Causality is different, for one. You in reality has a causal structure where future actions are caused by the state of you in the present + some inputs. You in the simulation has a causal structure where actions are caused by the simulator, to some extent.
I’m not really assuming that. My question is if there’s a coherent position where humans are conscious, p-zombie humans are impossible, but simulations can be high fidelity yet not conscious.
I’m not asking if it’s true, just whether the standard argument against p-zombies rules this out as well.
Well if qualia aren’t epiphenomenal then an accurate simulation must include them or deviate into errancy. Claiming that you could accuracy simulate a human but leave out consciousness is just the p-zombie argument in different robes
Causality is different, for one. You in reality has a causal structure where future actions are caused by the state of you in the present + some inputs. You in the simulation has a causal structure where actions are caused by the simulator, to some extent.
I’m not really assuming that. My question is if there’s a coherent position where humans are conscious, p-zombie humans are impossible, but simulations can be high fidelity yet not conscious.
I’m not asking if it’s true, just whether the standard argument against p-zombies rules this out as well.
Well if qualia aren’t epiphenomenal then an accurate simulation must include them or deviate into errancy. Claiming that you could accuracy simulate a human but leave out consciousness is just the p-zombie argument in different robes