This time I disagree with Eliezer...this experiment won’t convince me that 2+2=3...wouldn’t even convince me that physical maxim “everything goes somewhere” is wrong...I would find where the phones are (even if they sublimated). That still don’t make that an “imutable belief”.
There’s nothing wrong in switching lexically 3 and 4 ( S(2) = 4; S(4) = 3; S(3) = 5 )...sounds unuseful, and don’t attack Peano’s axioms. That would make me believe in 2+2=3.
To stop believing in the integer numbers, it’s needed to prove an inconsistency in Peano’s axioms (even if their representation is physical, inside the brain), and this experiment doesn’t prove that.
If the 2+2=3 gets usual in every empirical test I do, as suggested in this article (no matter how absurd it can seem to be), I wouldn’t stop believing in the integer numbers: I would have a NEW number system (axioms/definitions) with this characteristic (2+2=3). That’s a new model, and what was empirically falsified before, was the link between the old model and the physical reality I could note, but not the old model itself.
I’ve got curious about paraconsistent logics in this case...
This time I disagree with Eliezer...this experiment won’t convince me that 2+2=3...wouldn’t even convince me that physical maxim “everything goes somewhere” is wrong...I would find where the phones are (even if they sublimated). That still don’t make that an “imutable belief”.
There’s nothing wrong in switching lexically 3 and 4 ( S(2) = 4; S(4) = 3; S(3) = 5 )...sounds unuseful, and don’t attack Peano’s axioms. That would make me believe in 2+2=3.
To stop believing in the integer numbers, it’s needed to prove an inconsistency in Peano’s axioms (even if their representation is physical, inside the brain), and this experiment doesn’t prove that.
If the 2+2=3 gets usual in every empirical test I do, as suggested in this article (no matter how absurd it can seem to be), I wouldn’t stop believing in the integer numbers: I would have a NEW number system (axioms/definitions) with this characteristic (2+2=3). That’s a new model, and what was empirically falsified before, was the link between the old model and the physical reality I could note, but not the old model itself.
I’ve got curious about paraconsistent logics in this case...