The first follows from the second. (In that light, it’s obvious now that I put them in the wrong order.) If the pressure (real or imagined) to not say “obvious” things is lifted, that allows people to say things they otherwise could not. As a consequence, people who never would have thought of the supposed “obvious” thoughts are now figuratively allowed to think them by virtue of having seen them in the first place.
Sometimes, people hesitate to state the obvious because they falsely think the social norms or social consensus would disapprove. Cf. “The Emperor has no clothes.”
I once worked at a job where the decision-makers were notably conservative but the line workers were not. The line workers had a tendency to spin reports conservatively, even in situations when I think the decision-makers would not have naturally been as conservative.
Could you explain how you think that would work?
The first follows from the second. (In that light, it’s obvious now that I put them in the wrong order.) If the pressure (real or imagined) to not say “obvious” things is lifted, that allows people to say things they otherwise could not. As a consequence, people who never would have thought of the supposed “obvious” thoughts are now figuratively allowed to think them by virtue of having seen them in the first place.
That is not what Eliezer and Graham mean by “cannot think” and “can’t say” in the essays you linked.
Sometimes, people hesitate to state the obvious because they falsely think the social norms or social consensus would disapprove. Cf. “The Emperor has no clothes.”
I once worked at a job where the decision-makers were notably conservative but the line workers were not. The line workers had a tendency to spin reports conservatively, even in situations when I think the decision-makers would not have naturally been as conservative.
However, merely lifting a norm against saying obvious things is not going to solve that problem.