I do think it’s reasonable to call those cases “infinite ethics” given that they involve infinitely many possible worlds. But I definitely think it’s a distraction to frame them as being about infinite populations, and a mistake to expect them to be handled by ideas about aggregation across people.
(The main counterargument I can imagine is that you might think of probability distributions as a special case of aggregation across people, in which case you might think of “infinite populations” as the simpler case than “infinitely many possible worlds.” But this is still a bit funky given that infinitely many possible worlds is kind of the everyday default whereas infinite populations feel exotic.)
I do think it’s reasonable to call those cases “infinite ethics” given that they involve infinitely many possible worlds. But I definitely think it’s a distraction to frame them as being about infinite populations, and a mistake to expect them to be handled by ideas about aggregation across people.
(The main counterargument I can imagine is that you might think of probability distributions as a special case of aggregation across people, in which case you might think of “infinite populations” as the simpler case than “infinitely many possible worlds.” But this is still a bit funky given that infinitely many possible worlds is kind of the everyday default whereas infinite populations feel exotic.)