Dalliard writes as if Shalizi is proposing the lots-of-independent-factors model as his best account of what intelligence is actually like:
In contrast, these results are not at all what one would have expected based on the theory of intelligence that Shalizi advocates. According to Shalizi’s model, g factors reflect only the average or sum of the particular abilities called for by a given test battery, with batteries comprising different tests therefore almost always yielding different g factors. (I have more to say about Shalizi’s preferred theory later in this post.)
Here is one thing Shalizi actually writes about this model (emphasis mine):
Now, I don’t mean to suggest this model of thousands of IID abilities adding up as a serious depiction of how thought works, or even of how intelligence test scores work. My point, like Thomson’s, is to show you that the signs which the g-mongers point to as evidence for its reality, for there having to be a single predominant common cause, actually indicate nothing of the kind.
It seems to me that Dalliard is, at best, not reading Shalizi charitably.
(On the other hand, I would find Shalizi’s argument more compelling if he offered a theory that (1) is at least kinda-credible as a model of how thought works, and (2) doesn’t have any underlying mechanism resembling “g”, and (3) fits the statistical data reasonably well.)
Dalliard writes as if Shalizi is proposing the lots-of-independent-factors model as his best account of what intelligence is actually like:
Here is one thing Shalizi actually writes about this model (emphasis mine):
It seems to me that Dalliard is, at best, not reading Shalizi charitably.
(On the other hand, I would find Shalizi’s argument more compelling if he offered a theory that (1) is at least kinda-credible as a model of how thought works, and (2) doesn’t have any underlying mechanism resembling “g”, and (3) fits the statistical data reasonably well.)