My answer is that you will give Omega $5. If you don’t, Omega wouldn’t have made the prediction. If Omega made the prediction AND you don’t give $5 than the definition of Omega is flawed and we have to redefine Omega.
I agree with that. I don’t expect a perfect predictor to make that prediction, though, but if it were made, then I’d find myself handing over the $5 for some reason or other.
Yes, you would expect that you would find yourself handing over the money. If told “Omega will soon predict that you will give him $5”, then you divide the universe into two categories—I will give over $5, or I won’t—and assign much greater probability to the first option.
But that is not a reason to give him $5 if you otherwise wouldn’t. It’s a reason to expect that there will compelling reasons to make you do it—but if these compelling reasons don’t materialise, there is no reason for you to act as if they were there.
I agree with that. I don’t expect a perfect predictor to make that prediction, though, but if it were made, then I’d find myself handing over the $5 for some reason or other.
Yes, you would expect that you would find yourself handing over the money. If told “Omega will soon predict that you will give him $5”, then you divide the universe into two categories—I will give over $5, or I won’t—and assign much greater probability to the first option.
But that is not a reason to give him $5 if you otherwise wouldn’t. It’s a reason to expect that there will compelling reasons to make you do it—but if these compelling reasons don’t materialise, there is no reason for you to act as if they were there.
Yes, I agree with this.