Take any intuitive notion X, where people’s intuitions are generally a bit incoherent or poorly-thought-through—stream of consciousness, free will, divine grace, the voice in my head, etc.
(A) One thing you can say is: “X, when properly understood, is coherent, and here’s how to properly understand it …”
(B) Another you can say is: “X, as commonly understood by the average person, is incoherent, but hey let me tell you about these closely related concepts which are coherent and which rescue some or all of those intuitions about X that you find compelling …”
Fundamentally, neither of these strategies is right or wrong. You say tomato, I say to-mah-to. :)
This is one of many causes of those annoying debates that go around in circles, that I’m trying to declare out-of-scope for this series, cf. §1.6.2. :)
For science terminology like “acceleration”, we take approach (A). People often have incoherent intuitions about acceleration, and when they do, we prompt them to discard their “wrong” intuitions, leaving the “real” acceleration concept.
For more everyday terminology, (A) versus (B) is more of a judgment call—for example, some physicalists say “‘God’ doesn’t exist”, others say “‘God’ is just the term for order and beauty in the universe” or whatever. As another example, I read Elbow Room recently, and Dennett’s revised preface says that he’s taken approach (A) to “free will” for his whole career, but now he’s thinking that maybe all along he should have taken the (B) path and said “free will (as commonly understood) doesn’t exist”.
Anyway, I feel like my post section is pointing out that people’s everyday poorly-thought-through intuitions about “stream of consciousness” are a bit incoherent, but I didn’t go further than that by advocating for either (A) or (B). Whereas your comment is advocating for the (A) path, where we prod people to update their intuitions about what happens when they try to remember what happened one second ago.
I don’t think I agree with this framing. I wasn’t trying to say “people need to rethink their concept of awareness”; I was saying “you haven’t actually demonstrated that there is anything wrong with the naive concept of awareness because the counterexample isn’t a proper counterexample”.
I mean I’ve conceded that people will give this intuitive answer, but only because they’ll respond before they’ve actually run the experiment you suggest. I’m saying that as soon as you (generic you) actually do the thing the post suggested (i.e., look at what you remember at the point in time where you heard the first syllable of a word that you don’t yet recognize), you’ll notice that you do not, in fact, remember hearing & understanding the first part of the word. This doesn’t entail a shift in the understanding of awareness. People can view awareness exactly like they did before, I just want them to actually run the experiment before answering!
(And also this seems like a pretty conceptually straight-forward case—the overarching question is basically, “is there a specific data structure in the brain whose state corresponds to people’s experience at every point in time”—which I think captures the naive view of awareness—and I’m saying “the example doesn’t show that the answer is no”.)
Take any intuitive notion X, where people’s intuitions are generally a bit incoherent or poorly-thought-through—stream of consciousness, free will, divine grace, the voice in my head, etc.
(A) One thing you can say is: “X, when properly understood, is coherent, and here’s how to properly understand it …”
(B) Another you can say is: “X, as commonly understood by the average person, is incoherent, but hey let me tell you about these closely related concepts which are coherent and which rescue some or all of those intuitions about X that you find compelling …”
Fundamentally, neither of these strategies is right or wrong. You say tomato, I say to-mah-to. :)
This is one of many causes of those annoying debates that go around in circles, that I’m trying to declare out-of-scope for this series, cf. §1.6.2. :)
For science terminology like “acceleration”, we take approach (A). People often have incoherent intuitions about acceleration, and when they do, we prompt them to discard their “wrong” intuitions, leaving the “real” acceleration concept.
For more everyday terminology, (A) versus (B) is more of a judgment call—for example, some physicalists say “‘God’ doesn’t exist”, others say “‘God’ is just the term for order and beauty in the universe” or whatever. As another example, I read Elbow Room recently, and Dennett’s revised preface says that he’s taken approach (A) to “free will” for his whole career, but now he’s thinking that maybe all along he should have taken the (B) path and said “free will (as commonly understood) doesn’t exist”.
Anyway, I feel like my post section is pointing out that people’s everyday poorly-thought-through intuitions about “stream of consciousness” are a bit incoherent, but I didn’t go further than that by advocating for either (A) or (B). Whereas your comment is advocating for the (A) path, where we prod people to update their intuitions about what happens when they try to remember what happened one second ago.
I don’t think I agree with this framing. I wasn’t trying to say “people need to rethink their concept of awareness”; I was saying “you haven’t actually demonstrated that there is anything wrong with the naive concept of awareness because the counterexample isn’t a proper counterexample”.
I mean I’ve conceded that people will give this intuitive answer, but only because they’ll respond before they’ve actually run the experiment you suggest. I’m saying that as soon as you (generic you) actually do the thing the post suggested (i.e., look at what you remember at the point in time where you heard the first syllable of a word that you don’t yet recognize), you’ll notice that you do not, in fact, remember hearing & understanding the first part of the word. This doesn’t entail a shift in the understanding of awareness. People can view awareness exactly like they did before, I just want them to actually run the experiment before answering!
(And also this seems like a pretty conceptually straight-forward case—the overarching question is basically, “is there a specific data structure in the brain whose state corresponds to people’s experience at every point in time”—which I think captures the naive view of awareness—and I’m saying “the example doesn’t show that the answer is no”.)