Sorry, but I don’t know what we’re talking about (i.e. I don’t know how to define consciousness). Could you transmit your understanding to me through words? Thanks in advance.
I, also, still do not know what you’re talking about. I expect to have experiences in the future. I do not really expect them to contain qualia, but I’m not sure what that would mean in your terms. Please describe the difference I should expect in terms of things I can verify or falsify internally.
“I will have experiences but do not expect them to contain qualia,” as I understand it, means “I will have experiences but do not expect to experience things in any particular way.” This is because qualia are just the ways that things are experienced.
I do not know what it would mean to expect that to happen. Asking how you can verify it is like asking, “How do I verify whether or not 2 + 2 seems to be 4 but is not?”
It seems like you and VAuroch have a disagreement about how to use the word “qualia”.
Your usage seems very modest, in the sense of not committing you to anything much. Are you sure that the way you actually use the word is consistently that modest? If having qualia just means experiencing things in some way, then you aren’t entitled to assume
that there are actually such things as qualia
anything about the “structure” of experiences—e.g., perhaps experiences are kinda indivisible and there’s no such thing as a “quale of red” that’s separable from the qualia of all the vast numbers of experiences that involve red things
anything about the relationships between qualia and (other?) physical phenomena like electrochemical activity in the brain
without some further argument that explores the nature of qualia in more detail.
(I suspect that VAuroch may have in mind some more-specific meaning of “qualia” that does entail particular positions on some questions like those. Or perhaps he merely doubts that there is any really satisfactory way to define “qualia” and is pushing you for more detail in the expectation that doing so will reveal problems?)
I am not sure what you mean by “things” when you say that I can’t assume there are such things as qualia. I say that there are ways we experience things, and those are qualia. They are not things in the way that apples and dogs are things, but in another way. There is nothing strange about that, because there are many kinds of things that exist in many kinds of ways.
I don’t make any assumption about the structure of experiences, but try to figure it out by looking at my experiences.
I personally assume there is a direct relationship between our experiences and physical phenomena in the brain. I have no reason to think I disagree with VAuroch in that respect. I disagree that it follows that “qualia do not exist,” is a reasonable description of the resulting situation.
I can transmit it through words. We both know what we’re talking about here.
Sorry, but I don’t know what we’re talking about (i.e. I don’t know how to define consciousness). Could you transmit your understanding to me through words? Thanks in advance.
I, also, still do not know what you’re talking about. I expect to have experiences in the future. I do not really expect them to contain qualia, but I’m not sure what that would mean in your terms. Please describe the difference I should expect in terms of things I can verify or falsify internally.
“I will have experiences but do not expect them to contain qualia,” as I understand it, means “I will have experiences but do not expect to experience things in any particular way.” This is because qualia are just the ways that things are experienced.
I do not know what it would mean to expect that to happen. Asking how you can verify it is like asking, “How do I verify whether or not 2 + 2 seems to be 4 but is not?”
It seems like you and VAuroch have a disagreement about how to use the word “qualia”.
Your usage seems very modest, in the sense of not committing you to anything much. Are you sure that the way you actually use the word is consistently that modest? If having qualia just means experiencing things in some way, then you aren’t entitled to assume
that there are actually such things as qualia
anything about the “structure” of experiences—e.g., perhaps experiences are kinda indivisible and there’s no such thing as a “quale of red” that’s separable from the qualia of all the vast numbers of experiences that involve red things
anything about the relationships between qualia and (other?) physical phenomena like electrochemical activity in the brain
without some further argument that explores the nature of qualia in more detail.
(I suspect that VAuroch may have in mind some more-specific meaning of “qualia” that does entail particular positions on some questions like those. Or perhaps he merely doubts that there is any really satisfactory way to define “qualia” and is pushing you for more detail in the expectation that doing so will reveal problems?)
I am not sure what you mean by “things” when you say that I can’t assume there are such things as qualia. I say that there are ways we experience things, and those are qualia. They are not things in the way that apples and dogs are things, but in another way. There is nothing strange about that, because there are many kinds of things that exist in many kinds of ways.
I don’t make any assumption about the structure of experiences, but try to figure it out by looking at my experiences.
I personally assume there is a direct relationship between our experiences and physical phenomena in the brain. I have no reason to think I disagree with VAuroch in that respect. I disagree that it follows that “qualia do not exist,” is a reasonable description of the resulting situation.