In my very limited experience (which is mostly board games with some social situations thrown in), attempts to obscure publically discernible information to influence other people’s actions are often extremely counter-productive. If you don’t give people the full picture, then the most likely case is not that they discover nothing, but that they discover half the picture. And you don’t know in advance which half. This makes them extremely unpredictable. You want them to pick A in preference to B, but the half-picture they get drives them to pick C which is massively worse for everyone.
In board games I have played, if a slightly prisoner’s dilemma like situation arises, you are much more likely to get stung by someone who has either misunderstood the rules or has misunderstood the equilibrium than someone who knows what is going on. [As a concrete example, in the game Scyth a new player believed that they got mission completion points for each military victory, not just the first one. As they had already scored a victory another played reasoned they wouldn’t make a pointless attack. But they did make the pointless attack. It set them and their target back, giving the two players not involved in that battle a relative advantage.]
I agree with this.
In my very limited experience (which is mostly board games with some social situations thrown in), attempts to obscure publically discernible information to influence other people’s actions are often extremely counter-productive. If you don’t give people the full picture, then the most likely case is not that they discover nothing, but that they discover half the picture. And you don’t know in advance which half. This makes them extremely unpredictable. You want them to pick A in preference to B, but the half-picture they get drives them to pick C which is massively worse for everyone.
In board games I have played, if a slightly prisoner’s dilemma like situation arises, you are much more likely to get stung by someone who has either misunderstood the rules or has misunderstood the equilibrium than someone who knows what is going on. [As a concrete example, in the game Scyth a new player believed that they got mission completion points for each military victory, not just the first one. As they had already scored a victory another played reasoned they wouldn’t make a pointless attack. But they did make the pointless attack. It set them and their target back, giving the two players not involved in that battle a relative advantage.]
“The best swordsman does not fear the second best, he fears the worst since there’s no telling what that idiot is going to do.” [https://freakonomics.com/2011/10/rules-of-the-game/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThe%20best%20swordsman%20does%20not,can%20beat%20smartness%20and%20foresight%3F]
This best swordsman wants more people to know how to sword fight, not fewer.