Mostly I only start paying attention to people’s opinions on these things once they’ve demonstrated that they can reason seriously about weird futures
[tl;dr This is an understandable thing to do, but does seem to result in biasing one’s sample towards higher x-risk estimates]
I can see the appeal of that principle. I partly apply such a principle myself (though in the form of giving less weight to some opinions, not ruling them out).
But what if it turns out the future won’t be weird in the ways you’re thinking of? Or what if it turns out that, even if it will be weird in those ways, influencing it is too hard, or just isn’t very urgent (i.e., the “hinge of history” is far from now), or is already too likely to turn out well “by default” (perhaps because future actors will also have mostly good intentions and will be more informed).
Under such conditions, it might be that the smartest people with the best judgement won’t demonstrate that they can reason seriously about weird futures, even if they hypothetically could, because it’s just not worth their time to do so. In the same way as how I haven’t demonstrated my ability to reason seriously about tax policy, because I think reasoning seriously about the long-term future is a better use of my time. Someone who starts off believing tax policy is an overwhelmingly big deal could then say “Well, Michael thinks the long-term future is what we should focus on instead, but how why should I trust Michael’s view on that when he hasn’t demonstrated he can reason seriously about the importance and consequences of tax policy?”
(I think I’m being inspired here by Trammell’s interested posting “But Have They Engaged With The Arguments?” There’s some LessWrong discussion—which I haven’t read—of an early version here.)
I in fact do believe we should focus on long-term impacts, and am dedicating my career to doing so, as influencing the long-term future seems sufficiently likely to be tractable, urgent, and important. But I think there are reasonable arguments against each of those claims, and I wouldn’t be very surprised if they turned out to all be wrong. (But I think currently we’ve only had a very small part of humanity working intensely and strategically on this topic for just ~15 years, so it would seem too early to assume there’s nothing we can usefully do here.)
And if so, it would be better to try to improve the short-term future, which further future people can’t help us with, and then it would make sense for the smart people with good judgement to not demonstrate their ability to think seriously about the long-term future. So under such conditions, the people left in the sample you pay attention to aren’t the smartest people with the best judgement, and are skewed towards unreasonably high estimates of the tractability, urgency, and/or importance of influencing the long-term future.
To emphasise: I really do want way more work on existential risks and longtermism more broadly! And I do think that, when it comes to those topics, we should pay more attention to “experts” who’ve thought a lot about those topics than to other people (even if we shouldn’t only pay attention to them). I just want us to be careful about things like echo chamber effects and biasing the sample of opinions we listen to.
[tl;dr This is an understandable thing to do, but does seem to result in biasing one’s sample towards higher x-risk estimates]
I can see the appeal of that principle. I partly apply such a principle myself (though in the form of giving less weight to some opinions, not ruling them out).
But what if it turns out the future won’t be weird in the ways you’re thinking of? Or what if it turns out that, even if it will be weird in those ways, influencing it is too hard, or just isn’t very urgent (i.e., the “hinge of history” is far from now), or is already too likely to turn out well “by default” (perhaps because future actors will also have mostly good intentions and will be more informed).
Under such conditions, it might be that the smartest people with the best judgement won’t demonstrate that they can reason seriously about weird futures, even if they hypothetically could, because it’s just not worth their time to do so. In the same way as how I haven’t demonstrated my ability to reason seriously about tax policy, because I think reasoning seriously about the long-term future is a better use of my time. Someone who starts off believing tax policy is an overwhelmingly big deal could then say “Well, Michael thinks the long-term future is what we should focus on instead, but how why should I trust Michael’s view on that when he hasn’t demonstrated he can reason seriously about the importance and consequences of tax policy?”
(I think I’m being inspired here by Trammell’s interested posting “But Have They Engaged With The Arguments?” There’s some LessWrong discussion—which I haven’t read—of an early version here.)
I in fact do believe we should focus on long-term impacts, and am dedicating my career to doing so, as influencing the long-term future seems sufficiently likely to be tractable, urgent, and important. But I think there are reasonable arguments against each of those claims, and I wouldn’t be very surprised if they turned out to all be wrong. (But I think currently we’ve only had a very small part of humanity working intensely and strategically on this topic for just ~15 years, so it would seem too early to assume there’s nothing we can usefully do here.)
And if so, it would be better to try to improve the short-term future, which further future people can’t help us with, and then it would make sense for the smart people with good judgement to not demonstrate their ability to think seriously about the long-term future. So under such conditions, the people left in the sample you pay attention to aren’t the smartest people with the best judgement, and are skewed towards unreasonably high estimates of the tractability, urgency, and/or importance of influencing the long-term future.
To emphasise: I really do want way more work on existential risks and longtermism more broadly! And I do think that, when it comes to those topics, we should pay more attention to “experts” who’ve thought a lot about those topics than to other people (even if we shouldn’t only pay attention to them). I just want us to be careful about things like echo chamber effects and biasing the sample of opinions we listen to.