I’m curious what part of your comment you think I disagree with. I’m not arguing for “forcing a resolution”, except insofar as you need to sometimes actually make decisions under worldview uncertainty. In fact, “forcing a resolution” by forming “all-things-considered” credences is the thing I’m arguing against in this post.
I also agree that humans have lots of experience weighing up contradictory heuristics and model-fragments. I think all the mechanisms you gave for how humans might do these are consistent with the thing I’m advocating. In particular, “choose which heuristics to apply” or “search for a policy consistent with different model-fragments” seem like basically what the policy approach would recommend (e.g. searching for a policy consistent with both the Yudkowsky model-fragment and the Christiano model-fragment). By contrast, I don’t think this is an accurate description of the way most EAs currently think about epistemic deference, which is the concrete example I’m contrasting my approach against.
(My model here is that you see me as missing a mood, like I’m not being sufficiently anti-black-boxes. I also expect that my proposal sounds more extreme than it actually is, because for simplicity I’m focusing on the limiting case of having almost no ability to resolve disagreements between worldviews.)
Huh. Yeah, I got the impression from the post that you wanted to do something like replace “epistemic deference plus black-box tests of predictive accuracy” with “policy deference plus simulated negotiation”. And I do indeed feel like a missing anti-black-box mood is the main important problem with epistemic deference. But it’s plausible we’re just in violent agreement here :).
I’m curious what part of your comment you think I disagree with. I’m not arguing for “forcing a resolution”, except insofar as you need to sometimes actually make decisions under worldview uncertainty. In fact, “forcing a resolution” by forming “all-things-considered” credences is the thing I’m arguing against in this post.
I also agree that humans have lots of experience weighing up contradictory heuristics and model-fragments. I think all the mechanisms you gave for how humans might do these are consistent with the thing I’m advocating. In particular, “choose which heuristics to apply” or “search for a policy consistent with different model-fragments” seem like basically what the policy approach would recommend (e.g. searching for a policy consistent with both the Yudkowsky model-fragment and the Christiano model-fragment). By contrast, I don’t think this is an accurate description of the way most EAs currently think about epistemic deference, which is the concrete example I’m contrasting my approach against.
(My model here is that you see me as missing a mood, like I’m not being sufficiently anti-black-boxes. I also expect that my proposal sounds more extreme than it actually is, because for simplicity I’m focusing on the limiting case of having almost no ability to resolve disagreements between worldviews.)
Huh. Yeah, I got the impression from the post that you wanted to do something like replace “epistemic deference plus black-box tests of predictive accuracy” with “policy deference plus simulated negotiation”. And I do indeed feel like a missing anti-black-box mood is the main important problem with epistemic deference. But it’s plausible we’re just in violent agreement here :).