“Nope. I think that you focused on, to quote you, “egalitarianism, equality, and communitarianism” to the exclusion of other values. Notice how the terminal desires that we’ve been talking about in this sub-thread do not include any of those.”
As I said in the other comment thread, it’s an issue of universalizability of moral laws. It’s inconsistent to write a moral rule stating that any one person ought to be sacrificed for another against his/her will because it’s not what I would consent to myself. Similarly, it’s inconsistent with reality to state a moral rule saying that everyone ought to own an entire continent by themselves. Unless you start from a base of egalitarianism and equality, nothing a person can say has any merit because anything which conflicts with those values is ultimately hypocritical and inconsistent.
“Sure. There’s only one problem with that—ideas similar to yours were quite popular at the beginning of the XX century. They were also “different concepts” aiming to do better than capitalism. What was the price for trying them out?”
Undoubtedly quite high, but as a consequentialist and utilitarian, I see no problem in saying that, if they had worked out in reaching their ends, they would’ve been worth it from the perspective of someone who believed in those ends. The ends always justify the means because from the perspective of our consciousness, time only ever moves forward.
I’d like to think I’d be willing to sacrifice myself for some greater good if I agreed with it and thought my sacrifice would help achieve it. I’ll concede I might chicken out—I’m only human—but that would be a poor thing for me to do.
Unless you start from a base of egalitarianism and equality, nothing a person can say has any merit
You may want to think carefully about this claim. Assuming charitably that you are only talking about moral questions not other statements, this ignores the issue that even if one thinks that “egalitarianism and equality” should be basic moral axioms, one can still have derived common conclusions from a different moral base. For example, Lumifer and you almost certainly both think that say torturing cats is wrong and that deliberate genocide of human populations is also wrong (for a suitably narrow definition of genocide). So any conclusion Lumifer draw from those results will still be valid in your moral framework.
To use a different analogy, one person might be using ZFC as their axioms for math, while another uses ZF with Foundation replaced by the axiom of Anti-Foundation. The two will derive different theorems, but the vast majority of mathematics will be agreed on by both people. It wouldn’t make sense for the Foundationalist to ignore a proof that the Anti-Foundationalist did that only used Peano Artihmetic.
As I said in response to Lumifer’s post, the problem is this still leaves it up to chance. We may come to the same conclusions on one thing or another, but that is purely by accident, and if we should begin to come up with different moral axioms, I have no reason to respect his viewpoint if a.) I have no guarantee that he’ll respect mine, or b.) I have no axiom which states that I should respect other moral frameworks even if they’re different from mine. Certainly, there are many instances in which both parties to a discussion discover an idea they agree upon, but the debate continues because of how the agreement was come upon, when it shouldn’t matter.
We may come to the same conclusions on one thing or another, but that is purely by accident,
You may want to look at the ZFC example again. Is the shared commonality of Peano Arithmetic there purely by accident?
In general, humans occupy a pretty small piece of mindspace, and the ethical and moral attitudes of people influenced by Western thought occupies a small piece of that.
a.) I have no guarantee that he’ll respect mine, or b.) I have no axiom which states that I should respect other moral frameworks even if they’re different from mine.
I’m confused by a how a guarantee why personal respect is necessary. It doesn’t impact whether or not one of his arguments should be at all persuasive. As to the second, given your emphasis on equality and egalitarianism, I’m surprised that some form of respect for other moral frameworks would fall out from that.
Unless you start from a base of egalitarianism and equality, nothing a person can say has any merit
I think we’ll have to disagree about that.
I’d like to think I’d be willing to sacrifice myself
The point of that mention of history wasn’t that certain people were ready to sacrifice themselves. The point was that they were perfectly willing to sacrifice others.
If people aren’t treated as though they’re inherently equal, then why should any one person’s agency or vision be respected? If I’m not willing to abide by the obligation created by the existence of others’ rights, what obligation do others have to abide by the existence of my rights? And if there is no obligation in either direction, to what extent can we be said to have or acknowledge the existence of rights? I think you’d agree: none at all.
“The point of that mention of history wasn’t that certain people were ready to sacrifice themselves. The point was that they were perfectly willing to sacrifice others.”
You’ve been pointing out, throughout much of our discussion, a common definition of rights: they are both the right itself and an accompanying obligation. It’s misguided to expect a moral right without any accompanying obligation to hold much water, because whether something is a right or obligation is just a matter of perspective between the two different parties who claim them. E.g., I have a right to free religion, but this appears to be an obligation for others not to restrict my religious practice, and vice versa. It’s basic social contract theory, really, the only dysfunction in it arising when not all people affected by it are given equal say in its construction, hence the importance of egalitarianism and democracy.
Besides, we already have a form of voluntary sacrifice of agency which is practiced on a global scale; private property. We use private property laws because, while I may want to exercise my agency to get some of the resources someone else accumulates, I can’t condone thievery and pillaging because I wouldn’t want it to happen to me. So it doesn’t seem totally out-there to suggest this mutual-benefit mentality could be shifted away from or extended past private property to something else (and it seems to me that we have done that quite a lot already, e.g. laws against violence or in protection of intellectual property). I’m just suggesting a new kind of property right, but I think we’ve talked about that particular idea enough for now.
If people aren’t treated as though they’re inherently equal, then why should any one person’s agency or vision be respected?
I recommend observing real life and learning history. People have rarely been treated as inherently equal and yet it very often happened that “one person’s agency or vision” was respected.
Do note that people’s capabilities vary greatly and reality doesn’t care at all about equality or fairness.
whether something is a right or obligation is just a matter of perspective between the two different parties who claim them.
Yes, this is correct, but I don’t see how is this related to the willingness to sacrifice others.
“I recommend observing real life and learning history. People have rarely been treated as inherently equal and yet it very often happened that “one person’s agency or vision” was respected. Do note that people’s capabilities vary greatly and reality doesn’t care at all about equality or fairness.”
That essentially relies on chance. A person’s agency is most likely to be respected by me if, by chance, I see that person as roughly my equal. Most people don’t worry about violating the agency of a dog nearly as much as they worry about violating the agency of another human (although this obviously depends on one’s definition of personhood). The agency of African American people in the U.S. was frequently violated because they were perceived as being different from, and lesser than, white people.
Proximity plays a noted role, here. There’s generally a greater concern for the agency of those near you than those you don’t know about, because the only violations of agency you care about are those that seem to be a threat to you. I just think that personhood is a valuable enough thing that we ought to be more systemic in how we protect the agency of things which fit whatever definition of personhood we agree to.
“Yes, this is correct, but I don’t see how is this related to the willingness to sacrifice others.”
You cannot say that there is a right for you to sacrifice other people against their will, because, definitionally, you cannot willingly abide by the obligation to sacrifice yourself against your will for other people.
You cannot say that there is a right for you to sacrifice other people against their will, because, definitionally, you cannot willingly abide by the obligation to sacrifice yourself against your will for other people.
That is subject to the “what counts as the ‘same thing’?” objection. I would indeed willingly abide by the obligation to sacrifice non-Jiro people for Jiro so by your reasoning it’s okay to expect other people to abide by the same thing.
A person’s agency is most likely to be respected by me if, by chance, I see that person as roughly my equal.
No, I don’t think so. I think a person’s agency is most likely to be respected by you if that person has shown you evidence that he is superior to you.
“Nope. I think that you focused on, to quote you, “egalitarianism, equality, and communitarianism” to the exclusion of other values. Notice how the terminal desires that we’ve been talking about in this sub-thread do not include any of those.”
As I said in the other comment thread, it’s an issue of universalizability of moral laws. It’s inconsistent to write a moral rule stating that any one person ought to be sacrificed for another against his/her will because it’s not what I would consent to myself. Similarly, it’s inconsistent with reality to state a moral rule saying that everyone ought to own an entire continent by themselves. Unless you start from a base of egalitarianism and equality, nothing a person can say has any merit because anything which conflicts with those values is ultimately hypocritical and inconsistent.
“Sure. There’s only one problem with that—ideas similar to yours were quite popular at the beginning of the XX century. They were also “different concepts” aiming to do better than capitalism. What was the price for trying them out?”
Undoubtedly quite high, but as a consequentialist and utilitarian, I see no problem in saying that, if they had worked out in reaching their ends, they would’ve been worth it from the perspective of someone who believed in those ends. The ends always justify the means because from the perspective of our consciousness, time only ever moves forward.
I’d like to think I’d be willing to sacrifice myself for some greater good if I agreed with it and thought my sacrifice would help achieve it. I’ll concede I might chicken out—I’m only human—but that would be a poor thing for me to do.
You may want to think carefully about this claim. Assuming charitably that you are only talking about moral questions not other statements, this ignores the issue that even if one thinks that “egalitarianism and equality” should be basic moral axioms, one can still have derived common conclusions from a different moral base. For example, Lumifer and you almost certainly both think that say torturing cats is wrong and that deliberate genocide of human populations is also wrong (for a suitably narrow definition of genocide). So any conclusion Lumifer draw from those results will still be valid in your moral framework.
To use a different analogy, one person might be using ZFC as their axioms for math, while another uses ZF with Foundation replaced by the axiom of Anti-Foundation. The two will derive different theorems, but the vast majority of mathematics will be agreed on by both people. It wouldn’t make sense for the Foundationalist to ignore a proof that the Anti-Foundationalist did that only used Peano Artihmetic.
As I said in response to Lumifer’s post, the problem is this still leaves it up to chance. We may come to the same conclusions on one thing or another, but that is purely by accident, and if we should begin to come up with different moral axioms, I have no reason to respect his viewpoint if a.) I have no guarantee that he’ll respect mine, or b.) I have no axiom which states that I should respect other moral frameworks even if they’re different from mine. Certainly, there are many instances in which both parties to a discussion discover an idea they agree upon, but the debate continues because of how the agreement was come upon, when it shouldn’t matter.
You may want to look at the ZFC example again. Is the shared commonality of Peano Arithmetic there purely by accident?
In general, humans occupy a pretty small piece of mindspace, and the ethical and moral attitudes of people influenced by Western thought occupies a small piece of that.
I’m confused by a how a guarantee why personal respect is necessary. It doesn’t impact whether or not one of his arguments should be at all persuasive. As to the second, given your emphasis on equality and egalitarianism, I’m surprised that some form of respect for other moral frameworks would fall out from that.
I think we’ll have to disagree about that.
The point of that mention of history wasn’t that certain people were ready to sacrifice themselves. The point was that they were perfectly willing to sacrifice others.
If people aren’t treated as though they’re inherently equal, then why should any one person’s agency or vision be respected? If I’m not willing to abide by the obligation created by the existence of others’ rights, what obligation do others have to abide by the existence of my rights? And if there is no obligation in either direction, to what extent can we be said to have or acknowledge the existence of rights? I think you’d agree: none at all.
“The point of that mention of history wasn’t that certain people were ready to sacrifice themselves. The point was that they were perfectly willing to sacrifice others.”
You’ve been pointing out, throughout much of our discussion, a common definition of rights: they are both the right itself and an accompanying obligation. It’s misguided to expect a moral right without any accompanying obligation to hold much water, because whether something is a right or obligation is just a matter of perspective between the two different parties who claim them. E.g., I have a right to free religion, but this appears to be an obligation for others not to restrict my religious practice, and vice versa. It’s basic social contract theory, really, the only dysfunction in it arising when not all people affected by it are given equal say in its construction, hence the importance of egalitarianism and democracy.
Besides, we already have a form of voluntary sacrifice of agency which is practiced on a global scale; private property. We use private property laws because, while I may want to exercise my agency to get some of the resources someone else accumulates, I can’t condone thievery and pillaging because I wouldn’t want it to happen to me. So it doesn’t seem totally out-there to suggest this mutual-benefit mentality could be shifted away from or extended past private property to something else (and it seems to me that we have done that quite a lot already, e.g. laws against violence or in protection of intellectual property). I’m just suggesting a new kind of property right, but I think we’ve talked about that particular idea enough for now.
I recommend observing real life and learning history. People have rarely been treated as inherently equal and yet it very often happened that “one person’s agency or vision” was respected.
Do note that people’s capabilities vary greatly and reality doesn’t care at all about equality or fairness.
Yes, this is correct, but I don’t see how is this related to the willingness to sacrifice others.
“I recommend observing real life and learning history. People have rarely been treated as inherently equal and yet it very often happened that “one person’s agency or vision” was respected. Do note that people’s capabilities vary greatly and reality doesn’t care at all about equality or fairness.”
That essentially relies on chance. A person’s agency is most likely to be respected by me if, by chance, I see that person as roughly my equal. Most people don’t worry about violating the agency of a dog nearly as much as they worry about violating the agency of another human (although this obviously depends on one’s definition of personhood). The agency of African American people in the U.S. was frequently violated because they were perceived as being different from, and lesser than, white people.
Proximity plays a noted role, here. There’s generally a greater concern for the agency of those near you than those you don’t know about, because the only violations of agency you care about are those that seem to be a threat to you. I just think that personhood is a valuable enough thing that we ought to be more systemic in how we protect the agency of things which fit whatever definition of personhood we agree to.
“Yes, this is correct, but I don’t see how is this related to the willingness to sacrifice others.”
You cannot say that there is a right for you to sacrifice other people against their will, because, definitionally, you cannot willingly abide by the obligation to sacrifice yourself against your will for other people.
That is subject to the “what counts as the ‘same thing’?” objection. I would indeed willingly abide by the obligation to sacrifice non-Jiro people for Jiro so by your reasoning it’s okay to expect other people to abide by the same thing.
No, I don’t think so. I think a person’s agency is most likely to be respected by you if that person has shown you evidence that he is superior to you.