The way I see it, causal decision theory simply ignores a part of the problem: that the Predictor is able to “predict”.
Evidence should get inside the equation, but not the same way as evidential decision theory: the evidence is what should fuel the hypothesis “The Predictor predicts our choices”.
It does not matter if we “think” that our “choice” shouldn’t change what’s inside the boxes—as the main thing about a prediction is that we aren’t actually making any “choice”, that “choice” is already predicted. It’s the whole “free will” illusion all over again, that we think our choices are ours, when the presence of such a Predictor would simply invalidate that hypothesis.
Causal decision theory should still work, but not with a reasoning that forgets about the Predictor. Since the Predictor is gone, our choice shouldn’t (and won’t) affect what’s in the boxes—but as our choice was predicted, accurately, and as we have supposedly enough evidence to infer this prediction, we should one box—and this won’t be a “choice”, it will simply have been predicted, and we’ll get the money.
I’m probably not being clear, and will try to say it another way.
“Choosing” to one box will simply mean that the Predictor had predicted that choice. “Choosing” to two box will also mean the same. It’s not a “choice” at all—our behavior will simply be deterministic. Therefore we should one box, even though that is not a real “choice”.
The features of the Predictor should appear in causal decision theory.
The way I see it, causal decision theory simply ignores a part of the problem: that the Predictor is able to “predict”.
Evidence should get inside the equation, but not the same way as evidential decision theory: the evidence is what should fuel the hypothesis “The Predictor predicts our choices”.
It does not matter if we “think” that our “choice” shouldn’t change what’s inside the boxes—as the main thing about a prediction is that we aren’t actually making any “choice”, that “choice” is already predicted. It’s the whole “free will” illusion all over again, that we think our choices are ours, when the presence of such a Predictor would simply invalidate that hypothesis.
Causal decision theory should still work, but not with a reasoning that forgets about the Predictor. Since the Predictor is gone, our choice shouldn’t (and won’t) affect what’s in the boxes—but as our choice was predicted, accurately, and as we have supposedly enough evidence to infer this prediction, we should one box—and this won’t be a “choice”, it will simply have been predicted, and we’ll get the money.
I’m probably not being clear, and will try to say it another way. “Choosing” to one box will simply mean that the Predictor had predicted that choice. “Choosing” to two box will also mean the same. It’s not a “choice” at all—our behavior will simply be deterministic. Therefore we should one box, even though that is not a real “choice”.
The features of the Predictor should appear in causal decision theory.