1) What seems (un)likely to an individual depends on their assumptions. If you regard consc. as a form of information processing, thern there is very little inferrential gap to a conclusion of functionalism or computationalism.
But there is a Hard Problem of consc, precisely because some aspects—subjective experince, qualia—don’t have any theoretical or practical basis in functionalism of computer technology: we can build memory chips and write storage routines, but we can’t even get a start on building emotion chips or writing seeRed().
2) It’s not practical at the monent, and wouldn’t answer the theoretical questions.
1) What seems (un)likely to an individual depends on their assumptions. If you regard consc. as a form of information processing, thern there is very little inferrential gap to a conclusion of functionalism or computationalism. But there is a Hard Problem of consc, precisely because some aspects—subjective experince, qualia—don’t have any theoretical or practical basis in functionalism of computer technology: we can build memory chips and write storage routines, but we can’t even get a start on building emotion chips or writing seeRed().
2) It’s not practical at the monent, and wouldn’t answer the theoretical questions.