For example, if $religion’s teachings correctly constrain expectations in verifiable ways, I expect such debates to look something like this:
Skeptic: “Why do you follow the teachings of $religion?”
Believer: “Because its teachings correctly constrain expectations. Here, I’ll show you: here’s a real-world situation. What do you expect to happen next?”
Skeptic: “I expect $A.”
Believer: “Well, applying $religion’s teachings I conclude that $B is more likely.”
Skeptic: “Excellent! Let’s see what happens.”
(lather, rinse, repeat)
Eventually one of them says to the other: “Huh. Yeah, it seems you were right!”
“$religion’s teachings correctly constrain expectations in verifiable ways”—that’s where it fails every time. That the universe was created 6000 years ago “should not be taken literally” now, though it was back when it was not testable. There is some nice stuff about it in HPMoR, Ch 22, Belief in Belief. There is no rational argument you can make that would change someone’s belief if they are determined to keep it. Our Mormon friend here is a typical example. An honestly religious person would say that “this is what I choose to believe, leave logic out of it.”
I’m not sure if you think I disagree with you, or if you’re just echoing me for emphasis.
Just to be clear, I was answering JGWeissman’s question: if a religion were correct, for at least that understanding of “correct” (which I endorse), that’s what I would expect debates with its followers to look like.
I’ve never encountered a religious tradition for which debates with its followers actually looked like that, which I take as evidence that no religious tradition I’m familiar with correctly constrains expectations in verifiable ways.
My point was that the reason you never encountered it is because it would imply rationality, which is incompatible with faith. Not to say that a religious person cannot be rational about other things, just not about their own beliefs. Thus “if a religion were correct” is not a meaningful statement.
I think your proposed explanation for the observed event is underdetermined by the evidence we’re discussing, but it could certainly be true.
Nevertheless, I’m still inclined to attend more to how well a practice is observed to constrain anticipated experience than to how rational its practitioners can be inferred to be on general principles… though I’ll grant you that inferrable level of rationality correlates pretty well to how much energy I’ll devote to making the observations in the first place.
First, it would be interesting to know how one can convince a neutral and mildly rational observer what it means for a given religion to be correct and explain how this correctness can be tested experimentally. I don’t have Yudkowsky’s imagination, so it’s not something I can easily conceive.
If I interpret JGW’s comment correctly, the rhetorical question wouldn’t suffer much were it phrased “If X were true, what would you expect debates with people who believed X was true to look like?”
The answer is that as humans speaking colloquially, they would first say “X is true” and then rattle off reasons, in the same format apologists use. This pattern of speaking does not strongly imply that the pattern of speaking was the pattern of thinking, it’s just how people speak.
Some people do think in this pattern, including many theists, so one can lose sight of the fact that the mode of speaking and mode of thinking are not perfectly correlated.
explain how this correctness can be tested experimentally
As hard as they try, I don’t think religions can avoid making testable claims. The untestable claim X is implicitly paired with the testable claim that one should believe X.
Even probabilistic beliefs are held because belief systems lead people to expect things. when confronted with inputs.
If a Unitarian Universalist says “(One ought to believe that) there is a 99.9% chance Jesus existed,” and the scientific consensus is “(One ought to believe that) there is a 99.5% chance Jesus existed,” and we fire up the ol’ AIXI and it outputs the latter, the UU is wrong even if Jesus existed as one historical character.
The UU might as well claim that the Noah’s ark tale literally happened, if he isn’t his belief system is in one way worse than the fundamentalist’s, as his contains the proposition “To hell with reality when it contradicts my religion, if I can defy it without doing so in a flagrant enough way that people notice, including myself”, whereas the latter’s contains the proposition “To hell with reality when it contradicts my religion.” Much simpler.
If a religion were correct, what would you expect debates with followers of that religion to look like?
Depends on what you mean by “correct”.
For example, if $religion’s teachings correctly constrain expectations in verifiable ways, I expect such debates to look something like this: Skeptic: “Why do you follow the teachings of $religion?” Believer: “Because its teachings correctly constrain expectations. Here, I’ll show you: here’s a real-world situation. What do you expect to happen next?” Skeptic: “I expect $A.” Believer: “Well, applying $religion’s teachings I conclude that $B is more likely.” Skeptic: “Excellent! Let’s see what happens.” (lather, rinse, repeat) Eventually one of them says to the other: “Huh. Yeah, it seems you were right!”
“$religion’s teachings correctly constrain expectations in verifiable ways”—that’s where it fails every time. That the universe was created 6000 years ago “should not be taken literally” now, though it was back when it was not testable. There is some nice stuff about it in HPMoR, Ch 22, Belief in Belief. There is no rational argument you can make that would change someone’s belief if they are determined to keep it. Our Mormon friend here is a typical example. An honestly religious person would say that “this is what I choose to believe, leave logic out of it.”
I’m not sure if you think I disagree with you, or if you’re just echoing me for emphasis.
Just to be clear, I was answering JGWeissman’s question: if a religion were correct, for at least that understanding of “correct” (which I endorse), that’s what I would expect debates with its followers to look like.
I’ve never encountered a religious tradition for which debates with its followers actually looked like that, which I take as evidence that no religious tradition I’m familiar with correctly constrains expectations in verifiable ways.
My point was that the reason you never encountered it is because it would imply rationality, which is incompatible with faith. Not to say that a religious person cannot be rational about other things, just not about their own beliefs. Thus “if a religion were correct” is not a meaningful statement.
Ah. Thanks for clarifying.
I think your proposed explanation for the observed event is underdetermined by the evidence we’re discussing, but it could certainly be true.
Nevertheless, I’m still inclined to attend more to how well a practice is observed to constrain anticipated experience than to how rational its practitioners can be inferred to be on general principles… though I’ll grant you that inferrable level of rationality correlates pretty well to how much energy I’ll devote to making the observations in the first place.
First, it would be interesting to know how one can convince a neutral and mildly rational observer what it means for a given religion to be correct and explain how this correctness can be tested experimentally. I don’t have Yudkowsky’s imagination, so it’s not something I can easily conceive.
If I interpret JGW’s comment correctly, the rhetorical question wouldn’t suffer much were it phrased “If X were true, what would you expect debates with people who believed X was true to look like?”
The answer is that as humans speaking colloquially, they would first say “X is true” and then rattle off reasons, in the same format apologists use. This pattern of speaking does not strongly imply that the pattern of speaking was the pattern of thinking, it’s just how people speak.
Some people do think in this pattern, including many theists, so one can lose sight of the fact that the mode of speaking and mode of thinking are not perfectly correlated.
As hard as they try, I don’t think religions can avoid making testable claims. The untestable claim X is implicitly paired with the testable claim that one should believe X.
Even probabilistic beliefs are held because belief systems lead people to expect things. when confronted with inputs.
If a Unitarian Universalist says “(One ought to believe that) there is a 99.9% chance Jesus existed,” and the scientific consensus is “(One ought to believe that) there is a 99.5% chance Jesus existed,” and we fire up the ol’ AIXI and it outputs the latter, the UU is wrong even if Jesus existed as one historical character.
The UU might as well claim that the Noah’s ark tale literally happened, if he isn’t his belief system is in one way worse than the fundamentalist’s, as his contains the proposition “To hell with reality when it contradicts my religion, if I can defy it without doing so in a flagrant enough way that people notice, including myself”, whereas the latter’s contains the proposition “To hell with reality when it contradicts my religion.” Much simpler.