I think the logical incoherence of theism is a stronger knock down argument. The most devastating criticism of theism relates not to what caused god but what causes his actions. God is conceived as an all-powerful will, subjecting it to the same simple argument that disposes of libertarian “free will.” Either God’s conduct is random or determined. But conceiving of god as something other than a will makes god otiose. If god acts randomly, the description is indistinguishable from the universe simply being random; if god is determined that is indistinguishable from the universe is simply determined.
Who created the creator is a good argument, but it isn’t decisive. To say god must be more complex than the universe 1) is denied by theists, who call god uniquely simply; and 2) leaves the theist with one (weak) counterargument, inasmuch as it means treating god as a mechanism rather than something that is, well, supernatural. The theist says the causal requirements that govern matter don’t apply, and we’re unwarranted in generalizing our observations about the material world to the characteristics of god.
Ultimately, you can’t avoid getting down to the really basic question: what is this god. If he’s not a deterministic entity, what’s the alternative to his behavior being random? [Actually, I’m not sure raw randomness is coherent either, but you don’t have to take the argument that far.]
I think the logical incoherence of theism is a stronger knock down argument. The most devastating criticism of theism relates not to what caused god but what causes his actions. God is conceived as an all-powerful will, subjecting it to the same simple argument that disposes of libertarian “free will.” Either God’s conduct is random or determined. But conceiving of god as something other than a will makes god otiose. If god acts randomly, the description is indistinguishable from the universe simply being random; if god is determined that is indistinguishable from the universe is simply determined.
Who created the creator is a good argument, but it isn’t decisive. To say god must be more complex than the universe 1) is denied by theists, who call god uniquely simply; and 2) leaves the theist with one (weak) counterargument, inasmuch as it means treating god as a mechanism rather than something that is, well, supernatural. The theist says the causal requirements that govern matter don’t apply, and we’re unwarranted in generalizing our observations about the material world to the characteristics of god.
Ultimately, you can’t avoid getting down to the really basic question: what is this god. If he’s not a deterministic entity, what’s the alternative to his behavior being random? [Actually, I’m not sure raw randomness is coherent either, but you don’t have to take the argument that far.]