A lot of voting schemes look like effective ways of consensus decisionmaking among aligned groups, but stop working well once multiple groups with competing interests start using the voting scheme to compete directly.
I think the effectiveness of this scheme, like voting systems in practice, would be severely affected by the degree of pre-commitment transparency (does everyone know who has committed exactly what prior to settlement of the vote? Does everyone know who has how many votes remaining? Does everyone know how many total votes were spent on something that passed?) and the interaction of ‘saved votes’ with turnover of voting officials (due to death, loss of election, etc). For example, could a ‘loser seat’ with a lot of saved votes suddenly become unusually valuable?
With regard to transparency, ballot anonymity is necessary so that outside parties seeking to influence the election cannot receive a receipt from a voter who was purchased or coerced. Public precommitment to positions would likely be even more exploitable than public knowledge of who proposed what and who voted in which direction.
SV PAYW is mainly designed for people to signal both intensity and direction of preferences. My opinion is that it is close to optimal to create conditions for truth telling of preferences.
In the situation considered in the paper there are only two players, so they know how many votes have themselves and the other player and the previous sequence of votes. The “incomplete information” situation means that the true value of wining in a given round is public.
While the voting system is very general, the situation considered is very simple, so recursive Nash equilibrium can be computed and simulated.
As commented in the second paper, unfortunately the big question is how to vote, but to create a meaning vote space… the question “what to vote” is in my view the most important. See “the ideal political workflow”.
A lot of voting schemes look like effective ways of consensus decisionmaking among aligned groups, but stop working well once multiple groups with competing interests start using the voting scheme to compete directly.
I think the effectiveness of this scheme, like voting systems in practice, would be severely affected by the degree of pre-commitment transparency (does everyone know who has committed exactly what prior to settlement of the vote? Does everyone know who has how many votes remaining? Does everyone know how many total votes were spent on something that passed?) and the interaction of ‘saved votes’ with turnover of voting officials (due to death, loss of election, etc). For example, could a ‘loser seat’ with a lot of saved votes suddenly become unusually valuable?
With regard to transparency, ballot anonymity is necessary so that outside parties seeking to influence the election cannot receive a receipt from a voter who was purchased or coerced. Public precommitment to positions would likely be even more exploitable than public knowledge of who proposed what and who voted in which direction.
Do you have any thoughts in this direction?
SV PAYW is mainly designed for people to signal both intensity and direction of preferences. My opinion is that it is close to optimal to create conditions for truth telling of preferences.
In the situation considered in the paper there are only two players, so they know how many votes have themselves and the other player and the previous sequence of votes. The “incomplete information” situation means that the true value of wining in a given round is public.
While the voting system is very general, the situation considered is very simple, so recursive Nash equilibrium can be computed and simulated.
As commented in the second paper, unfortunately the big question is how to vote, but to create a meaning vote space… the question “what to vote” is in my view the most important. See “the ideal political workflow”.