I think some parts of it do—e.g. in this post. But yes, I do really like Chapman’s critique and wish I’d remembered about it before writing this so that I could reference it and build on it.
Especially: Understanding informal reasoning is probably more important than understanding technical methods. I very much agree with this.
If Bayesianism would work for an agent with arbitrary much cognitive power, the eternalism that Chapman criticizes would still be true. Christian belief in a God that escapes full human understanding is still eternalism.
Chapman’s critique was stronger. Chapman’s argument doesn’t depend on computational ability being finitive.
I think some parts of it do—e.g. in this post. But yes, I do really like Chapman’s critique and wish I’d remembered about it before writing this so that I could reference it and build on it.
Especially: Understanding informal reasoning is probably more important than understanding technical methods. I very much agree with this.
If Bayesianism would work for an agent with arbitrary much cognitive power, the eternalism that Chapman criticizes would still be true. Christian belief in a God that escapes full human understanding is still eternalism.
Probability theory does not extend logic is the post where Chapman makes that argument in more depth.