It does not imply belief in all true Π1 sentences. If f(x) is true for all x, the probability of f(x) will go to 1 as x goes to infinity, but the probability of (¬¬)n∀xf(x) may stay bounded away from 1.
So the difference in this example is that a coherent prior with approximation Pt(n) can have limtPt(ϕsn)→1 for all n, but not have limtPt(ϕst)→1; uniformly coherent must have this. To be precise, if we set Pt(ϕ):=M(┌(¬¬)tϕ┐) with M uniformly coherent, we must have this.
It does not imply belief in all true Π1 sentences. If f(x) is true for all x, the probability of f(x) will go to 1 as x goes to infinity, but the probability of (¬¬)n∀xf(x) may stay bounded away from 1.
Ahh, right. Silly mistake.
So the difference in this example is that a coherent prior with approximation Pt(n) can have limtPt(ϕsn)→1 for all n, but not have limtPt(ϕst)→1; uniformly coherent must have this. To be precise, if we set Pt(ϕ):=M(┌(¬¬)tϕ┐) with M uniformly coherent, we must have this.
Correct.