Yes, incommensurability is the problem of translating from one theory into a later theory.
Aristotelian physics, from the point of view of Newtonian physics, is absolutely stupid. It’s like Aristotle wasn’t looking at the same reality. Overstating slightly to make a point, Newtonian physics, from the point of view of relativistic physics, is manifestly false. It’s like Newton wasn’t looking at the same reality. How many times must the circle repeat before the Bayesian conclusion is that the different scientists were not looking at the same reality? By the principle of incommensurability, you can’t say that the earlier theory can be massaged into a more simplistic version of the later theory.
If different scientists are looking at a different reality, how on earth did we keep making better predictions? Thus the appeal to the regularity of phenomena, which rescues the concept of scientific progress even if we think that our model is likely to be considered utter nonsense a generation or so into the future.
ETA: The social position of science is an expansion of the halo effect point I made.
Yes, incommensurability is the problem of translating from one theory into a later theory.
If different scientists are looking at a different reality, how on earth did we keep making better predictions? Thus the appeal to the regularity of phenomena, which rescues the concept of scientific progress even if we think that our model is likely to be considered utter nonsense a generation or so into the future.
ETA: The social position of science is an expansion of the halo effect point I made.