This seems a bizarre way of thinking about it, to me. It’s as though you’d said “suppose there’s someone walking past Sam in the street, and Sam can shoot and kill them, ought Sam do it?” and I’d replied “well, I need to know how reliable a shot Sam is. If Sam’s odds of hitting the person are low enough, then it’s OK. And that depends on the make of gun, and how much training Sam has had, and...”
I mean, sure, in the real world, those are perhaps relevant factors (and perhaps not). But you’ve already told me to suppose that Sam can shoot and kill the passerby. If I assume that (which in the real world I would not be justified in simply assuming without evidence), the make of the gun no longer matters.
Similarly, I agree that if all I know is that Omega was right in 100 trials that I’ve heard of, I should lend greater credence to the hypothesis that there were >>100 trials, the successful 100 were cherrypicked, and Omega is not a particularly reliable predictor. This falls into the same category as assuming Omega is simply lying… sure, it’s highest-expected-value thing to do in an analogous situation that I might actually find myself in, but that’s different from what the problem assumes.
The problem assumes that I know Omega has an N% prediction rate. If I’m going to engage with the problem, I have to make that assumption. If I am unable to make that assumption, and instead make various other assumptions that are different, then I am unable to engage with the problem.
Which is OK… engaging with Newcombe’s problem is not a particularly important thing to be able to do. If I’m unable to do it, I can still lead a fulfilling life.
This seems a bizarre way of thinking about it, to me. It’s as though you’d said “suppose there’s someone walking past Sam in the street, and Sam can shoot and kill them, ought Sam do it?” and I’d replied “well, I need to know how reliable a shot Sam is. If Sam’s odds of hitting the person are low enough, then it’s OK. And that depends on the make of gun, and how much training Sam has had, and...”
I mean, sure, in the real world, those are perhaps relevant factors (and perhaps not). But you’ve already told me to suppose that Sam can shoot and kill the passerby. If I assume that (which in the real world I would not be justified in simply assuming without evidence), the make of the gun no longer matters.
Similarly, I agree that if all I know is that Omega was right in 100 trials that I’ve heard of, I should lend greater credence to the hypothesis that there were >>100 trials, the successful 100 were cherrypicked, and Omega is not a particularly reliable predictor. This falls into the same category as assuming Omega is simply lying… sure, it’s highest-expected-value thing to do in an analogous situation that I might actually find myself in, but that’s different from what the problem assumes.
The problem assumes that I know Omega has an N% prediction rate. If I’m going to engage with the problem, I have to make that assumption. If I am unable to make that assumption, and instead make various other assumptions that are different, then I am unable to engage with the problem.
Which is OK… engaging with Newcombe’s problem is not a particularly important thing to be able to do. If I’m unable to do it, I can still lead a fulfilling life.