Non-Born rules give us anthropic superpowers. It is plausibly the case that the laws of reality are such that no anthropic superpowers are ever possible, and that this is a quickie explanation for why the laws of reality give rise to the Born rules. One would still like to know what, exactly, these laws are.
To put it another way, the universe runs on causality, not modus tollens. Causality is rules like “and then, gravity accelerates the bowling ball downward”. Saying, “Well, if the bowling ball stayed up, we could have too much fun by hanging off it, and the universe won’t let us have that much fun, so modus tollens makes the ball fall downward” isn’t very causal.
This reminds me of an anecdote I read in a biography of Feynman. As a young physics student, he avoided using the principle of least action to solve problems, preferring to solve the differential equations. The nonlocal nature of the variational optimization required by the principle of least action seemed non-physical to him, whereas the local nature of the differential equations seemed more natural.*
I wonder if there might not be a more local and causal dual representation of the principle of no anthropic superpowers. Pure far-fetched speculation, alas.
Non-Born rules give us anthropic superpowers. It is plausibly the case that the laws of reality are such that no anthropic superpowers are ever possible, and that this is a quickie explanation for why the laws of reality give rise to the Born rules. One would still like to know what, exactly, these laws are.
To put it another way, the universe runs on causality, not modus tollens. Causality is rules like “and then, gravity accelerates the bowling ball downward”. Saying, “Well, if the bowling ball stayed up, we could have too much fun by hanging off it, and the universe won’t let us have that much fun, so modus tollens makes the ball fall downward” isn’t very causal.
This reminds me of an anecdote I read in a biography of Feynman. As a young physics student, he avoided using the principle of least action to solve problems, preferring to solve the differential equations. The nonlocal nature of the variational optimization required by the principle of least action seemed non-physical to him, whereas the local nature of the differential equations seemed more natural.*
I wonder if there might not be a more local and causal dual representation of the principle of no anthropic superpowers. Pure far-fetched speculation, alas.
* If this seems vaguely familiar to anyone, it’s because I’m repeating myself.