Are you familiar with Richard Wiseman, who has found that “luck” (as the phrase is used by people in everyday life to refer to people and events) appears to be both predictable and changeable?
That’s an interesting result! It doesn’t surprise me that people frequently confuse which complex outcomes they can and can’t control, though. Do you think I’m wrong about the intension of “luck”? Or do you think most people are just wrong about its extension?
I think the definition of ‘luck’ as ‘complex outcomes I have only minor control over’ is useful, as well as the definition of ‘luck’ as ‘the resolution of uncertain outcomes.’ For both of them, I think there’s meat to the sentence “rationalists should not be predictably unlucky”: in the first, it means rationalists should exert a level of effort justified by the system they’re dealing with, and not be dissuaded by statistically insignificant feedback; in the second, it means rationalists should be calibrated (and so P_10 or worse events happen to them 10% of the time, i.e. rationalists are not surprised that they lose money at the casino).
Ahh, thanks! This helps me better understand what Eliezer was getting at. I was having trouble thinking my way into other concepts of ‘luck’ that might avoid triviality.
Are you familiar with Richard Wiseman, who has found that “luck” (as the phrase is used by people in everyday life to refer to people and events) appears to be both predictable and changeable?
That’s an interesting result! It doesn’t surprise me that people frequently confuse which complex outcomes they can and can’t control, though. Do you think I’m wrong about the intension of “luck”? Or do you think most people are just wrong about its extension?
I think the definition of ‘luck’ as ‘complex outcomes I have only minor control over’ is useful, as well as the definition of ‘luck’ as ‘the resolution of uncertain outcomes.’ For both of them, I think there’s meat to the sentence “rationalists should not be predictably unlucky”: in the first, it means rationalists should exert a level of effort justified by the system they’re dealing with, and not be dissuaded by statistically insignificant feedback; in the second, it means rationalists should be calibrated (and so P_10 or worse events happen to them 10% of the time, i.e. rationalists are not surprised that they lose money at the casino).
Ahh, thanks! This helps me better understand what Eliezer was getting at. I was having trouble thinking my way into other concepts of ‘luck’ that might avoid triviality.