I’ve always thought of that question as being more about the nature of identity itself.
If you lost your memories, would you still be the same being? If you compare a brain at two different points in time, is their ‘identity’ a continuum, or is it the type of quantity where there is a single agreed definition of “same” versus “not the same”?
Though I agree that the answer to a question that’s most fundamentally true (or of interest to a philosopher), isn’t necessarily going to be the answer that is most helpful in all circumstances.
I’ve always thought of that question as being more about the nature of identity itself.
If you lost your memories, would you still be the same being? If you compare a brain at two different points in time, is their ‘identity’ a continuum, or is it the type of quantity where there is a single agreed definition of “same” versus “not the same”?
See:
Though I agree that the answer to a question that’s most fundamentally true (or of interest to a philosopher), isn’t necessarily going to be the answer that is most helpful in all circumstances.