I’m confused about why this problem is different from other decision problems.
Given the problem statement, this is not an acausal situation. No physics is being disobeyed—Kramers Kronig still works, relativity still works. It’s completely reasonable that my choice could be predicted from my source code. Why isn’t this just another example of prior information being appropriately applied to a decision?
Am I dodging the question? Does EY’s new decision theory account for truly acausal situations? If I based my decision on the result of, say, a radioactive decay experiment performed after Omega left, could I still optimize?
I’m confused about why this problem is different from other decision problems.
Given the problem statement, this is not an acausal situation. No physics is being disobeyed—Kramers Kronig still works, relativity still works. It’s completely reasonable that my choice could be predicted from my source code. Why isn’t this just another example of prior information being appropriately applied to a decision?
Am I dodging the question? Does EY’s new decision theory account for truly acausal situations? If I based my decision on the result of, say, a radioactive decay experiment performed after Omega left, could I still optimize?