Yes, but it’s also clear that that would be a non-problem. What I mean is, there is no decision to make in such a problem, because, by assumption, the “you” referred to is a “you” that will give $5. There’s no need to think about what you “would” do because that’s already known.
But likewise, in Newcomb’s problem, the same thing is happening: by assumption, there is no decision left to make. At most, I can “decide” right now, so I make a good choice when the problem comes up, but for the problem as stated, my decision has already been made.
(Then again, it sounds like I’m making the error of fatalism there, but I’m not sure.)
So the fundamental puzzle of Omega is: what do you do if he tells you he has predicted you will give him $5?
And the answer is, “Whatever you want to do, but you want to give him $5.” I guess I’m missing the significance of all this.
Yes, but it’s also clear that that would be a non-problem. What I mean is, there is no decision to make in such a problem, because, by assumption, the “you” referred to is a “you” that will give $5. There’s no need to think about what you “would” do because that’s already known.
But likewise, in Newcomb’s problem, the same thing is happening: by assumption, there is no decision left to make. At most, I can “decide” right now, so I make a good choice when the problem comes up, but for the problem as stated, my decision has already been made.
(Then again, it sounds like I’m making the error of fatalism there, but I’m not sure.)
The problem I see is that then you (together with Omega’s prediction about you) becomes something like self-PA.
I thought it was obvious, but people are disagreeing with me, so… I don’t know what that means.