I’m at least +70 decibans (“99.99999%”) confident that mental states supervene on to physical states. Whether your exact description to do with neurons in the brain completely captures all the physical states I’m less confident of.
EDIT: updated from 30 to 70 decibans: I would more easily be convinced that I had won the lottery than that this wasn’t so.
updated from 30 to 70 decibans: I would more easily be convinced that I had won the lottery than that this wasn’t so.
I might be misunderstanding what you mean by ‘more easily be convinced’, but if the nature of the evidence we’d expect to be doing the convincing is so different in each case, I don’t think we can rely on that to tell how much we believe something.
I was much less easily convinced about Many Worlds that I would be that I’d won the lottery, but beforehand I think I’d have put the odds about the same as rolling a six.
updated from 30 to 70 decibans: I would more easily be convinced that I had won the lottery than that this wasn’t so.
I don’t think we can use an ease-of-convincing heuristic to compare deciban levels, if the nature of the evidence we’d expect to get is so different.
I was much less easily convinced about Many Worlds that I would be that I’d won the lottery, but beforehand I think I’d have put the odds about the same as rolling a six.
I’m at least +70 decibans (“99.99999%”) confident that mental states supervene on to physical states. Whether your exact description to do with neurons in the brain completely captures all the physical states I’m less confident of.
EDIT: updated from 30 to 70 decibans: I would more easily be convinced that I had won the lottery than that this wasn’t so.
I might be misunderstanding what you mean by ‘more easily be convinced’, but if the nature of the evidence we’d expect to be doing the convincing is so different in each case, I don’t think we can rely on that to tell how much we believe something.
I was much less easily convinced about Many Worlds that I would be that I’d won the lottery, but beforehand I think I’d have put the odds about the same as rolling a six.
I don’t think we can use an ease-of-convincing heuristic to compare deciban levels, if the nature of the evidence we’d expect to get is so different.
I was much less easily convinced about Many Worlds that I would be that I’d won the lottery, but beforehand I think I’d have put the odds about the same as rolling a six.