Unless you start from a base of egalitarianism and equality, nothing a person can say has any merit
I think we’ll have to disagree about that.
I’d like to think I’d be willing to sacrifice myself
The point of that mention of history wasn’t that certain people were ready to sacrifice themselves. The point was that they were perfectly willing to sacrifice others.
If people aren’t treated as though they’re inherently equal, then why should any one person’s agency or vision be respected? If I’m not willing to abide by the obligation created by the existence of others’ rights, what obligation do others have to abide by the existence of my rights? And if there is no obligation in either direction, to what extent can we be said to have or acknowledge the existence of rights? I think you’d agree: none at all.
“The point of that mention of history wasn’t that certain people were ready to sacrifice themselves. The point was that they were perfectly willing to sacrifice others.”
You’ve been pointing out, throughout much of our discussion, a common definition of rights: they are both the right itself and an accompanying obligation. It’s misguided to expect a moral right without any accompanying obligation to hold much water, because whether something is a right or obligation is just a matter of perspective between the two different parties who claim them. E.g., I have a right to free religion, but this appears to be an obligation for others not to restrict my religious practice, and vice versa. It’s basic social contract theory, really, the only dysfunction in it arising when not all people affected by it are given equal say in its construction, hence the importance of egalitarianism and democracy.
Besides, we already have a form of voluntary sacrifice of agency which is practiced on a global scale; private property. We use private property laws because, while I may want to exercise my agency to get some of the resources someone else accumulates, I can’t condone thievery and pillaging because I wouldn’t want it to happen to me. So it doesn’t seem totally out-there to suggest this mutual-benefit mentality could be shifted away from or extended past private property to something else (and it seems to me that we have done that quite a lot already, e.g. laws against violence or in protection of intellectual property). I’m just suggesting a new kind of property right, but I think we’ve talked about that particular idea enough for now.
If people aren’t treated as though they’re inherently equal, then why should any one person’s agency or vision be respected?
I recommend observing real life and learning history. People have rarely been treated as inherently equal and yet it very often happened that “one person’s agency or vision” was respected.
Do note that people’s capabilities vary greatly and reality doesn’t care at all about equality or fairness.
whether something is a right or obligation is just a matter of perspective between the two different parties who claim them.
Yes, this is correct, but I don’t see how is this related to the willingness to sacrifice others.
“I recommend observing real life and learning history. People have rarely been treated as inherently equal and yet it very often happened that “one person’s agency or vision” was respected. Do note that people’s capabilities vary greatly and reality doesn’t care at all about equality or fairness.”
That essentially relies on chance. A person’s agency is most likely to be respected by me if, by chance, I see that person as roughly my equal. Most people don’t worry about violating the agency of a dog nearly as much as they worry about violating the agency of another human (although this obviously depends on one’s definition of personhood). The agency of African American people in the U.S. was frequently violated because they were perceived as being different from, and lesser than, white people.
Proximity plays a noted role, here. There’s generally a greater concern for the agency of those near you than those you don’t know about, because the only violations of agency you care about are those that seem to be a threat to you. I just think that personhood is a valuable enough thing that we ought to be more systemic in how we protect the agency of things which fit whatever definition of personhood we agree to.
“Yes, this is correct, but I don’t see how is this related to the willingness to sacrifice others.”
You cannot say that there is a right for you to sacrifice other people against their will, because, definitionally, you cannot willingly abide by the obligation to sacrifice yourself against your will for other people.
You cannot say that there is a right for you to sacrifice other people against their will, because, definitionally, you cannot willingly abide by the obligation to sacrifice yourself against your will for other people.
That is subject to the “what counts as the ‘same thing’?” objection. I would indeed willingly abide by the obligation to sacrifice non-Jiro people for Jiro so by your reasoning it’s okay to expect other people to abide by the same thing.
A person’s agency is most likely to be respected by me if, by chance, I see that person as roughly my equal.
No, I don’t think so. I think a person’s agency is most likely to be respected by you if that person has shown you evidence that he is superior to you.
I think we’ll have to disagree about that.
The point of that mention of history wasn’t that certain people were ready to sacrifice themselves. The point was that they were perfectly willing to sacrifice others.
If people aren’t treated as though they’re inherently equal, then why should any one person’s agency or vision be respected? If I’m not willing to abide by the obligation created by the existence of others’ rights, what obligation do others have to abide by the existence of my rights? And if there is no obligation in either direction, to what extent can we be said to have or acknowledge the existence of rights? I think you’d agree: none at all.
“The point of that mention of history wasn’t that certain people were ready to sacrifice themselves. The point was that they were perfectly willing to sacrifice others.”
You’ve been pointing out, throughout much of our discussion, a common definition of rights: they are both the right itself and an accompanying obligation. It’s misguided to expect a moral right without any accompanying obligation to hold much water, because whether something is a right or obligation is just a matter of perspective between the two different parties who claim them. E.g., I have a right to free religion, but this appears to be an obligation for others not to restrict my religious practice, and vice versa. It’s basic social contract theory, really, the only dysfunction in it arising when not all people affected by it are given equal say in its construction, hence the importance of egalitarianism and democracy.
Besides, we already have a form of voluntary sacrifice of agency which is practiced on a global scale; private property. We use private property laws because, while I may want to exercise my agency to get some of the resources someone else accumulates, I can’t condone thievery and pillaging because I wouldn’t want it to happen to me. So it doesn’t seem totally out-there to suggest this mutual-benefit mentality could be shifted away from or extended past private property to something else (and it seems to me that we have done that quite a lot already, e.g. laws against violence or in protection of intellectual property). I’m just suggesting a new kind of property right, but I think we’ve talked about that particular idea enough for now.
I recommend observing real life and learning history. People have rarely been treated as inherently equal and yet it very often happened that “one person’s agency or vision” was respected.
Do note that people’s capabilities vary greatly and reality doesn’t care at all about equality or fairness.
Yes, this is correct, but I don’t see how is this related to the willingness to sacrifice others.
“I recommend observing real life and learning history. People have rarely been treated as inherently equal and yet it very often happened that “one person’s agency or vision” was respected. Do note that people’s capabilities vary greatly and reality doesn’t care at all about equality or fairness.”
That essentially relies on chance. A person’s agency is most likely to be respected by me if, by chance, I see that person as roughly my equal. Most people don’t worry about violating the agency of a dog nearly as much as they worry about violating the agency of another human (although this obviously depends on one’s definition of personhood). The agency of African American people in the U.S. was frequently violated because they were perceived as being different from, and lesser than, white people.
Proximity plays a noted role, here. There’s generally a greater concern for the agency of those near you than those you don’t know about, because the only violations of agency you care about are those that seem to be a threat to you. I just think that personhood is a valuable enough thing that we ought to be more systemic in how we protect the agency of things which fit whatever definition of personhood we agree to.
“Yes, this is correct, but I don’t see how is this related to the willingness to sacrifice others.”
You cannot say that there is a right for you to sacrifice other people against their will, because, definitionally, you cannot willingly abide by the obligation to sacrifice yourself against your will for other people.
That is subject to the “what counts as the ‘same thing’?” objection. I would indeed willingly abide by the obligation to sacrifice non-Jiro people for Jiro so by your reasoning it’s okay to expect other people to abide by the same thing.
No, I don’t think so. I think a person’s agency is most likely to be respected by you if that person has shown you evidence that he is superior to you.