I wonder if it would help to try to bracket the uncertain area with less ambiguous cases, and maybe lead to a better articulation of the implicit criteria by which people distinguish program and data.
On one side, I propose that if the behavior you’re talking about would also be exhibited by a crash dummy substituted for your body, then it’s data and not program. For example, if someone pushes me off a cliff, it’s not my suicidal “program” that accelerates me downwards @ 32ft / s^2, but the underlying “data.”
On the other, if you write down a plan beforehand and actually locomote (e.g. on muscle power) to enact the plan, then it is program.
Are these reasonable outer bounds to our uncertainty? If not, why? If so, can we narrow them further?
I wonder if it would help to try to bracket the uncertain area with less ambiguous cases, and maybe lead to a better articulation of the implicit criteria by which people distinguish program and data.
On one side, I propose that if the behavior you’re talking about would also be exhibited by a crash dummy substituted for your body, then it’s data and not program. For example, if someone pushes me off a cliff, it’s not my suicidal “program” that accelerates me downwards @ 32ft / s^2, but the underlying “data.”
On the other, if you write down a plan beforehand and actually locomote (e.g. on muscle power) to enact the plan, then it is program.
Are these reasonable outer bounds to our uncertainty? If not, why? If so, can we narrow them further?