Not a great example. “But if one could prove that the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, that would constitute a disproof of X.”—where X is free will? Probably not by many definitions of it.
In general, I don’t see how this question is different from “what a Bayesian should do” with any other probabilistic statement.
One of the ways in which it is different is that it is dealing with logical uncertainty, which has not yet received a conclusive formulation, as far as I’m aware.
ETA: Actually, I misread the OP. It talks about whether X will be proven, not whether it can be proven. So it’s not logical uncertainty. Retracting.
Not a great example. “But if one could prove that the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, that would constitute a disproof of X.”—where X is free will? Probably not by many definitions of it.
In general, I don’t see how this question is different from “what a Bayesian should do” with any other probabilistic statement.
One of the ways in which it is different is that it is dealing with logical uncertainty, which has not yet received a conclusive formulation, as far as I’m aware.
ETA: Actually, I misread the OP. It talks about whether X will be proven, not whether it can be proven. So it’s not logical uncertainty. Retracting.