So, when are you going to tell us your solution to the hard problem of consciousness?
Edited to add: The above wasn’t meant as a sarcastic objection to Eliezer’s post. I’m totally convinced by his arguments, and even if I wasn’t I don’t think not having a solution to the hard problem is a greater problem for reductionism than for dualism (of any kind). I was seriously asking Eliezer to share his solution, because he seems to think he has one.
Not having a solution doesn’t prevent from criticizing an hypothesis or theory on the subject. I don’t know what are the prime factors of 4567613486214 but I know that “5” is not a valid answer (numbers having 5 among their prime factors end up with 5 or 0) and that “blue” doesn’t have the shape of a valid answer. So saying p-zombism and epiphenomenalism aren’t valid answers to the “hard problem of consciousness” doesn’t require having a solution to it.
Quite true, but if you follow the link in Furcas’s last paragraph (which may not have been there when you wrote your comment) you will see Eliezer more or less explicitly claiming to have a solution.
There’s saying it and saying it. If you say that a particular solution is particularly bad, that kind of inmplies a better solution somewhere. If you wanted to say that all known solutions are bad, you would presumably say something about all known solutions.
This re-posting was prompted by a Sean Carroll article, that argued along similar lines...epiphenomenalism (one of a number of possible alternatives to physicalism) is incredible, therefore no zombies.
There are a number of problems with this kind of thinking.
One is that there may be better dualisms than epiphenomenalism.
Another is that criticising epi. doesn’t show that there is a workable physical explanation of consciousness. There is no see-saw (titter-totter) effect whereby the wrongness of one theory implies the correctness of another. For one thing,there are more than two theories (see above). For another, an explanation has to explain...there are positive, absolute standards for explanation..you cannot say some Y is an an explanation, that it actually explains, just because some X is wrong, and Y is different to X. (The idea that physicalism is correct as an incomprehensible brute fact is known as the “new mysterianism” and probably isn’t what reductionists physicalists and rationalists are aiming at).
Carroll and others have put forward a philosophical version of a physical account of consciousness, one stating in general terms that consciousness is a high-level, emergent outcome, of fine-grained neurological activity. The zombie argument (Mary’s room, etc) are intended as handwaving philosophical arguments against that sort of argument. If the physicalist side had a scientific version of a physical account of consciousness, there would be no point in arguing against them philosophically, any more than there is a point in arguing philosophically against gravity. Scientific, as opposed to philosophical, theories are detailed and predictive, which allows them to be disproven or confirmed and not merely argued for or against.
And, given that there is no detailed, predictive explanation of consciousness, zombies are still imaginable, in a sense.
If someone claims they can imagine (in the sense of picturing) a hovering rock, you can show that it is not possible by writing down some high school physics. Zombies are imaginable in a stronger sense: not only can they be pictuured, but the picture cannot be refuted.
Another is that criticising epi. doesn’t show that there is a workable physical explanation of consciousness.
I feel like it’s gets halfway there though. Once you accept epiphenomenalism is nonsense, you are left with something like nonmaterial “souls” at best. That there is some real force that actually interacts with the world, and could be, in principle, observed, experimented with, and modelled in something like a computer simulation. Some chain of causes and effects lead you to say you “feel conscious”, and that chain could be, in principle, understood.
That seems to take all the magic out of it though. It’s no longer something that’s “beyond science”. It’s some set of laws that could be understood just like physics, just not the physics we know currently. If you are uncomfortable with the idea that we are “just atoms”, and don’t feel like that explains qualia or experience, just getting new laws of physics isn’t going to help. Then you have to confront the idea that maybe physics can explain experience.
. Once you accept epiphenomenalism is nonsense, you are left with something like nonmaterial “souls” at best
Perhaps, so long as you have also refuted physicalist monism.
That seems to take all the magic out of it though. It’s no longer something that’s “beyond science”. It’s some set of laws that could be understood just like physics, just not the physics we know currently. If you are uncomfortable with the idea that we are “just atoms”, and don’t feel like that explains qualia or experience, just getting new laws of physics isn’t going to help.
If you have a reason for thinking that no physics can possibly explain consciousness, then you would reject the Extra Physics family of theories, but if you beef is just with the present state of physics, then you might not.
Nice.
So, when are you going to tell us your solution to the hard problem of consciousness?
Edited to add: The above wasn’t meant as a sarcastic objection to Eliezer’s post. I’m totally convinced by his arguments, and even if I wasn’t I don’t think not having a solution to the hard problem is a greater problem for reductionism than for dualism (of any kind). I was seriously asking Eliezer to share his solution, because he seems to think he has one.
Not having a solution doesn’t prevent from criticizing an hypothesis or theory on the subject. I don’t know what are the prime factors of 4567613486214 but I know that “5” is not a valid answer (numbers having 5 among their prime factors end up with 5 or 0) and that “blue” doesn’t have the shape of a valid answer. So saying p-zombism and epiphenomenalism aren’t valid answers to the “hard problem of consciousness” doesn’t require having a solution to it.
Quite true, but if you follow the link in Furcas’s last paragraph (which may not have been there when you wrote your comment) you will see Eliezer more or less explicitly claiming to have a solution.
Yeah, I edited my comment after reading kilobug’s.
There’s saying it and saying it. If you say that a particular solution is particularly bad, that kind of inmplies a better solution somewhere. If you wanted to say that all known solutions are bad, you would presumably say something about all known solutions.
Snarky, but pertinent.
This re-posting was prompted by a Sean Carroll article, that argued along similar lines...epiphenomenalism (one of a number of possible alternatives to physicalism) is incredible, therefore no zombies.
There are a number of problems with this kind of thinking.
One is that there may be better dualisms than epiphenomenalism.
Another is that criticising epi. doesn’t show that there is a workable physical explanation of consciousness. There is no see-saw (titter-totter) effect whereby the wrongness of one theory implies the correctness of another. For one thing,there are more than two theories (see above). For another, an explanation has to explain...there are positive, absolute standards for explanation..you cannot say some Y is an an explanation, that it actually explains, just because some X is wrong, and Y is different to X. (The idea that physicalism is correct as an incomprehensible brute fact is known as the “new mysterianism” and probably isn’t what reductionists physicalists and rationalists are aiming at).
Carroll and others have put forward a philosophical version of a physical account of consciousness, one stating in general terms that consciousness is a high-level, emergent outcome, of fine-grained neurological activity. The zombie argument (Mary’s room, etc) are intended as handwaving philosophical arguments against that sort of argument. If the physicalist side had a scientific version of a physical account of consciousness, there would be no point in arguing against them philosophically, any more than there is a point in arguing philosophically against gravity. Scientific, as opposed to philosophical, theories are detailed and predictive, which allows them to be disproven or confirmed and not merely argued for or against.
And, given that there is no detailed, predictive explanation of consciousness, zombies are still imaginable, in a sense. If someone claims they can imagine (in the sense of picturing) a hovering rock, you can show that it is not possible by writing down some high school physics. Zombies are imaginable in a stronger sense: not only can they be pictuured, but the picture cannot be refuted.
Ahh, it wasn’t meant to be snarky. I saw an opportunity to try and get Eliezer to fess up, that’s all. :)
I feel like it’s gets halfway there though. Once you accept epiphenomenalism is nonsense, you are left with something like nonmaterial “souls” at best. That there is some real force that actually interacts with the world, and could be, in principle, observed, experimented with, and modelled in something like a computer simulation. Some chain of causes and effects lead you to say you “feel conscious”, and that chain could be, in principle, understood.
That seems to take all the magic out of it though. It’s no longer something that’s “beyond science”. It’s some set of laws that could be understood just like physics, just not the physics we know currently. If you are uncomfortable with the idea that we are “just atoms”, and don’t feel like that explains qualia or experience, just getting new laws of physics isn’t going to help. Then you have to confront the idea that maybe physics can explain experience.
Perhaps, so long as you have also refuted physicalist monism.
If you have a reason for thinking that no physics can possibly explain consciousness, then you would reject the Extra Physics family of theories, but if you beef is just with the present state of physics, then you might not.