My point of view is that the winning thing to do here and the logical thing to do are the same.
If you want to understand my point of view or if you want me to understand your point of view, you need to tell me where you think logical and winning diverge. Then I tell you why I think they don’t, etc.
You’ve mentioned ‘backwards causality’ which isn’t assumed in our one-box solution to Newcomb. How comfortable are you with the assumption of determinism? (If you’re not, how do you reconcile that Omega is a perfect predictor?)
You’ve mentioned ‘backwards causality’ which isn’t assumed in our one-box solution
to Newcomb.
Only to rule it out as a solution. No problem here.
How comfortable are you with the assumption of determinism?
In general, very.
Concerning Newcomb, I don’t think it’s essential, and as far as I recall, it isn’t mentioned in the orginal problem.
you need to tell me where you think logical and winning diverge
I’ll try again: I think you can show with simple counterexamples that winning is neither necessary nor sufficient for being logical (your term for my rational, if I understand you correctly).
Here we go: it’s not necessary, because you can be unlucky. Your strategy might be best, but you might lose as soon as luck is involved.
It’s not sufficient, because you can be lucky. You can win a game even if you’re not perfectly rational.
1-boxing seems a variant of the second case, instead of (bad) luck the game is rigged.
My point of view is that the winning thing to do here and the logical thing to do are the same.
If you want to understand my point of view or if you want me to understand your point of view, you need to tell me where you think logical and winning diverge. Then I tell you why I think they don’t, etc.
You’ve mentioned ‘backwards causality’ which isn’t assumed in our one-box solution to Newcomb. How comfortable are you with the assumption of determinism? (If you’re not, how do you reconcile that Omega is a perfect predictor?)
Only to rule it out as a solution. No problem here.
In general, very. Concerning Newcomb, I don’t think it’s essential, and as far as I recall, it isn’t mentioned in the orginal problem.
I’ll try again: I think you can show with simple counterexamples that winning is neither necessary nor sufficient for being logical (your term for my rational, if I understand you correctly).
Here we go: it’s not necessary, because you can be unlucky. Your strategy might be best, but you might lose as soon as luck is involved. It’s not sufficient, because you can be lucky. You can win a game even if you’re not perfectly rational.
1-boxing seems a variant of the second case, instead of (bad) luck the game is rigged.
Around here, “rational” is taken to include in its definition “not losing predictably”. Could you explain what you mean by the term?