It requires quite a lot of things to go right. If your group is generally opposed, you need some authority that they’ll respond to that will stop them from protesting, either keeping the message secret from the authorities you’re trying to oppose, or without telling them the real reason in the first place. The assassinations have to be successful, without the assassins being caught, and present day assassinations frequently fail or are so difficult that they are not attempted in the first place. The authorities have to realize that pulling out would put an end to the deaths, but not decide to retaliate by further victimizing locals with an ultimatum that they’ll continue until the assassinations stop.
he assassinations have to be successful, without the assassins being caught
Successful obviously. Failing to assassinate people is a terrible strategy. But the ‘without being caught’ is by no means required. In fact for that group that gave the role it’s name getting away was not even a high priority. It was far more important to make the killing public and visible so as to best demoralize the enemy leaders.
The authorities have to realize that pulling out would put an end to the deaths, but not decide to retaliate by further victimizing locals with an ultimatum that they’ll continue until the assassinations stop.
Which of course moves things along to guerrilla warfare against an occupying force with terrible morale and weakened leadership. If your people are not in a position to overthrow the occupying force when they have that much motivation then you are pretty much screwed. My only advice is “don’t be you”.
It’s one thing for the assassins to die executing their missions like the Hashishin, another for them to be captured, at which point they become liabilities. Besides, if your group is revealed to be associated with assassinations, your opposition won’t stay secret.
The occupying force has a strong motive not to back down against weaker foes who show willingness to target their leaders, otherwise they give everyone else they might occupy the incentive to do the same. Besides pulling off repeated assassinations is hard. The Hashishin installed sleeper agents years, sometimes decades in advance, and improved documentation in the present day makes this even more difficult to do without getting caught.
The occupying force has a strong motive not to back down against weaker foes who show willingness to target their leaders, otherwise they give everyone else they might occupy the incentive to do the same.
Yes, monolithic entities obviously have a strong motive to not submit to power moves by other monolithic entities. This applies to peasants going on hunger strikes, silly walks and fighting conventional battles just as well.
But occupying forces are not monolithic entities. If a general has 1,000 of his soldiers killed in a battle with resistance then he has a strong personal incentive to send another 2,000 so that he does not look weak to his superiors. If a general and his household is killed then the replacement has a personal incentive to let the other general in the occupying force be the one who orders the next massacre. Or, better yet, he has an incentive to not vie so hard for the promotion and instead pull whatever strings he can to be reassigned as a lieutenant general back in a different province. (Downgrade the respective ranks as appropriate to the extent of the occupying force.)
Point is: If it comes a time to resist an enemy with violence target leaders with extreme prejudice. Don’t play by unwritten rules of polite warfare. Those favor the oppressor.
You also have a strong personal incentive not to assassinate if it most likely leads to capture, torture, and having your entire neighborhood purged.
I think you’re dramatically overestimating how easy it is to pull off a string of assassinations. Sure, you can keep attempting assassinations with force that’s not capable of effective resistance in a straight military conflict, but you’re likely to keep failing.
It’s one thing for the assassins to die executing their missions like the Hashishin, another for them to be captured, at which point they become liabilities.
The Ismailis (assassins) would often wait around, explicitly to be captured and tortured. If you are expecting to lose the asset, it isn’t a significant liability.
The Hashishin installed sleeper agents years, sometimes decades in advance, and improved documentation in the present day makes this even more difficult to do without getting caught.
This is the more significant concern, especially since most conflicts today are inter-ethnic rather than inter-religious. Convincing a Persian Muslim to join a different sect of Islam and then assassinate another Persian is very different from getting a Palestinian suicide-bomber within range of an Israeli politician.
Modern examples of a similar strategy- terrorists- seem to not be terribly effective at enacting their political goals. That may be because targeting leaders is more effective than targeting civilians or symbols, but it’s not clear to me that that is the case.
Modern examples of a similar strategy- terrorists- seem to not be terribly effective at enacting their political goals.
That’s far from the truth. Leaders seem to give them exactly what they want and the terrorists have success beyond anything they could have hoped for. At the rationalist boot camp we had some fun calculating the amount of economic damage caused by one attempted act of terrorism with a shoe bomb that failed. The extra time spent every day by Americans at airports waiting in lines to take off their shoes is hilarious (to anyone for whom costs measured in dollars do not have the instinctive salience that costs in pain and death do when multiplied out). Then there are the effects that 9/11 had on instilling fear (overt goal!), undermining legal rights and causing about a billion dollars worth of expenditure on war per 9/11 victim.
You obviously consider terrorism to not be successful and so we have a significant disagreement there but probably not one that we need to get into. Because ‘terrorism works’ is so incredibly political and it isn’t something I am trying to claim here. I would concede the point for the sake of the argument because I am not advocating terrorism (of the kind you describe).
Blowing up the oppressor’s civilians is terribly impractical. It just costs far too much in terms of lives of your people. Reserve blowing up the enemy’s civilians unless you have a way to make it look like it was the doing of a rival of your enemy—then it is just about perfect! No, you kill whichever enemy leader is the most hostile to your people. If the situation has escalated such that the enemy is making reprisals against civilians then you probably should expand the assassination to “leaders who ordered civilians killed plus their family if convenient”. Whatever it takes to make the replacement figure of power desperate to make the other guy be the one to take the initiative on the tyranny front.
It’s not always going to work—some fights can’t be won no matter what you do. Some fights aren’t worth fighting at all. And most of the time it is better to let some other guy do the fighting and dying for you if you can manage it.
That’s far from the truth. Leaders seem to give them exactly what they want and the terrorists have success beyond anything they could have hoped for. At the rationalist boot camp we had some fun calculating the amount of economic damage caused by one attempted act of terrorism with a shoe bomb that failed.
By “political goals” I meant things like “remove American soldiers from Saudi Arabia” not “divert American effort towards protection,” as we were originally discussing independence efforts rather than destructive efforts. I agree with you that terrorism is very effective at getting people to spend money on defense. What I am looking for, and do not see, is many terrorist groups that make the transition from oppressed minority to political leadership. The Tamil Tigers were crushed after 9/11 made funding terrorism passe, the IRA managed to get a truce with Britain but then turned on itself in a civil war. Palestine doesn’t seem much of a success story, given the dominance of Israel.
To the best of my knowledge, no contemporary group has tried the Ismaili strategy you advocate. I don’t know enough to say why.
I would bet against you heavily in most relevant counterfactual scenarios.
It requires quite a lot of things to go right. If your group is generally opposed, you need some authority that they’ll respond to that will stop them from protesting, either keeping the message secret from the authorities you’re trying to oppose, or without telling them the real reason in the first place. The assassinations have to be successful, without the assassins being caught, and present day assassinations frequently fail or are so difficult that they are not attempted in the first place. The authorities have to realize that pulling out would put an end to the deaths, but not decide to retaliate by further victimizing locals with an ultimatum that they’ll continue until the assassinations stop.
Successful obviously. Failing to assassinate people is a terrible strategy. But the ‘without being caught’ is by no means required. In fact for that group that gave the role it’s name getting away was not even a high priority. It was far more important to make the killing public and visible so as to best demoralize the enemy leaders.
Which of course moves things along to guerrilla warfare against an occupying force with terrible morale and weakened leadership. If your people are not in a position to overthrow the occupying force when they have that much motivation then you are pretty much screwed. My only advice is “don’t be you”.
It’s one thing for the assassins to die executing their missions like the Hashishin, another for them to be captured, at which point they become liabilities. Besides, if your group is revealed to be associated with assassinations, your opposition won’t stay secret.
The occupying force has a strong motive not to back down against weaker foes who show willingness to target their leaders, otherwise they give everyone else they might occupy the incentive to do the same. Besides pulling off repeated assassinations is hard. The Hashishin installed sleeper agents years, sometimes decades in advance, and improved documentation in the present day makes this even more difficult to do without getting caught.
Yes, monolithic entities obviously have a strong motive to not submit to power moves by other monolithic entities. This applies to peasants going on hunger strikes, silly walks and fighting conventional battles just as well.
But occupying forces are not monolithic entities. If a general has 1,000 of his soldiers killed in a battle with resistance then he has a strong personal incentive to send another 2,000 so that he does not look weak to his superiors. If a general and his household is killed then the replacement has a personal incentive to let the other general in the occupying force be the one who orders the next massacre. Or, better yet, he has an incentive to not vie so hard for the promotion and instead pull whatever strings he can to be reassigned as a lieutenant general back in a different province. (Downgrade the respective ranks as appropriate to the extent of the occupying force.)
Point is: If it comes a time to resist an enemy with violence target leaders with extreme prejudice. Don’t play by unwritten rules of polite warfare. Those favor the oppressor.
You also have a strong personal incentive not to assassinate if it most likely leads to capture, torture, and having your entire neighborhood purged.
I think you’re dramatically overestimating how easy it is to pull off a string of assassinations. Sure, you can keep attempting assassinations with force that’s not capable of effective resistance in a straight military conflict, but you’re likely to keep failing.
The Ismailis (assassins) would often wait around, explicitly to be captured and tortured. If you are expecting to lose the asset, it isn’t a significant liability.
This is the more significant concern, especially since most conflicts today are inter-ethnic rather than inter-religious. Convincing a Persian Muslim to join a different sect of Islam and then assassinate another Persian is very different from getting a Palestinian suicide-bomber within range of an Israeli politician.
Modern examples of a similar strategy- terrorists- seem to not be terribly effective at enacting their political goals. That may be because targeting leaders is more effective than targeting civilians or symbols, but it’s not clear to me that that is the case.
That’s far from the truth. Leaders seem to give them exactly what they want and the terrorists have success beyond anything they could have hoped for. At the rationalist boot camp we had some fun calculating the amount of economic damage caused by one attempted act of terrorism with a shoe bomb that failed. The extra time spent every day by Americans at airports waiting in lines to take off their shoes is hilarious (to anyone for whom costs measured in dollars do not have the instinctive salience that costs in pain and death do when multiplied out). Then there are the effects that 9/11 had on instilling fear (overt goal!), undermining legal rights and causing about a billion dollars worth of expenditure on war per 9/11 victim.
You obviously consider terrorism to not be successful and so we have a significant disagreement there but probably not one that we need to get into. Because ‘terrorism works’ is so incredibly political and it isn’t something I am trying to claim here. I would concede the point for the sake of the argument because I am not advocating terrorism (of the kind you describe).
Blowing up the oppressor’s civilians is terribly impractical. It just costs far too much in terms of lives of your people. Reserve blowing up the enemy’s civilians unless you have a way to make it look like it was the doing of a rival of your enemy—then it is just about perfect! No, you kill whichever enemy leader is the most hostile to your people. If the situation has escalated such that the enemy is making reprisals against civilians then you probably should expand the assassination to “leaders who ordered civilians killed plus their family if convenient”. Whatever it takes to make the replacement figure of power desperate to make the other guy be the one to take the initiative on the tyranny front.
It’s not always going to work—some fights can’t be won no matter what you do. Some fights aren’t worth fighting at all. And most of the time it is better to let some other guy do the fighting and dying for you if you can manage it.
By “political goals” I meant things like “remove American soldiers from Saudi Arabia” not “divert American effort towards protection,” as we were originally discussing independence efforts rather than destructive efforts. I agree with you that terrorism is very effective at getting people to spend money on defense. What I am looking for, and do not see, is many terrorist groups that make the transition from oppressed minority to political leadership. The Tamil Tigers were crushed after 9/11 made funding terrorism passe, the IRA managed to get a truce with Britain but then turned on itself in a civil war. Palestine doesn’t seem much of a success story, given the dominance of Israel.
To the best of my knowledge, no contemporary group has tried the Ismaili strategy you advocate. I don’t know enough to say why.