.
In particular, for a piece of knowledge to have epistemic value to me (or anyone else, for that matter), I need to have some way of acquiring that knowledge.
We’re not talking about whether a statement has “epistemic value to [you]” or not. We’re talking about whether it’s epistemically justified or not—whether it’s true or not.
There exists a mysterious substance called “consciousness” that does not causally interact with anything in the physical universe.
Neither I nor Chalmers describe consciousness as a substance.
Since this substance does not causally interact with anything in the physical universe, and you are part of the physical universe, said substance does not causally interact with you.
Only if you mean “you” in the reductive physicalist sense, which I don’t.
This means, among other things, that when you use your physical fingers to type on your physical keyboard the words, “we are conscious, and know this fact through direct experience of consciousness”, the cause of that series of physical actions cannot be the mysterious substance called “consciousness”, since (again) that substance is causally inactive. Instead, some other mysterious process in your physical brain is occurring and causing you to type those words, operating completely independently of this mysterious substance.
Of course, although physicalists believe that the exact same “some other mysterious process in your physical brain” causes us to type, they just happen to make the assertion that consciousness is identical to that other process.
Nevertheless, for some reason you appear to expect me to treat the words you type as evidence of this mysterious, causally inactive substance’s existence.
As I have stated repeatedly, I don’t, and if you’d taken the time to read Chalmers you’d have known this instead of writing an entirely impotent attack on his ideas. Or you could have even read what I wrote. I literally said in the parent comment,
The confusion in your post is grounded in the idea that Chalmers or I would claim that the proof for consciousness is people’s claims that they are conscious. We don’t (although it could be evidence for it, if we had prior expectations against p-zombie universes which talked about consciousness). The claim is that we know consciousness is real due to our experience of it.
Honestly. How deliberately obtuse could you be to write an entire attack on an idea which I explicitly rejected in the comment to which you replied. Do not waste my time like this in the future.
Not too long ago, it would also have been quite easy to conceive of a world in which heat and motion were two separate things. Today, this is no longer conceivable. If something seems conceivable to you now, that might just be because you don’t yet understand how it’s actually impossible. To make the jump from “conceivability” (a fact about your bounded mind) to “logically possible” (a fact about reality) is a misstep, and a rather enormous one at that.
By stipulation, you would have typed the above sentence regardless of whether or not you were actually conscious, and hence your statement does not provide evidence either for or against the existence of consciousness. If we accept the Zombie World as a logical possibility, our priors remain unaltered by the quoted sentence, and continue to be heavily weighted toward the Zombie World. (Again, we can easily get out of this conundrum by refusing to accept the logical possibility of the Zombie World, but this seems to be something you refuse to do.)
This exact statement could have been emitted by a p-zombie. Without direct access to your qualia, I have no way of distinguishing the difference based on anything you say or do, and as such this sentence provides just as much evidence that you are conscious as the earlier quoted statement does—that is to say, no evidence at all.
Oh, but it does. In particular, for a piece of knowledge to have epistemic value to me (or anyone else, for that matter), I need to have some way of acquiring that knowledge. For me to acquire that knowledge, I must causally interact with it in some manner. If that knowledge is “causally inefficacious”, as you put it, by definition I have no way of knowing about it, and it can hardly be called “knowledge” at all, much less have any epistemic value.
Allow me to spell things out for you. Your claims, interpreted literally, would imply the following statements:
There exists a mysterious substance called “consciousness” that does not causally interact with anything in the physical universe.
Since this substance does not causally interact with anything in the physical universe, and you are part of the physical universe, said substance does not causally interact with you.
This means, among other things, that when you use your physical fingers to type on your physical keyboard the words, “we are conscious, and know this fact through direct experience of consciousness”, the cause of that series of physical actions cannot be the mysterious substance called “consciousness”, since (again) that substance is causally inactive. Instead, some other mysterious process in your physical brain is occurring and causing you to type those words, operating completely independently of this mysterious substance. Moreover, this physical process would occur and cause you to type those same words regardless of whether the mysterious epiphenomenal substance called “consciousness” was actually present.
Nevertheless, for some reason you appear to expect me to treat the words you type as evidence of this mysterious, causally inactive substance’s existence. This, despite the fact that those words and that substance are, by stipulation, completely uncorrelated.
...Yeah, no. Not buying it, sorry. If you can’t seeing the massive improbabilities you’re incurring here, there’s really not much left for me to say.
But it is conceivable for thermodynamics to be caused by molecular motion. No part of that is (or ever was, really) inconceivable. It is inconceivable for the sense qualia of heat to be reducible to motion, but that’s just another reason to believe that physicalism is wrong. The blog post you linked doesn’t actually address the idea of inconceivability.
No, it’s because there is no possible physical explanation for consciousness (whereas there are possible kinetic explanations for heat, as well as possible sonic explanations for heat, and possible magnetic explanations for heat, and so on. All these nonexistent explanations are conceivable in ways that a physical description of sense datum is not).
And I do not claim that my statement is evidence that I have qualia.
See above. No one is claiming that claims of qualia prove the existence of qualia. People are claiming that the experience of qualia proves the existence of qualia.
We’re not talking about whether a statement has “epistemic value to [you]” or not. We’re talking about whether it’s epistemically justified or not—whether it’s true or not.
Neither I nor Chalmers describe consciousness as a substance.
Only if you mean “you” in the reductive physicalist sense, which I don’t.
Of course, although physicalists believe that the exact same “some other mysterious process in your physical brain” causes us to type, they just happen to make the assertion that consciousness is identical to that other process.
As I have stated repeatedly, I don’t, and if you’d taken the time to read Chalmers you’d have known this instead of writing an entirely impotent attack on his ideas. Or you could have even read what I wrote. I literally said in the parent comment,
Honestly. How deliberately obtuse could you be to write an entire attack on an idea which I explicitly rejected in the comment to which you replied. Do not waste my time like this in the future.