It becomes increasingly clear to me that I have no idea what the phrase “theory of mind” refers to in this discussion. It seems moderately clear to me that any observer capable of predicting the behavior of a class of minds has something I’m willing to consider a theory of mind, but that doesn’t seem to be consistent with your usage here. Can you expand on what you understand a theory of mind to be, in this context?
I’m understanding it in the typical way—the first paragraph here should be clear:
Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states—beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc.—to oneself and others and to understand that others have beliefs, desires and intentions that are different from one’s own.
An agent can model the effects of interventions on human populations (or even particular humans) without modeling their “mental states” at all.
That is, we’re talking about a hypothetical system that is capable of predicting that if it does certain things, I will subsequently act in certain ways, assert certain propositions as true, etc. etc, etc. Suppose we were faced with such a system, and you and I both agreed that it can make all of those predictions.Further suppose that you asserted that the system had a theory of mind, and I asserted that it didn’t.
It is not in the least bit clear to me what we we would actually be disagreeing about, how our anticipated experiences would differ, etc.
What is it that we would actually be disagreeing about, other than what English phrase to use to describe the system’s underlying model(s)?
What is it that we would actually be disagreeing about, other than what English phrase to use to describe the system’s underlying model(s)?
We would be disagreeing about the form of the system’s underlying models.
2 different strategies to consider:
I know that Steve believes that red blinking lights before 9 AM are a message from God that he has not been doing enough charity, so I can predict that he will give more money to charity if I show him a blinking light before 9 AM.
Steve seeing a red blinking light before 9 AM has historically resulted in a 20% increase of charitable donation for that day, so I can predict that he will give more money to charity if I show him a blinking light before 9 AM.
You can model humans with or without referring to their mental states. Both kinds of models are useful, depending on circumstance.
And the assertion here is that with strategy #2 I could also predict that if I asked Steve why he did that, he would say “because I saw a red blinking light this morning, which was a message from God that I haven’t been doing enough charity,” but that my underlying model would nevertheless not include anything that corresponds to Steve’s belief that red blinking lights are messages from God, merely an algorithm that happens to make those predictions in other ways.
So.. when we posit in this discussion a system that lacks a theory of mind in a sense that matters, are we positing a system that cannot make predictions like this one? I assume so, given what you just said, but I want to confirm.
Yes, I’d say so. It isn’t helpful here to say that a system lacks a theory of mind if it has a mechanism that allows it to make predictions about reported beliefs, intentions, etc.
Cool! This was precisely my concern. It sounded an awful lot like y’all were talking about a system that could make such predictions but somehow lacked a theory of mind. Thanks for clarifying.
It becomes increasingly clear to me that I have no idea what the phrase “theory of mind” refers to in this discussion. It seems moderately clear to me that any observer capable of predicting the behavior of a class of minds has something I’m willing to consider a theory of mind, but that doesn’t seem to be consistent with your usage here. Can you expand on what you understand a theory of mind to be, in this context?
I’m understanding it in the typical way—the first paragraph here should be clear:
An agent can model the effects of interventions on human populations (or even particular humans) without modeling their “mental states” at all.
Well, right, I read that article too.
But in this context I don’t get it.
That is, we’re talking about a hypothetical system that is capable of predicting that if it does certain things, I will subsequently act in certain ways, assert certain propositions as true, etc. etc, etc. Suppose we were faced with such a system, and you and I both agreed that it can make all of those predictions.Further suppose that you asserted that the system had a theory of mind, and I asserted that it didn’t.
It is not in the least bit clear to me what we we would actually be disagreeing about, how our anticipated experiences would differ, etc.
What is it that we would actually be disagreeing about, other than what English phrase to use to describe the system’s underlying model(s)?
We would be disagreeing about the form of the system’s underlying models.
2 different strategies to consider:
I know that Steve believes that red blinking lights before 9 AM are a message from God that he has not been doing enough charity, so I can predict that he will give more money to charity if I show him a blinking light before 9 AM.
Steve seeing a red blinking light before 9 AM has historically resulted in a 20% increase of charitable donation for that day, so I can predict that he will give more money to charity if I show him a blinking light before 9 AM.
You can model humans with or without referring to their mental states. Both kinds of models are useful, depending on circumstance.
And the assertion here is that with strategy #2 I could also predict that if I asked Steve why he did that, he would say “because I saw a red blinking light this morning, which was a message from God that I haven’t been doing enough charity,” but that my underlying model would nevertheless not include anything that corresponds to Steve’s belief that red blinking lights are messages from God, merely an algorithm that happens to make those predictions in other ways.
Yes?
Yes, that’s possible. It’s still possible that you could get a lot done with strategy #2 without being able to make that prediction.
I agree that if 2 systems have the same inputs and outputs, their internals don’t matter much here.
So.. when we posit in this discussion a system that lacks a theory of mind in a sense that matters, are we positing a system that cannot make predictions like this one? I assume so, given what you just said, but I want to confirm.
Yes, I’d say so. It isn’t helpful here to say that a system lacks a theory of mind if it has a mechanism that allows it to make predictions about reported beliefs, intentions, etc.
Cool! This was precisely my concern. It sounded an awful lot like y’all were talking about a system that could make such predictions but somehow lacked a theory of mind. Thanks for clarifying.
For me it denotes the ability to simulate other agents to various degrees of granularity. Possessing a mental model of another agent.