I don’t understand where the tension is supposed to come in. The idea that causation is in the mind, not in the world is part of the Humean tradition and has been a respected (although minority) position in philosophy for centuries. If anything, it seems to mesh particularly well with empiricist leaning philosophies (especially those with an anti-metaphysical stance).
I don’t understand where the tension is supposed to come in.
It just seems really weird to be able to correctly say that A caused B when, in fact, A had nothing to do with B. If that doesn’t seem weird to you, then O.K.
The idea that causation is in the mind, not in the world is part of the Humean tradition
I think that’s unclear; I side with those who think Hume was arguing for causal skepticism rather than some sort of subjectivism.
It just seems really weird to be able to correctly say that A caused B when, in fact, A had nothing to do with B. If that doesn’t seem weird to you, then O.K.
This point is completely independent of whether causation is “in the mind” or not. Also, correlated things do have something to do with each other (by definition!). What is at issue is whether this something is “out in the world” or “in your head”.
I think that’s unclear; I side with those who think Hume was arguing for causal skepticism rather than some sort of subjectivism.
Right, there is probably no consensus on Humean interpretation. In any case, Hume would predict with near certainty that a billiard ball that was struck by a second billiard ball would make a sound and roll away in regular manner, just the same as you would. But since he doesn’t need this “causal necessity” thing “out in the world” somewhere in order to coherently make the same prediction, your web-of-belief real estate seems to have lower rent than Hume’s.
It just seems really weird to be able to correctly say that A caused B when, in fact, A had nothing to do with B. If that doesn’t seem weird to you, then O.K.
“Causation is in the mind” does not imply “correlation is in the mind,” does it? I mean, assuming a deterministic interpretation of QM, causal determinism is pretty much a correct philosophical position. That means causality, in the Pearl sense, really is only in the mind. In the world, there are only interactions which happen according to mathematically regular rules.
You might as well talk about causality along the X-axis instead of the time axis: “the state of the universe at any point along the X axis can be known, with unlimited computing power and complete knowledge of any other Y,Z,T hyperplane.” If we were epistemically limited to a one-way view along the universe’s X-axis, and could see in both directions along the time axis, this would make sense.
I don’t understand where the tension is supposed to come in. The idea that causation is in the mind, not in the world is part of the Humean tradition and has been a respected (although minority) position in philosophy for centuries. If anything, it seems to mesh particularly well with empiricist leaning philosophies (especially those with an anti-metaphysical stance).
It just seems really weird to be able to correctly say that A caused B when, in fact, A had nothing to do with B. If that doesn’t seem weird to you, then O.K.
I think that’s unclear; I side with those who think Hume was arguing for causal skepticism rather than some sort of subjectivism.
This point is completely independent of whether causation is “in the mind” or not. Also, correlated things do have something to do with each other (by definition!). What is at issue is whether this something is “out in the world” or “in your head”.
Right, there is probably no consensus on Humean interpretation. In any case, Hume would predict with near certainty that a billiard ball that was struck by a second billiard ball would make a sound and roll away in regular manner, just the same as you would. But since he doesn’t need this “causal necessity” thing “out in the world” somewhere in order to coherently make the same prediction, your web-of-belief real estate seems to have lower rent than Hume’s.
“Causation is in the mind” does not imply “correlation is in the mind,” does it? I mean, assuming a deterministic interpretation of QM, causal determinism is pretty much a correct philosophical position. That means causality, in the Pearl sense, really is only in the mind. In the world, there are only interactions which happen according to mathematically regular rules.
You might as well talk about causality along the X-axis instead of the time axis: “the state of the universe at any point along the X axis can be known, with unlimited computing power and complete knowledge of any other Y,Z,T hyperplane.” If we were epistemically limited to a one-way view along the universe’s X-axis, and could see in both directions along the time axis, this would make sense.