If Charles’s qualia have changed, that will be noticeable to Charles—introspection is hardly necessary, sinc ethe external world wil look different! But Charles won’t report the change.
I don’t think I understand what you’re saying here, what kind of change could you notice but not report?
If a change to the way your funcitonality is implemented alters how your consciousness seems to you, your consciosuness will seem different to you. If your funcitonality is preserved, you won’t be able to report it. You will
report tomatos are red even if they look grue or bleen to you. (You may also not be able to cognitively access—remember or think about—the change, if that is part of the preserved functionality, But if your experience changes, you can’t
fail to experience it).
Hmm, it seems to me that any change that affects your experience but not your reports must have also affected your memory. Otherwise you should be able to say that the color of tomatoes now seems darker or cooler or just different than it did before. Would you agree?
I don’t think I understand what you’re saying here, what kind of change could you notice but not report?
If a change to the way your funcitonality is implemented alters how your consciousness seems to you, your consciosuness will seem different to you. If your funcitonality is preserved, you won’t be able to report it. You will report tomatos are red even if they look grue or bleen to you. (You may also not be able to cognitively access—remember or think about—the change, if that is part of the preserved functionality, But if your experience changes, you can’t fail to experience it).
Hmm, it seems to me that any change that affects your experience but not your reports must have also affected your memory. Otherwise you should be able to say that the color of tomatoes now seems darker or cooler or just different than it did before. Would you agree?