Why do you think so? Where do I act as if I believed in moral realism? I am not aware of such.
This is similar to the way people who claim to be physical non-realists still manage to avoid walking out of high story windows. If someone punched you or stole your stuff, I strongly suspect you’d object in moral terms.
If someone punched you or stole your stuff, I strongly suspect you’d object in moral terms.
To me, this is a point in favor of anti-realism. I hardly react at all when strangers get punched and worse (as we speak, probably). Tragedy is when I cut my finger.
Of course I would, and that doesn’t make me a moral realist. I would say: by the morals that I feel, and most other people also feel and agree on, the person who assaulted me acted immorally. Nothing to do with objective moral rules: just rules that I and most other people feel to be moral and agree on.
More importantly, if some people in my place would appeal to “objective/factual morals”, that is not in itself evidence for the existence of such objective morals. Since when I ask them (you) how they perceive these objective morals, how they even know them to exist, I receive so far no answer.
Of course I would, and that doesn’t make me a moral realist. I would say: by the morals that I feel, and most other people also feel and agree on, the person who assaulted me acted immorally.
What if I said that by the morals I feel it’s ok for me to hit you? You could answer that most people disagree with me, but I suspect you’d object to being punched even if, e.g., you belonged to a low status group that people thought it was ok to abuse.
I live by my morals, whether or not others share them. This doesn’t change the fact that they are my morals, a feature of my brain state, and not some sort of objective independently existing morals. It’s exactly the same situation as saying that I feel that my girlfriend is beautiful whether or not others agree, but that doesn’t mean there’s an objective standard of beauty in the universe that doesn’t depend on observers.
If I belonged to a low status group that most people had no moral issues with abusing, then I would keep saying they behave immorally according to my views, and they would keep ignoring my words and abusing me. I fail to see what about this situation suggests that I behave as if I believe in realist morals.
If I belonged to a low status group that most people had no moral issues with abusing, then I would keep saying they behave immorally according to my views, and they would keep ignoring my words and abusing me. I fail to see what about this situation suggests that I behave as if I believe in realist morals.
And you would really be ok with them living by their morals and abusing you?
Of course I would not be OK. I would want them to change their behavior and I would try to change it. This would be because of my preferences as to how people should behave towards me. These preferences don’t exist independently of me. Morals are a special kind of preferences.
Saying “there exist someone’s morals but there do not exist morals by themselves” is exactly the same as saying “there exist someone’s preferences but there do not exist preferences by themselves”.
They wouldn’t. Nobody ever acts other than by their own preferences. Me by mine, they by theirs. This is pretty much baked into the definition of ‘preferences’, although with non-utility-maximizers like humans the situation is more complex than we’d like.
This is inherent in your own description of the scenario. You said they abuse me. So presumably their preferences (including their morals) are OK with that.
I’m sure you understand all this. What made you think I believed anything different?
Prediction: If you were forced to consider the situation in near mode, e.g., if you had something to protect that was being threatened, you wouldn’t be arguing that preferences are relative to the individual, but why the other person was acting amorally.
If I were in a crisis, I would be arguing whatever was most likely to convince the other person. If the other person was a moral realist—and most people instinctively are if they never really thought about the issue—then I would argue moral realism. And if the other person was religious—as again most people instinctively are—then I would argue about god. In neither case is that evidence that I believe in moral realism, or in gods; I would just be choosing the most effective argument.
And even if I did believe in moral realism, or the fact that many others do—that is not strong evidence for moral realism itself, because it is explained by evolutionary reasons that made us feel this way. Valid evidence is not that people believe one way or another, but the reasons they can explicitly articulate for that belief. When you observe that most or even all people behave like moral realists under pressure, that is a fact about people, not about moral realism.
This is similar to the way people who claim to be physical non-realists still manage to avoid walking out of high story windows. If someone punched you or stole your stuff, I strongly suspect you’d object in moral terms.
To me, this is a point in favor of anti-realism. I hardly react at all when strangers get punched and worse (as we speak, probably). Tragedy is when I cut my finger.
Ethical egoism is still a form of moral realism.
(Disclaimer: I don’t necessarily endorse full ethical egoism.)
Of course I would, and that doesn’t make me a moral realist. I would say: by the morals that I feel, and most other people also feel and agree on, the person who assaulted me acted immorally. Nothing to do with objective moral rules: just rules that I and most other people feel to be moral and agree on.
More importantly, if some people in my place would appeal to “objective/factual morals”, that is not in itself evidence for the existence of such objective morals. Since when I ask them (you) how they perceive these objective morals, how they even know them to exist, I receive so far no answer.
What if I said that by the morals I feel it’s ok for me to hit you? You could answer that most people disagree with me, but I suspect you’d object to being punched even if, e.g., you belonged to a low status group that people thought it was ok to abuse.
I live by my morals, whether or not others share them. This doesn’t change the fact that they are my morals, a feature of my brain state, and not some sort of objective independently existing morals. It’s exactly the same situation as saying that I feel that my girlfriend is beautiful whether or not others agree, but that doesn’t mean there’s an objective standard of beauty in the universe that doesn’t depend on observers.
If I belonged to a low status group that most people had no moral issues with abusing, then I would keep saying they behave immorally according to my views, and they would keep ignoring my words and abusing me. I fail to see what about this situation suggests that I behave as if I believe in realist morals.
And you would really be ok with them living by their morals and abusing you?
Of course I would not be OK. I would want them to change their behavior and I would try to change it. This would be because of my preferences as to how people should behave towards me. These preferences don’t exist independently of me. Morals are a special kind of preferences.
Saying “there exist someone’s morals but there do not exist morals by themselves” is exactly the same as saying “there exist someone’s preferences but there do not exist preferences by themselves”.
So why should they act in accordance with your preferences?
They wouldn’t. Nobody ever acts other than by their own preferences. Me by mine, they by theirs. This is pretty much baked into the definition of ‘preferences’, although with non-utility-maximizers like humans the situation is more complex than we’d like.
This is inherent in your own description of the scenario. You said they abuse me. So presumably their preferences (including their morals) are OK with that.
I’m sure you understand all this. What made you think I believed anything different?
Prediction: If you were forced to consider the situation in near mode, e.g., if you had something to protect that was being threatened, you wouldn’t be arguing that preferences are relative to the individual, but why the other person was acting amorally.
If I were in a crisis, I would be arguing whatever was most likely to convince the other person. If the other person was a moral realist—and most people instinctively are if they never really thought about the issue—then I would argue moral realism. And if the other person was religious—as again most people instinctively are—then I would argue about god. In neither case is that evidence that I believe in moral realism, or in gods; I would just be choosing the most effective argument.
And even if I did believe in moral realism, or the fact that many others do—that is not strong evidence for moral realism itself, because it is explained by evolutionary reasons that made us feel this way. Valid evidence is not that people believe one way or another, but the reasons they can explicitly articulate for that belief. When you observe that most or even all people behave like moral realists under pressure, that is a fact about people, not about moral realism.