No it doesn’t. It assumes a “perfect predictor” is what it is. I don’t give a damn about evidence—we’re specifying properties of a universe here.
You said “you shouldn’t smoke”, which is a decision-theoretical claim, not a specification. It’s consistent with EDT, but not CDT.
You don’t get to say “Everybody who smokes has this gene” as a property of the universe, and then pretend to be an exception to a property of the universe because you have a bizarre and magical agency that gets to bypass properties of the universe.
In other words, you’re denying the exact thing that CDT asserts.
There is a contradiction there
Which is what a counterfactual is.
Whatever your theory is, it is denying core claims that CDT makes, so you’re denying CDT (and implicitly assuming EDT as the method for making decisions, your arguments literally map directly onto EDT arguments).
You said “you shouldn’t smoke”, which is a decision-theoretical claim, not a specification. It’s consistent with EDT, but not CDT.
No it isn’t, it’s a statement about the universe: If you smoke, you’ll get lesions. It’s written into the specification of the universe; what decision theory you use doesn’t change the characteristics of the universe.
In other words, you’re denying the exact thing that CDT asserts.
No. You don’t get to specify a universe without the kind of causality that the kind of CDT we use in our universe depends on, and then claim that this says something significant about decision theory. Causality in our hypothetical works differently.
Which is what a counterfactual is.
No it isn’t.
Whatever your theory is, it is denying core claims that CDT makes, so you’re denying CDT (and implicitly assuming EDT as the method for making decisions, your arguments literally map directly onto EDT arguments).
No it isn’t. In terms of CDT, we can say that smoking causes the gene; this isn’t wrong, because, according to the universe, anybody who smokes has the gene; if they didn’t, they do now, because the correlation is guaranteed by the laws of the universe. No matter how much work you prepared to ensure you didn’t have the gene in advance of smoking, the law of the universe says you have it now. No matter how many tests you ran, they were all wrong.
It may seem unintuitive and bizarre, because our own universe doesn’t behave this way—but when you find yourself in an alien universe, stomping your foot and insisting that the laws of physics should behave the way you’re used to them behaving is a fast way to die. Once you introduce a perfect predictor, the universe must bend to ensure the predictions work out.
You don’t get to specify a universe without the kind of causality that the kind of CDT we use in our universe depends on, and then claim that this says something significant about decision theory.
What kind of causality is this, given that you assert that the correct thing to do in smoking lesions is refrain from smoking, and smoking lesions is one of the standard things where CDT says to smoke?
“A causes B, therefore B causes A” is a fallacy no matter what arguments you put forward.
In terms of CDT, we can say that smoking causes the gene
CDT asserts the opposite, and so if you claim this then you disagree with CDT.
What kind of causality is this, given that you assert that the correct thing to do in smoking lesions is refrain from smoking, and smoking lesions is one of the standard things where CDT says to smoke?
Recursive causality.
“A causes B, therefore B causes A” is a fallacy no matter what arguments you put forward.
Perfect mutual correlation means both that A->B and that B->A.
CDT asserts the opposite, and so if you claim this then you disagree with CDT.
No it doesn’t.
You don’t understand what counterfactuals are.
A counterfactual is a state of existence which is not true of the universe. It is not a contradiction.
You said “you shouldn’t smoke”, which is a decision-theoretical claim, not a specification. It’s consistent with EDT, but not CDT.
In other words, you’re denying the exact thing that CDT asserts.
Which is what a counterfactual is.
Whatever your theory is, it is denying core claims that CDT makes, so you’re denying CDT (and implicitly assuming EDT as the method for making decisions, your arguments literally map directly onto EDT arguments).
No it isn’t, it’s a statement about the universe: If you smoke, you’ll get lesions. It’s written into the specification of the universe; what decision theory you use doesn’t change the characteristics of the universe.
No. You don’t get to specify a universe without the kind of causality that the kind of CDT we use in our universe depends on, and then claim that this says something significant about decision theory. Causality in our hypothetical works differently.
No it isn’t.
No it isn’t. In terms of CDT, we can say that smoking causes the gene; this isn’t wrong, because, according to the universe, anybody who smokes has the gene; if they didn’t, they do now, because the correlation is guaranteed by the laws of the universe. No matter how much work you prepared to ensure you didn’t have the gene in advance of smoking, the law of the universe says you have it now. No matter how many tests you ran, they were all wrong.
It may seem unintuitive and bizarre, because our own universe doesn’t behave this way—but when you find yourself in an alien universe, stomping your foot and insisting that the laws of physics should behave the way you’re used to them behaving is a fast way to die. Once you introduce a perfect predictor, the universe must bend to ensure the predictions work out.
What kind of causality is this, given that you assert that the correct thing to do in smoking lesions is refrain from smoking, and smoking lesions is one of the standard things where CDT says to smoke?
“A causes B, therefore B causes A” is a fallacy no matter what arguments you put forward.
CDT asserts the opposite, and so if you claim this then you disagree with CDT.
You don’t understand what counterfactuals are.
Recursive causality.
Perfect mutual correlation means both that A->B and that B->A.
No it doesn’t.
A counterfactual is a state of existence which is not true of the universe. It is not a contradiction.