My prediction is that this becomes a commitment race. A general is going to post something like “I am going to log off until the game begins, at which point I will immediately nuke without reading any messages.”, at which point the generals on the other side get to decide if 2 days of access to LessWrong for everyone is worth the reputational cost of being known as someone who doesn’t retaliate. Given what I know about LessWrong and how this entire game is framed, you’ll likely get more social capital from not retaliating, meaning the commitment works and everyone keeps access.
The real question is how committing to nuking affects your reputation. My guess is that it’s bad? I clearly made a mistake opting-in to this game, so maybe the civilians will be grateful that you didn’t destroy their access to LessWrong, but committing looks pretty bad to all the bystanders, many of whom make decisions at places like Manifund and may incorporate this information into if your next project gets funded.
My guess would be that a commitment to retaliation—including one that you don’t manage to announce to General Logoff before they log off—is positive, not negative, to one’s reputation around these here parts. Sophisticated decision theories have been popular for fifteen years, and “I retaliate to defection even when it’s costly to me and negative-net-welfare” reads to me as sophisticated, not shameworthy.
If a general of mine reads a blind commitment by General Logoff on the other side and does nuke back, I’ll think positively of them-and-all-my-generals. (Note: if they fire without seeing such a commitment, I’ll think negatively of them-and-all-my-generals, and update on whether I want them as collaborators in projects going forward.)
My prediction is that this becomes a commitment race. A general is going to post something like “I am going to log off until the game begins, at which point I will immediately nuke without reading any messages.”, at which point the generals on the other side get to decide if 2 days of access to LessWrong for everyone is worth the reputational cost of being known as someone who doesn’t retaliate. Given what I know about LessWrong and how this entire game is framed, you’ll likely get more social capital from not retaliating, meaning the commitment works and everyone keeps access.
The real question is how committing to nuking affects your reputation. My guess is that it’s bad? I clearly made a mistake opting-in to this game, so maybe the civilians will be grateful that you didn’t destroy their access to LessWrong, but committing looks pretty bad to all the bystanders, many of whom make decisions at places like Manifund and may incorporate this information into if your next project gets funded.
My guess would be that a commitment to retaliation—including one that you don’t manage to announce to General Logoff before they log off—is positive, not negative, to one’s reputation around these here parts. Sophisticated decision theories have been popular for fifteen years, and “I retaliate to defection even when it’s costly to me and negative-net-welfare” reads to me as sophisticated, not shameworthy.
If a general of mine reads a blind commitment by General Logoff on the other side and does nuke back, I’ll think positively of them-and-all-my-generals. (Note: if they fire without seeing such a commitment, I’ll think negatively of them-and-all-my-generals, and update on whether I want them as collaborators in projects going forward.)