While I can certainly say that the Greene’s assertion that deontological ethics is shrouded in rationalizations (is this a fair summary?) rings true to me, I’d reserve judgement until I see a blind study showing that utilitarian or pragmatic ethics can be experimentally distinguished from the deontological one based on some unambiguous rationalization quotient.
I suspect that if we dig deep enough, we find Kant’s deontological moral imperatives in any ethics. The rules themselves certainly depend on the ethical system. For example, EY clearly believes in a radical version of “Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”, which he call the Fun Theory . As a deontological model, it must be shrouded in rationalizations, according to Greene.
If true, I wonder what those rationalizations are.
While I can certainly say that the Greene’s assertion that deontological ethics is shrouded in rationalizations (is this a fair summary?) rings true to me, I’d reserve judgement until I see a blind study showing that utilitarian or pragmatic ethics can be experimentally distinguished from the deontological one based on some unambiguous rationalization quotient.
I suspect that if we dig deep enough, we find Kant’s deontological moral imperatives in any ethics. The rules themselves certainly depend on the ethical system. For example, EY clearly believes in a radical version of “Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”, which he call the Fun Theory . As a deontological model, it must be shrouded in rationalizations, according to Greene.
If true, I wonder what those rationalizations are.