You can only give reasons, that is, non-conclusive reasons, for thinking that it is probably impossible. And the reasons for thinking that are very similar to the reason I gave for thinking that other people are conscious. Your comment confuses two different ideas, namely whether zombies are possible, and what we know about zombies and how we know it, which are two different things.
This is not a matter of knowledge, but of expectation. Basically, the question boils down to whether I, personally, believe that consciousness will eventually be explained in reductionistic, lower level terms, just as heat was explained in reductionistic, lower level terms, even if such an explanation is currently unavailable. And the answer to that question is yes. Yes, I do.
I do not believe that consciousness is magic, and I do not believe that it will remain forever inexplicable. I believe that although we do not currently have an explanation for qualia, we will eventually discover such an explanation, just as I believe there exists a googol-th digit of pi, even if we have not yet calculated that digit. And finally, I expect that once such an explanation is discovered, it will make the entire concept of “p-zombies” seem exactly as possible as “heat” somehow being different from “motion”, or biology being powered by something other than chemistry, or the third digit of pi being anything other than 4.
This is, it seems to me, the only reasonable position to take; anything else would, in my opinion, require a massive helping of faith. I have attempted to lay out my arguments for why this is so on multiple occasions, and (if you’ll forgive my immodesty) I think I’ve done a decent job of it. I have also asked you several questions in order to help clarify your objections so that I might be able to better address said objections; so far, these questions of mine have gone unanswered, and I have instead been presented with (what appears to me to be) little more than vague hand-waving in response to my carefully worded arguments.
As this conversation has progressed, all of these things have served to foster a feeling of increasing frustration on my part. I say this, not to start an argument, but to express my feelings regarding this discussion directly in the spirit of Tell Culture. Forgive me if my tone in this comment seems a bit short, but there is only so much dancing around the point I am willing to tolerate before I deem the conversation a frustrating and fruitless pursuit. I don’t mean to sound like I’m giving an ultimatum here, but to put it bluntly: unless I encounter a point I feel is worth addressing in detail, this will likely be my last reply to you on this topic. I’ve laid out my case; I leave the task of refuting it to others.
That is my point. It is a question of your beliefs, not of proofs. In essence, in your earlier comment, you asserted that you do not depend on an inductive argument to tell you that other people are conscious, because zombies are impossible. But my point is that without the inductive argument, you would have no reason to believe that zombies are impossible.
No, I don’t believe zombies are impossible because of some nebulously defined “inductive argument”. I believe zombies are impossible because I am experiencing qualia, and I don’t believe those qualia are the result of some magical consciousness substance that can be added or subtracted from a universe at will.
Those are not the only possibilities (that either zombies are impossible or that qualia are the result of magic), but even if they were, your reasons for disbelieving in magic are inductive.
Also, regarding the personal things here, I am not surprised that you find it hard to understand me, for two reasons. First, as I have said, I haven’t been trying to lay out an entire position anyway, because it is not something that would fit into a few comments on Less Wrong. Second, you are deeply confused about a large number of things.
Of course, you suppose that I am the one who is confused. This is normal for disagreements. But I have good evidence that it is you who are confused, rather than me. You admit that you do not understand what I am saying, calling it “vague hand-waving.” In contrast, I understand both what I am saying, and what you are saying. I understand your position quite well, and all of its reasons, along with the ways that you are mistaken. This is a difference that gives me a reason to think that you are the one who is confused, not me.
I agree that it would not be productive to continue a discussion along those lines, of course.
“You think I’m wrong, but actually you’re the one who’s wrong. I’m not going to give any reasons you’re wrong, because this margin is too narrow to contain those reasons, but rest assured I know for a fact that I’m right and you’re wrong.”
This is, frankly, ridiculous and a load of drivel. Sorry, but I have no intention of continuing to argue with someone who doesn’t even bother to present their side of the argument and insults my intelligence on top of that. Tapping out.
You should take a look at the last comment he made in reply to me, where he explicitly ascribed to me and then attacked (at length) a claim which I clearly stated that I didn’t hold in the parent comment. It’s amazing how difficult it is for the naive-eliminativist crowd to express cogent arguments or understand the positions which they attack, and a common pattern I’ve noticed across this forum as well as others.
Yes, I noticed he overlooked the distinction between “I know I am conscious because it’s my direct experience” and “I know I am conscious because I say ‘I know I am conscious because it’s my direct experience.’” And those are two entirely different things.
The first of those things is incompatible with the Zombie Universe Argument, if we take ‘knowledge’ to mean a probability that one could separate from the subjective experience. You can’t assume that direct experience is epiphenomenal, meaning it doesn’t cause any behavior or calculation directly, and then also assume, “I know I am conscious because it’s my direct experience”.
If it seems unfair to suggest that Chalmers doesn’t know he himself is conscious, remember that to our eyes Chalmers is the one creating the problem; we say that consciousness is a major cause of our beliefs about consciousness.
I don’t think experience is epiphenomenal. As I said, I disagree with the Zombie world argument as proposed.
Nonetheless, it is not true that the first of those things is incompatible with the Zombie argument, even taken in that way. Because knowing I am conscious, not the saying of the words but the being, would itself be epiphenomenal, according to that theory. So direct experience could be the cause of someone knowing that he was conscious, because both of those (experience and knowing) would be epiphenonomenal, so that experience would not be the cause of anything physical (e.g. such as producing sounds that sound like someone saying “I know I am conscious because it’s my direct experience.)
I don’t intend to get involved in another discussion, but a brief note:
if we take ‘knowledge’ to mean a probability that one could separate from the subjective experience.
This definition is from hairyfigment’s comment. Since you didn’t challenge his/her definition, I assume this means you agree with it. However, if we use this definition of “knowledge”, the second paragraph of your comment becomes irrelevant. (This, incidentally, was also the point I was making in my response to UmamiSalami.)
True.
False.
This is not a matter of knowledge, but of expectation. Basically, the question boils down to whether I, personally, believe that consciousness will eventually be explained in reductionistic, lower level terms, just as heat was explained in reductionistic, lower level terms, even if such an explanation is currently unavailable. And the answer to that question is yes. Yes, I do.
I do not believe that consciousness is magic, and I do not believe that it will remain forever inexplicable. I believe that although we do not currently have an explanation for qualia, we will eventually discover such an explanation, just as I believe there exists a googol-th digit of pi, even if we have not yet calculated that digit. And finally, I expect that once such an explanation is discovered, it will make the entire concept of “p-zombies” seem exactly as possible as “heat” somehow being different from “motion”, or biology being powered by something other than chemistry, or the third digit of pi being anything other than 4.
This is, it seems to me, the only reasonable position to take; anything else would, in my opinion, require a massive helping of faith. I have attempted to lay out my arguments for why this is so on multiple occasions, and (if you’ll forgive my immodesty) I think I’ve done a decent job of it. I have also asked you several questions in order to help clarify your objections so that I might be able to better address said objections; so far, these questions of mine have gone unanswered, and I have instead been presented with (what appears to me to be) little more than vague hand-waving in response to my carefully worded arguments.
As this conversation has progressed, all of these things have served to foster a feeling of increasing frustration on my part. I say this, not to start an argument, but to express my feelings regarding this discussion directly in the spirit of Tell Culture. Forgive me if my tone in this comment seems a bit short, but there is only so much dancing around the point I am willing to tolerate before I deem the conversation a frustrating and fruitless pursuit. I don’t mean to sound like I’m giving an ultimatum here, but to put it bluntly: unless I encounter a point I feel is worth addressing in detail, this will likely be my last reply to you on this topic. I’ve laid out my case; I leave the task of refuting it to others.
“I do not believe etc.”
That is my point. It is a question of your beliefs, not of proofs. In essence, in your earlier comment, you asserted that you do not depend on an inductive argument to tell you that other people are conscious, because zombies are impossible. But my point is that without the inductive argument, you would have no reason to believe that zombies are impossible.
No, I don’t believe zombies are impossible because of some nebulously defined “inductive argument”. I believe zombies are impossible because I am experiencing qualia, and I don’t believe those qualia are the result of some magical consciousness substance that can be added or subtracted from a universe at will.
Those are not the only possibilities (that either zombies are impossible or that qualia are the result of magic), but even if they were, your reasons for disbelieving in magic are inductive.
Also, regarding the personal things here, I am not surprised that you find it hard to understand me, for two reasons. First, as I have said, I haven’t been trying to lay out an entire position anyway, because it is not something that would fit into a few comments on Less Wrong. Second, you are deeply confused about a large number of things.
Of course, you suppose that I am the one who is confused. This is normal for disagreements. But I have good evidence that it is you who are confused, rather than me. You admit that you do not understand what I am saying, calling it “vague hand-waving.” In contrast, I understand both what I am saying, and what you are saying. I understand your position quite well, and all of its reasons, along with the ways that you are mistaken. This is a difference that gives me a reason to think that you are the one who is confused, not me.
I agree that it would not be productive to continue a discussion along those lines, of course.
...Your comment, paraphrased:
“You think I’m wrong, but actually you’re the one who’s wrong. I’m not going to give any reasons you’re wrong, because this margin is too narrow to contain those reasons, but rest assured I know for a fact that I’m right and you’re wrong.”
This is, frankly, ridiculous and a load of drivel. Sorry, but I have no intention of continuing to argue with someone who doesn’t even bother to present their side of the argument and insults my intelligence on top of that. Tapping out.
You should take a look at the last comment he made in reply to me, where he explicitly ascribed to me and then attacked (at length) a claim which I clearly stated that I didn’t hold in the parent comment. It’s amazing how difficult it is for the naive-eliminativist crowd to express cogent arguments or understand the positions which they attack, and a common pattern I’ve noticed across this forum as well as others.
Yes, I noticed he overlooked the distinction between “I know I am conscious because it’s my direct experience” and “I know I am conscious because I say ‘I know I am conscious because it’s my direct experience.’” And those are two entirely different things.
The first of those things is incompatible with the Zombie Universe Argument, if we take ‘knowledge’ to mean a probability that one could separate from the subjective experience. You can’t assume that direct experience is epiphenomenal, meaning it doesn’t cause any behavior or calculation directly, and then also assume, “I know I am conscious because it’s my direct experience”.
If it seems unfair to suggest that Chalmers doesn’t know he himself is conscious, remember that to our eyes Chalmers is the one creating the problem; we say that consciousness is a major cause of our beliefs about consciousness.
I don’t think experience is epiphenomenal. As I said, I disagree with the Zombie world argument as proposed.
Nonetheless, it is not true that the first of those things is incompatible with the Zombie argument, even taken in that way. Because knowing I am conscious, not the saying of the words but the being, would itself be epiphenomenal, according to that theory. So direct experience could be the cause of someone knowing that he was conscious, because both of those (experience and knowing) would be epiphenonomenal, so that experience would not be the cause of anything physical (e.g. such as producing sounds that sound like someone saying “I know I am conscious because it’s my direct experience.)
I don’t intend to get involved in another discussion, but a brief note:
This definition is from hairyfigment’s comment. Since you didn’t challenge his/her definition, I assume this means you agree with it. However, if we use this definition of “knowledge”, the second paragraph of your comment becomes irrelevant. (This, incidentally, was also the point I was making in my response to UmamiSalami.)