This is related to the (unsolved) question of what consciousness is.
Briefly the currently conceived possibilities:
[A] Consciousness is an algorithm.
[B] Consciousness is a fundamental property of nature that emerges from certain structures of integrated information.
[C] Consciousness is a fundamental property of nature.
[D] Consciousness does not exist. We do not have an internal experience of anything.
About [A]:
Neuroscientists are trying to find the locus of consciousness in the brain but they haven’t managed yet. Even more important, there is a conceptual gap about the possibility of information encoding subjective experience. The very influential Chinese room thought experiment of John Searle is an extremely strong argument against the possibility of filling the information/meaning gap.
About [B]:
This is an interesting theory. It is not the same as [A]. I recommend Tononi’s book Phi if you want to learn more about it. It is not easy to digest but a really fascinating possibility. He proposes (and has a mathematical model for it), that certain configurations of matters with certain properties give rise to consciousness depending on their integration of information. It has not been experimentally proven or strongly indicated. It implies Panpsychism (see [C]).
About [C]:
In philosophy this is labelled as Panpsychism. It is a view that seems to be implied in the writings of all the major mystical traditions.
About [D]:
This is Daniel Dennett’s position. The proposition that our internal experience. The one we are having right now. Does not exist.
To my understanding, the simulation hypothesis is only valid if [A] or [D] is true.
This is related to the (unsolved) question of what consciousness is. Briefly the currently conceived possibilities:
[A] Consciousness is an algorithm.
[B] Consciousness is a fundamental property of nature that emerges from certain structures of integrated information.
[C] Consciousness is a fundamental property of nature.
[D] Consciousness does not exist. We do not have an internal experience of anything.
About [A]:
Neuroscientists are trying to find the locus of consciousness in the brain but they haven’t managed yet. Even more important, there is a conceptual gap about the possibility of information encoding subjective experience. The very influential Chinese room thought experiment of John Searle is an extremely strong argument against the possibility of filling the information/meaning gap.
About [B]:
This is an interesting theory. It is not the same as [A]. I recommend Tononi’s book Phi if you want to learn more about it. It is not easy to digest but a really fascinating possibility. He proposes (and has a mathematical model for it), that certain configurations of matters with certain properties give rise to consciousness depending on their integration of information. It has not been experimentally proven or strongly indicated. It implies Panpsychism (see [C]).
About [C]:
In philosophy this is labelled as Panpsychism. It is a view that seems to be implied in the writings of all the major mystical traditions.
About [D]:
This is Daniel Dennett’s position. The proposition that our internal experience. The one we are having right now. Does not exist.
To my understanding, the simulation hypothesis is only valid if [A] or [D] is true.