This should be taken seriously as as hypothesis. However, it can be broken down a bit:
1. LW readers one-box more because they are more likely to have read strong arguments in favor of one-boxing — namely Eliezer’s — than most philosophers are. 2. LW readers one-box more because LW disproportionately attracts or retains people who already had a predilection for one-boxing, because people like to affiliate with those who will confirm their beliefs. 3. LW readers one-box more because they are guessing the teacher’s password (or, more generally, parroting a “charismatic leader” or “high-status individual”) by copying Eliezer’s ideas.
To these I’ll add some variants:
4. LW readers one-box more than most atheists because for many atheists, two-boxing is a way of saying that they are serious about their atheism, by denying Omega’s godlike predictive ability; but LWers distinguish godlike AI from supernatual gods due to greater familiarity with Singularity ideas (or science fiction). 5. LW readers one-box to identify as (meta)contrarians among atheists / materialists. 6. LW readers one-box because they have absorbed the tribal belief that one-boxing makes you a better person.
The hypothesis that we don’t dare take seriously I may as well explicitly state:
7. LW readers one-box more because one-boxing is the right answer.
Good breakdown. #7 is not an explanation unless coupled with a hypothesis on why LW readers are more adept than mainstream philosophers and decision theorists at spotting the right answer on this problem. Unless one claims that LWers just have a generally higher IQ (implausible) an explanation for this would probably go back to #1 or something like it.
Personally, I think the answer is a combination of #1, #2, #3. I’m not sure about the relative roles played by each of them (which have a decreasing level of “rationality”) but here is an analogy:
Suppose you know that there is a controversy between two views A and B in philosophy (or economics, or psychology, or another area which is not a hard science), that University X has in its department a leading proponent of theory A, and that bunch of theorists have clustered around her. It is surely not surprising that there are more A proponents among this group than among the general discipline. As possible explanations, the same factors apply in this general case: we could hypothesize that philosophers in X are exposed to unusually strong arguments for A, or that B-proponents disproportionately go to other universities, or that philosophers in X are slavishly following their leader. I contend that the question about LW is no different in essence from this general one, and that whatever view about the interplay of sociology, memetic theory and rationality you have as your explanation of “many A-ers at X” also should apply for “many 1-boxers at LW”.
I suspect 4 is pretty strong. I can’t distinguish 1 and 2, but 3 doesn’t seem right. People disagree all the time with little regard to whom they’re disagreeing with.
In 1, new LW readers start at the base rate for one-boxing, but some two-boxers switch after reading good arguments in favor of one-boxing, which other folks have not read. In 2, new LW readers start at the base rate for one-boxing, but two-boxers are less likely to stick around.
4 seems to explain Asimov’s two-boxing; his view seems to be an attempt to counterfactually stick up for free will.
6 seems like 3; it’s just attributing the “conversion” to the community’s influence at large, rather than to Eliezer’s specifically. (Neither 6 nor 3 assumes the arguments here are good ones, which 1 does.)
This should be taken seriously as as hypothesis. However, it can be broken down a bit:
1. LW readers one-box more because they are more likely to have read strong arguments in favor of one-boxing — namely Eliezer’s — than most philosophers are.
2. LW readers one-box more because LW disproportionately attracts or retains people who already had a predilection for one-boxing, because people like to affiliate with those who will confirm their beliefs.
3. LW readers one-box more because they are guessing the teacher’s password (or, more generally, parroting a “charismatic leader” or “high-status individual”) by copying Eliezer’s ideas.
To these I’ll add some variants:
4. LW readers one-box more than most atheists because for many atheists, two-boxing is a way of saying that they are serious about their atheism, by denying Omega’s godlike predictive ability; but LWers distinguish godlike AI from supernatual gods due to greater familiarity with Singularity ideas (or science fiction).
5. LW readers one-box to identify as (meta)contrarians among atheists / materialists.
6. LW readers one-box because they have absorbed the tribal belief that one-boxing makes you a better person.
The hypothesis that we don’t dare take seriously I may as well explicitly state:
7. LW readers one-box more because one-boxing is the right answer.
Good breakdown. #7 is not an explanation unless coupled with a hypothesis on why LW readers are more adept than mainstream philosophers and decision theorists at spotting the right answer on this problem. Unless one claims that LWers just have a generally higher IQ (implausible) an explanation for this would probably go back to #1 or something like it.
Personally, I think the answer is a combination of #1, #2, #3. I’m not sure about the relative roles played by each of them (which have a decreasing level of “rationality”) but here is an analogy:
Suppose you know that there is a controversy between two views A and B in philosophy (or economics, or psychology, or another area which is not a hard science), that University X has in its department a leading proponent of theory A, and that bunch of theorists have clustered around her. It is surely not surprising that there are more A proponents among this group than among the general discipline. As possible explanations, the same factors apply in this general case: we could hypothesize that philosophers in X are exposed to unusually strong arguments for A, or that B-proponents disproportionately go to other universities, or that philosophers in X are slavishly following their leader. I contend that the question about LW is no different in essence from this general one, and that whatever view about the interplay of sociology, memetic theory and rationality you have as your explanation of “many A-ers at X” also should apply for “many 1-boxers at LW”.
I suspect 4 is pretty strong. I can’t distinguish 1 and 2, but 3 doesn’t seem right. People disagree all the time with little regard to whom they’re disagreeing with.
In 1, new LW readers start at the base rate for one-boxing, but some two-boxers switch after reading good arguments in favor of one-boxing, which other folks have not read. In 2, new LW readers start at the base rate for one-boxing, but two-boxers are less likely to stick around.
4 seems to explain Asimov’s two-boxing; his view seems to be an attempt to counterfactually stick up for free will.
6 seems like 3; it’s just attributing the “conversion” to the community’s influence at large, rather than to Eliezer’s specifically. (Neither 6 nor 3 assumes the arguments here are good ones, which 1 does.)