I’m not sure about it being the opposite of everyday uses of the word, but I think you are more or less correct. But there are further complications. For example, sometimes being a reductionist about something is presented as if it were an alternative to being a realist about that something, but there is no consistency in the application of that criterion. Utilitarians are generally classified as realists about ethics, while subjectivists are generally classified as non-realists about ethics, even though both make ethical claims reducible to psychological claims. My own preference is to taboo “realism” and insist that people be more specific about what they are claiming or denying, but this this position has, alas, not yet been widely adopted by the philosophical mainstream.
As for common language, I think what HM means is that a “realist” is usually someone who denies the existence of things, such as fairies. When people in international relations hold a realist) stance, they aren’t saying that they believe in something that their opponents don’t (as philosophers would), but that they believe in less, while their opponents hallucinate altruism or believe that treaties are ontologically basic objects.
I think you are wrong to say that utilitarians are generally classified as realists. They are only erratically so classified. When you say “even though both make ethical claims reducible to psychological claims,” it sounds like you are defining realism as cognitivism.
Utilitarians are generally classified as realists about ethics, while subjectivists are generally classified as non-realists about ethics, even though both make ethical claims reducible to psychological claims.
That’s because utilitarians make normative claims and subjectivists (of the kind you’re probably thinking of) don’t.
I’m not sure about it being the opposite of everyday uses of the word, but I think you are more or less correct. But there are further complications. For example, sometimes being a reductionist about something is presented as if it were an alternative to being a realist about that something, but there is no consistency in the application of that criterion. Utilitarians are generally classified as realists about ethics, while subjectivists are generally classified as non-realists about ethics, even though both make ethical claims reducible to psychological claims. My own preference is to taboo “realism” and insist that people be more specific about what they are claiming or denying, but this this position has, alas, not yet been widely adopted by the philosophical mainstream.
As for common language, I think what HM means is that a “realist” is usually someone who denies the existence of things, such as fairies. When people in international relations hold a realist) stance, they aren’t saying that they believe in something that their opponents don’t (as philosophers would), but that they believe in less, while their opponents hallucinate altruism or believe that treaties are ontologically basic objects.
I think you are wrong to say that utilitarians are generally classified as realists. They are only erratically so classified. When you say “even though both make ethical claims reducible to psychological claims,” it sounds like you are defining realism as cognitivism.
That’s because utilitarians make normative claims and subjectivists (of the kind you’re probably thinking of) don’t.