The anti-global-warming measure most commonly advocated as needing to be done immediately (or sooner) is reduction in fossil-fuel use. So far as I can see, this isn’t politically convenient for anybody.
Seriously? You don’t understand that there’s ideological opposition to fossil fuels (and to technology in general with unprincipled exceptions for such things as the anti-technology people’s personal iPads) and that global warming is extremely convenient for it?
Also, one of the if not the biggest measure advocated is government regulation and taxes. Surely you can see how that is politically convenient.
It appears to me that opposition to technology as such is rare among voters and even rarer among politicians, at least in the countries whose politics I know anything about. I’m sure there are some luddites who talk up the dangers of climate change in order to attack technology, but if you’re claiming that they explain a substantial fraction of what political support there is for taking action against climate change then I’ll need to see some evidence.
Yes, one way to discourage fossil-fuel use is to tax it heavily, and I can see why a politician might want more revenue to play with. But I can equally see why they might want to be seen not to favour high taxes; all else being equal, most voters prefer to be taxed less. If I imagine a Machiavellian politician thinking “I’ll advocate higher taxes to discourage the burning of fossil fuels, and then X will happen, and then I’ll be more powerful / more likely to be elected / richer / …”, I’m having trouble thinking of any really credible X.
If I imagine a Machiavellian politician thinking “I’ll advocate higher taxes to discourage the burning of fossil fuels, and then X will happen, and then I’ll be more powerful / more likely to be elected / richer / …”, I’m having trouble thinking of any really credible X.
I don’t see why you are having trouble.
“I’ll advocate higher taxes to get more revenue while saying it is to discourage the burning of fossil fuels, and then I will have control of of more money which I’ll channel to my cronies and use to bribe voters.
The common characteristic of most politicians is that they want more power. In Western democracies having control over budget and having money to allocate is a large part of that power.
First of all, for clarity, my imaginary politician was saying “I’ll advocate (higher taxes to discourage the burning of fossil fuels)” rather than “I’ll advocate higher taxes) to discourage the burning of fossil fuels”. That is, I wasn’t meaning to presuppose that the politician’s real purpose was as stated.
to get more revenue [...] channel to my cronies and use to bribe voters
OK, so if this sort of thing is (say) 50% of why those politicians who say we should take action to reduce or mitigate anthropomorphic climate change, then we should expect that (if politicians are perfectly Machiavellian and totally indifferent to what’s true and what’s beneficial) 50% of politicians who say that either are closely associated with “green energy” companies and the like, or else represent voters a substantial fraction of whom stand to benefit from “green energy” initiatives. If politicians are actually less than perfectly Machiavellian, and temper their pursuit of self-interest with occasional consideration of what would actually be best for their country and what the evidence actually says, then that figure of 50% needs to be correspondingly higher.
We should also, if politicians are that Machiavellian, expect to find that any politician who, e.g., represents a substantial number of voters who could be bribed in this way will advocate action against climate change.
I haven’t looked at the statistics, so my opinion isn’t worth much at present, but I don’t get the impression that things are anywhere near so clear-cut. Do you have data?
Just out of curiosity: What is your opinion about the motivation of politicians who say we shouldn’t take much action against anthropogenic climate change? If we discount the stated opinions of politicians on both sides, and of lobbyists for, e.g., solar panel fitters and oil companies, what opinions do you expect to find remaining?
It seems to me that this sort of argument constitutes a fully general justification for ignoring what politicians say. Which, actually, sounds on the whole like a pretty good idea.
I don’t get the impression that things are anywhere near so clear-cut
Things, of course, are not clear-cut at all because in reality you have a very complex network of incentives, counter-incentives, PR considerations, estimates and mis-estimates, the traditional bungling, etc. etc.
What is your opinion about the motivation of politicians who say we shouldn’t take much action against anthropogenic climate change?
The same :-)
what opinions do you expect to find remaining?
Well, the whole spectrum from “this is bollocks!” to “humanity’s survival is at stake!”, but probably dominated by “I dunno” :-D
I have to ask: Do you seriously think you are making a rational argument at this point? (Or have you, e.g., decided I’m an idiot not worth engaging with in actual rational discussion? Because if so, you could just say so.)
It makes no sense to answer my question “How do you know?” with “Same way you do” because I am not claiming to know anything about politicians’ motivations here, and you are.
When you imagine your Machiavellian politician, does your imagination provide you with something that plays the role of X for mine? Or does your imagined politician simply want more regulation as a terminal value, regulation purely for the sake of regulation? If the latter, what reason is there to think that the number of such politicians is not tiny?
I don’t expect a politician to literally want more regulation sa a terminal goal. However, I expect a politician to have terminal goals, such as doing better in the bureaucracy, signalling power to other politicians, etc. which more regulation helps him achieve. Bureaucracies given a chance to expand to encompass more regulation will take it.
It looks to me as if you’re mixing up two things that sound almost the same but are actually importantly different. (1) An actual preference for there to be more regulation. (2) A tendency to make there be more regulation. I agree that politicians are likely to have #2 because it may boost their status if their name is on lots of laws. But I don’t think that implies #1, and it’s #1 rather than #2 that I can imagine being responsible for insincere professions of belief in and concern about anthropogenic climate change.
I would expect #2 to manifest as politicians liking to introduce laws about whatever they happen to think important, or whatever they expect their voters to be impressed by. If you’re a politician with a severe case of #2 and not otherwise inclined to think climate change is a big deal, there’s no need for you to jump on the bandwagon just in order to have regulations to introduce. It’s not like there’s a shortage of other things to regulate. (Or, for some sorts of politician, to deregulate. That can go down well with voters and senior party officials too.)
In any case, I realise I’m not quite sure why we’re talking about politicians in any case. Do you have the impression that there is much push for action on climate change coming from politicians? It doesn’t look that way to me. I mean, for sure some politicians are saying there should be action on climate change, but I think there has consistently been less political support for such action than climate scientists’ analyses would lead one to expect.
There’s one obvious high-profile exception, namely Al Gore who has been unusually active in promoting action against climate change, and who (so I gather) has if anything overstated rather than understated the case in comparison to what actual experts would say. But this doesn’t seem well explained in terms of political considerations like “doing better in the bureaucracy” or “signalling power to other politicians”; Gore seems pretty clearly to be out of politics now. (I dunno, maybe he’ll surprise everyone by running for president in 2020 or something, but I bet he won’t. Aside from everything else, he’d be as old in 2020 as McCain was in 2008, and McCain’s age clearly hurt him.)
Do you have the impression that there is much push for action on climate change coming from politicians?
There seems to be much push for political solutions. Even if it’s not a politician who pushes for the solution, the people pushing for the solution generally benefit from increasing their side’s political power, and that includes proposing solutions that politicians on their side want because of other incentives.
There’s also interplay between different causes (if you can pull off a carbon tax, that increases the respectibility of taxes as solutions, which may help your side if your side also proposes taxes as solutions to other problems).
As I say, it looks to me as if politicians have generally favoured less intervention than the scientific consensus has seemed to warrant, which would be the exact opposite of what your analysis would predict. But I don’t have any very compelling evidence for this. How about you?
What matters here is the direction, not the end value. The idea is that politicians favor more intervention than we actually have, even if they favor less intervention than the scientific consensus. If so, then people allied with the politicians benefit from supporting intervention.
(Also, I don’t actually believe there is a scientific consensus on how much intervention is needed. That’s inherently a political question; it depends on how to value various tradeoffs, what you think the chance is of a policy being abused, etc. It’s like asking if there’s a scientific consensus about what to do to stop hunger.)
If we’re trying to assess the theory that AGW policies are strongly perturbed by politicians’ alleged desire to increase taxes and regulation, then we need to compare actual AGW policies with a baseline estimate that ignores the effects of that desire. There’s no point comparing against doing nothing, unless we know there’s no reason to do anything. (“The captain of this ship says there’s a big iceberg ahead and we have to steer to the left, but I think he’s mostly steering left because he likes the view in that direction. And look, we’re veering way further to the left than we would if we just kept going in a straight line—clearly that shows he’s biased.” Compare that with ”… way further to the left than I think we need to do avoid the iceberg I can see ahead”, which of course might be wrong if I am inexpert concerning either icebergs or steering but is at least trying to address the right question.)
I don’t actually believe there is a scientific consensus on how much intervention is needed.
I didn’t say there is (and agree that there probably isn’t, though there might e.g. be a scientific consensus that the answer is “more than we’re doing now”). By “less than the scientific consensus has seemed to warrant” I mean: look at what the scientists say about the likely climatic outcome of business as usual and of various levels of intervention, look at what politicians are actually doing, and consider whether it’s credible that this is close to optimal given any reasonable set of priorities. In general you’d expect this to be really hard because there are lots of difficult things to evaluate, but the politicians have made it easier by keeping the level of intervention almost indistinguishable from zero.
If we’re trying to assess the theory that AGW policies are strongly perturbed by politicians’ alleged desire to increase taxes and regulation, then we need to compare actual AGW policies with a baseline estimate that ignores the effects of that desire.
Yes, but the baseline itself is relative to the current situation. Politicians want to regulate more than the regulation we actually have, so if you also want to increase regulation to more than we have, that benefits politicians. It may be true that you want an end point far beyond what the politician wants, but that’s going to be irrelevant unless your push has some reasonable chance of going that far, which it probably doesn’t.
No, you did not. A Machiavellan politician wants to stay in power, that is, to be elected. You’re asserting a group interest that does not exist. We observe that politicians are happy to cut taxes (for people who can benefit them) if they personally get paid as much or more than before. Why would it be otherwise? (And any long-term interest, eg power for their family, should take the state of their civilization into account.)
We observe that politicians are happy to cut taxes (for people who can benefit them) if they personally get paid as much or more than before. Why would it be otherwise?
Having the ability to take and redistribute someone else’s money provides a concentrated benefit to the one doing the taking and redistributing. Cutting taxes produces a much more diffuse benefit. Concentrated benefits lead to Machiavellian behavior much more than diffuse benefits. It is possible, of course, to have an anti-taxes lobbying group which provides a concentrated benefit, but the overall balance between concentrated and diffuse benefits is on the side of the higher taxes.
(And any long-term interest, eg power for their family, should take the state of their civilization into account.)
That would be a diffuse cost. The politician may care about the portion of the diffuse effectthat affects his family, but that’s only a small portion of the total. If the politician makes policy based on which costs help him and his family and which ones hurt him and his family, the concentrated ones will win. The ones that affect all civilization, a small portion of which he actually cares about because it goes to his family, will lose.
a concentrated benefit to the one doing the taking and redistributing. Cutting taxes produces a much more diffuse benefit.
FFS, I shouldn’t have to tell you the government is not a person and does not make decisions like one. Show me a correlation between tax rates and benefits to individual politicians, or admit it’s diffuse as all Hell. Oh, wait:
Having the ability to take
Well then, since that’s always present, we seem to have reached agreement that actually using it is unnecessary for a given politician. Nor, I would say, do we need additional reasons to justify implied taxation threats in a world where the USA is deep in debt.
Here’s another comment for Eugine Nier to downvote: you are talking about a political issue and asserting by definition that politicians like Inhofe are not politicians. The real world doesn’t enter into it. You are spouting the most shameful tribalist garbage.
No indeed, your No True Scotsman fallacy is over here. Though as I keep saying, the more fundamental problem is that you haven’t shown anyone has the personal interest in question. And you try to hide this by talking as if the government were an agent, in violation of what should be conservative insights. I think I’m done with this.
Seriously? You don’t understand that there’s ideological opposition to fossil fuels (and to technology in general with unprincipled exceptions for such things as the anti-technology people’s personal iPads) and that global warming is extremely convenient for it?
Also, one of the if not the biggest measure advocated is government regulation and taxes. Surely you can see how that is politically convenient.
It appears to me that opposition to technology as such is rare among voters and even rarer among politicians, at least in the countries whose politics I know anything about. I’m sure there are some luddites who talk up the dangers of climate change in order to attack technology, but if you’re claiming that they explain a substantial fraction of what political support there is for taking action against climate change then I’ll need to see some evidence.
Yes, one way to discourage fossil-fuel use is to tax it heavily, and I can see why a politician might want more revenue to play with. But I can equally see why they might want to be seen not to favour high taxes; all else being equal, most voters prefer to be taxed less. If I imagine a Machiavellian politician thinking “I’ll advocate higher taxes to discourage the burning of fossil fuels, and then X will happen, and then I’ll be more powerful / more likely to be elected / richer / …”, I’m having trouble thinking of any really credible X.
I don’t see why you are having trouble.
“I’ll advocate higher taxes to get more revenue while saying it is to discourage the burning of fossil fuels, and then I will have control of of more money which I’ll channel to my cronies and use to bribe voters.
The common characteristic of most politicians is that they want more power. In Western democracies having control over budget and having money to allocate is a large part of that power.
First of all, for clarity, my imaginary politician was saying “I’ll advocate (higher taxes to discourage the burning of fossil fuels)” rather than “I’ll advocate higher taxes) to discourage the burning of fossil fuels”. That is, I wasn’t meaning to presuppose that the politician’s real purpose was as stated.
OK, so if this sort of thing is (say) 50% of why those politicians who say we should take action to reduce or mitigate anthropomorphic climate change, then we should expect that (if politicians are perfectly Machiavellian and totally indifferent to what’s true and what’s beneficial) 50% of politicians who say that either are closely associated with “green energy” companies and the like, or else represent voters a substantial fraction of whom stand to benefit from “green energy” initiatives. If politicians are actually less than perfectly Machiavellian, and temper their pursuit of self-interest with occasional consideration of what would actually be best for their country and what the evidence actually says, then that figure of 50% needs to be correspondingly higher.
We should also, if politicians are that Machiavellian, expect to find that any politician who, e.g., represents a substantial number of voters who could be bribed in this way will advocate action against climate change.
I haven’t looked at the statistics, so my opinion isn’t worth much at present, but I don’t get the impression that things are anywhere near so clear-cut. Do you have data?
Just out of curiosity: What is your opinion about the motivation of politicians who say we shouldn’t take much action against anthropogenic climate change? If we discount the stated opinions of politicians on both sides, and of lobbyists for, e.g., solar panel fitters and oil companies, what opinions do you expect to find remaining?
It seems to me that this sort of argument constitutes a fully general justification for ignoring what politicians say. Which, actually, sounds on the whole like a pretty good idea.
Things, of course, are not clear-cut at all because in reality you have a very complex network of incentives, counter-incentives, PR considerations, estimates and mis-estimates, the traditional bungling, etc. etc.
The same :-)
Well, the whole spectrum from “this is bollocks!” to “humanity’s survival is at stake!”, but probably dominated by “I dunno” :-D
It goes the other way around: They advocate taxing fossil fuels because they are generally in favor of government regulation.
How do you know?
Same way you do. You imagined a Machiavellan politician; well, I imagined another one.
I have to ask: Do you seriously think you are making a rational argument at this point? (Or have you, e.g., decided I’m an idiot not worth engaging with in actual rational discussion? Because if so, you could just say so.)
It makes no sense to answer my question “How do you know?” with “Same way you do” because I am not claiming to know anything about politicians’ motivations here, and you are.
When you imagine your Machiavellian politician, does your imagination provide you with something that plays the role of X for mine? Or does your imagined politician simply want more regulation as a terminal value, regulation purely for the sake of regulation? If the latter, what reason is there to think that the number of such politicians is not tiny?
I don’t expect a politician to literally want more regulation sa a terminal goal. However, I expect a politician to have terminal goals, such as doing better in the bureaucracy, signalling power to other politicians, etc. which more regulation helps him achieve. Bureaucracies given a chance to expand to encompass more regulation will take it.
It looks to me as if you’re mixing up two things that sound almost the same but are actually importantly different. (1) An actual preference for there to be more regulation. (2) A tendency to make there be more regulation. I agree that politicians are likely to have #2 because it may boost their status if their name is on lots of laws. But I don’t think that implies #1, and it’s #1 rather than #2 that I can imagine being responsible for insincere professions of belief in and concern about anthropogenic climate change.
I would expect #2 to manifest as politicians liking to introduce laws about whatever they happen to think important, or whatever they expect their voters to be impressed by. If you’re a politician with a severe case of #2 and not otherwise inclined to think climate change is a big deal, there’s no need for you to jump on the bandwagon just in order to have regulations to introduce. It’s not like there’s a shortage of other things to regulate. (Or, for some sorts of politician, to deregulate. That can go down well with voters and senior party officials too.)
In any case, I realise I’m not quite sure why we’re talking about politicians in any case. Do you have the impression that there is much push for action on climate change coming from politicians? It doesn’t look that way to me. I mean, for sure some politicians are saying there should be action on climate change, but I think there has consistently been less political support for such action than climate scientists’ analyses would lead one to expect.
There’s one obvious high-profile exception, namely Al Gore who has been unusually active in promoting action against climate change, and who (so I gather) has if anything overstated rather than understated the case in comparison to what actual experts would say. But this doesn’t seem well explained in terms of political considerations like “doing better in the bureaucracy” or “signalling power to other politicians”; Gore seems pretty clearly to be out of politics now. (I dunno, maybe he’ll surprise everyone by running for president in 2020 or something, but I bet he won’t. Aside from everything else, he’d be as old in 2020 as McCain was in 2008, and McCain’s age clearly hurt him.)
[EDITED to fix an inconsequential typo.]
There seems to be much push for political solutions. Even if it’s not a politician who pushes for the solution, the people pushing for the solution generally benefit from increasing their side’s political power, and that includes proposing solutions that politicians on their side want because of other incentives.
There’s also interplay between different causes (if you can pull off a carbon tax, that increases the respectibility of taxes as solutions, which may help your side if your side also proposes taxes as solutions to other problems).
As I say, it looks to me as if politicians have generally favoured less intervention than the scientific consensus has seemed to warrant, which would be the exact opposite of what your analysis would predict. But I don’t have any very compelling evidence for this. How about you?
What matters here is the direction, not the end value. The idea is that politicians favor more intervention than we actually have, even if they favor less intervention than the scientific consensus. If so, then people allied with the politicians benefit from supporting intervention.
(Also, I don’t actually believe there is a scientific consensus on how much intervention is needed. That’s inherently a political question; it depends on how to value various tradeoffs, what you think the chance is of a policy being abused, etc. It’s like asking if there’s a scientific consensus about what to do to stop hunger.)
If we’re trying to assess the theory that AGW policies are strongly perturbed by politicians’ alleged desire to increase taxes and regulation, then we need to compare actual AGW policies with a baseline estimate that ignores the effects of that desire. There’s no point comparing against doing nothing, unless we know there’s no reason to do anything. (“The captain of this ship says there’s a big iceberg ahead and we have to steer to the left, but I think he’s mostly steering left because he likes the view in that direction. And look, we’re veering way further to the left than we would if we just kept going in a straight line—clearly that shows he’s biased.” Compare that with ”… way further to the left than I think we need to do avoid the iceberg I can see ahead”, which of course might be wrong if I am inexpert concerning either icebergs or steering but is at least trying to address the right question.)
I didn’t say there is (and agree that there probably isn’t, though there might e.g. be a scientific consensus that the answer is “more than we’re doing now”). By “less than the scientific consensus has seemed to warrant” I mean: look at what the scientists say about the likely climatic outcome of business as usual and of various levels of intervention, look at what politicians are actually doing, and consider whether it’s credible that this is close to optimal given any reasonable set of priorities. In general you’d expect this to be really hard because there are lots of difficult things to evaluate, but the politicians have made it easier by keeping the level of intervention almost indistinguishable from zero.
Yes, but the baseline itself is relative to the current situation. Politicians want to regulate more than the regulation we actually have, so if you also want to increase regulation to more than we have, that benefits politicians. It may be true that you want an end point far beyond what the politician wants, but that’s going to be irrelevant unless your push has some reasonable chance of going that far, which it probably doesn’t.
The terminal value is power. Regulation is an intermediate instrumental goal.
No, you did not. A Machiavellan politician wants to stay in power, that is, to be elected. You’re asserting a group interest that does not exist. We observe that politicians are happy to cut taxes (for people who can benefit them) if they personally get paid as much or more than before. Why would it be otherwise? (And any long-term interest, eg power for their family, should take the state of their civilization into account.)
Having the ability to take and redistribute someone else’s money provides a concentrated benefit to the one doing the taking and redistributing. Cutting taxes produces a much more diffuse benefit. Concentrated benefits lead to Machiavellian behavior much more than diffuse benefits. It is possible, of course, to have an anti-taxes lobbying group which provides a concentrated benefit, but the overall balance between concentrated and diffuse benefits is on the side of the higher taxes.
That would be a diffuse cost. The politician may care about the portion of the diffuse effectthat affects his family, but that’s only a small portion of the total. If the politician makes policy based on which costs help him and his family and which ones hurt him and his family, the concentrated ones will win. The ones that affect all civilization, a small portion of which he actually cares about because it goes to his family, will lose.
FFS, I shouldn’t have to tell you the government is not a person and does not make decisions like one. Show me a correlation between tax rates and benefits to individual politicians, or admit it’s diffuse as all Hell. Oh, wait:
Well then, since that’s always present, we seem to have reached agreement that actually using it is unnecessary for a given politician. Nor, I would say, do we need additional reasons to justify implied taxation threats in a world where the USA is deep in debt.
Here’s another comment for Eugine Nier to downvote: you are talking about a political issue and asserting by definition that politicians like Inhofe are not politicians. The real world doesn’t enter into it. You are spouting the most shameful tribalist garbage.
“The politician” doesn’t mean that I am making the statement about every single politician in the world.
No indeed, your No True Scotsman fallacy is over here. Though as I keep saying, the more fundamental problem is that you haven’t shown anyone has the personal interest in question. And you try to hide this by talking as if the government were an agent, in violation of what should be conservative insights. I think I’m done with this.