Thanks for the explanation. It makes a lot of sense, but I’m having difficulty trying to make the distinction precise. Can you give necessary and sufficient conditions for both framing and priming, as you are conceiving of them?
It sounds like you’re saying that framing “activates associated concepts to such a degree that they rise to consciousness” (assuming for the moment that the degree of activation is what determines that) and that “the activated associated concepts then have direct influence on behavior”. Are both conditions required for it to be framing (assuming other prerequisites are met)? What constitutes direct influence? What if they rise to consciousness and then have indirect influence? What if they don’t rise to consciousness but still have direct influence? Are these last two combinations not possible?
If it is necessarily the case that conscious iff direct and non-conscious iff indirect, then we only need to distinguish using one attribute, not two. Which is it? If we use the attribute of whether it rises to consciousness or not, which seems much simpler given the fuzziness of directness, does that mean that if we presented the same stimulus to two people, and the behavior of both was influenced in the same way, but we interrupted one of them and prevented the concepts from rising to consciousness for that person, that it would be framing for one person and priming for the other? Also, is rising to consciousness a boolean, or does it admit of degrees? If the latter, as I would argue, where do we draw the threshold, or do we perhaps use a fuzzy distinction (in the sense of fuzzy logic values)?
Thanks for the explanation. It makes a lot of sense, but I’m having difficulty trying to make the distinction precise. Can you give necessary and sufficient conditions for both framing and priming, as you are conceiving of them?
It sounds like you’re saying that framing “activates associated concepts to such a degree that they rise to consciousness” (assuming for the moment that the degree of activation is what determines that) and that “the activated associated concepts then have direct influence on behavior”. Are both conditions required for it to be framing (assuming other prerequisites are met)? What constitutes direct influence? What if they rise to consciousness and then have indirect influence? What if they don’t rise to consciousness but still have direct influence? Are these last two combinations not possible?
If it is necessarily the case that conscious iff direct and non-conscious iff indirect, then we only need to distinguish using one attribute, not two. Which is it? If we use the attribute of whether it rises to consciousness or not, which seems much simpler given the fuzziness of directness, does that mean that if we presented the same stimulus to two people, and the behavior of both was influenced in the same way, but we interrupted one of them and prevented the concepts from rising to consciousness for that person, that it would be framing for one person and priming for the other? Also, is rising to consciousness a boolean, or does it admit of degrees? If the latter, as I would argue, where do we draw the threshold, or do we perhaps use a fuzzy distinction (in the sense of fuzzy logic values)?
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