Sometimes, people try to get me to do or try things which, in my estimation, it would probably be good for me to do/try.
In such cases, I refuse to do or try these things. In fact, I refuse even more vehemently and consistently than when people try to get me to do or try things that I expect to dislike, or that I really don’t think are good ideas. In fact, I think such cases—when people are trying to get me to do things that I think might be good ideas or that I think I might like—are the cases when it’s especially important to consistently and credibly refuse.
“Why??”, you ask?
Two reasons:
First, because I definitely do not want to establish the precedent that I can be talked into things. (No, I do not think that “taking ideas seriously” is mostly—much less entirely—a good trait.) This would give people an incentive to try and talk me into things; I don’t want that.
(Aside: a big part of the problem is that this precedent-setting, and resulting perceived incentives, occur even if I decide to do or try the thing for totally unrelated reasons; protestations of “no, I’m not doing this because you told me I should!” are obviously useless.)
(Naturally, people who know/recognize and expect this pattern may perceive a way to manipulate me, via “reverse psychology”; fortunately, defenses against this sort of thing are fairly easy—things like “on a randomly determined subset of occasions, break this pattern”, etc.)
Second, because cases when I think a thing might be a good idea, or I might enjoy it, are precisely those cases when I am most susceptible to being persuaded to do/try a thing which, on reflection, is not actually a good idea/enjoyable, and to subsequently false convincing myself that it is a good idea or that I do enjoy it—in short, the danger is greatest, then, of social pressure / social proof overriding my own judgment. Thus it’s most critical, at such times, to firmly refuse.
P.S.: There are some people whom I trust to such a degree—of whom I am so certain that they have my best interests in mind and that they know me well enough that their model of my preferences and so on is accurate—that if they suggest something to me, then the reasoning I outlined above is inapplicable. There are very, very few such people. No one who has known me for less than a decade could possibly be included in that set.
Ah, okay; with regard to your first objection, I’m sorry if it seemed like I was considering cases where another agent is trying to update your preferences on your behalf. I didn’t intend this. I admire your will to avoid being manipulated by others and to avoid social pressure, but I imagined this preference updating to being happening internally, without too much weight given to how your preferences might be percieved by others. Extra care should be taken then to make others less aware of your internal mechanisms, to avoid ‘hacking’ from unwholesome characters. Personally, I don’t find social pressures overide my judgement in almost all cases, but I can’t speak for others in the same way (I’m more of a “stuff you, I do what I want” kind of guy). I’ll ammend my comment in light of this.
With regard to your second objection, I can see how a misstep could lead me into thinking a bad idea (in reality) is a good one, but I’m operating on a baseline assumption that an ideal agent would recognise these bad ideas quite quickly.
Do you think my general assumption that it’s better to be more open to updates is just wrong? I’m relatively new to the rationalsphere, and appreciate the disagreement!
I imagined this preference updating to being happening internally
I’m not sure I quite grasp your meaning, here; rephrase?
I’m more of a ‘stuff you, I do what I want’ kind of guy
Yes. So am I. It takes vigilance to maintain this, else you may find yourself going along with others while still having the self-image of yourself as a “stuff you, I do what I want” kind of guy.
an ideal agent would
Perhaps, but I am not an ideal agent. Are you an ideal agent?
Do you think my general assumption that it’s better to be more open to updates is just wrong?
More than what?
(In any case, I strongly suspect the optimum here varies interpersonally; but I will say that, in my experience, most people who consider themselves “rationalists” should probably be less open to updates.)
I’m relatively new to the rationalsphere, and appreciate the disagreement!
I’m not sure I quite grasp your meaning, here; rephrase?
In your mind, I guess.
Perhaps, but I am not an ideal agent. Are you an ideal agent?
Definitely not! But at least with respect to my personal preferences, I’m pretty good at identifying those which are good or bad and having the comittment (willpower?) to change them if they’re bad.
More than what?
More than the character in the thought experiment who is unwilling to try the broccoli, I suppose.
I’ll take stock of your comments in any case and think more about this.
Nope.
Elaborating:
Sometimes, people try to get me to do or try things which, in my estimation, it would probably be good for me to do/try.
In such cases, I refuse to do or try these things. In fact, I refuse even more vehemently and consistently than when people try to get me to do or try things that I expect to dislike, or that I really don’t think are good ideas. In fact, I think such cases—when people are trying to get me to do things that I think might be good ideas or that I think I might like—are the cases when it’s especially important to consistently and credibly refuse.
“Why??”, you ask?
Two reasons:
First, because I definitely do not want to establish the precedent that I can be talked into things. (No, I do not think that “taking ideas seriously” is mostly—much less entirely—a good trait.) This would give people an incentive to try and talk me into things; I don’t want that.
(Aside: a big part of the problem is that this precedent-setting, and resulting perceived incentives, occur even if I decide to do or try the thing for totally unrelated reasons; protestations of “no, I’m not doing this because you told me I should!” are obviously useless.)
(Naturally, people who know/recognize and expect this pattern may perceive a way to manipulate me, via “reverse psychology”; fortunately, defenses against this sort of thing are fairly easy—things like “on a randomly determined subset of occasions, break this pattern”, etc.)
Second, because cases when I think a thing might be a good idea, or I might enjoy it, are precisely those cases when I am most susceptible to being persuaded to do/try a thing which, on reflection, is not actually a good idea/enjoyable, and to subsequently false convincing myself that it is a good idea or that I do enjoy it—in short, the danger is greatest, then, of social pressure / social proof overriding my own judgment. Thus it’s most critical, at such times, to firmly refuse.
P.S.: There are some people whom I trust to such a degree—of whom I am so certain that they have my best interests in mind and that they know me well enough that their model of my preferences and so on is accurate—that if they suggest something to me, then the reasoning I outlined above is inapplicable. There are very, very few such people. No one who has known me for less than a decade could possibly be included in that set.
Ah, okay; with regard to your first objection, I’m sorry if it seemed like I was considering cases where another agent is trying to update your preferences on your behalf. I didn’t intend this. I admire your will to avoid being manipulated by others and to avoid social pressure, but I imagined this preference updating to being happening internally, without too much weight given to how your preferences might be percieved by others. Extra care should be taken then to make others less aware of your internal mechanisms, to avoid ‘hacking’ from unwholesome characters. Personally, I don’t find social pressures overide my judgement in almost all cases, but I can’t speak for others in the same way (I’m more of a “stuff you, I do what I want” kind of guy). I’ll ammend my comment in light of this.
With regard to your second objection, I can see how a misstep could lead me into thinking a bad idea (in reality) is a good one, but I’m operating on a baseline assumption that an ideal agent would recognise these bad ideas quite quickly.
Do you think my general assumption that it’s better to be more open to updates is just wrong? I’m relatively new to the rationalsphere, and appreciate the disagreement!
I’m not sure I quite grasp your meaning, here; rephrase?
Yes. So am I. It takes vigilance to maintain this, else you may find yourself going along with others while still having the self-image of yourself as a “stuff you, I do what I want” kind of guy.
Perhaps, but I am not an ideal agent. Are you an ideal agent?
More than what?
(In any case, I strongly suspect the optimum here varies interpersonally; but I will say that, in my experience, most people who consider themselves “rationalists” should probably be less open to updates.)
As do I (despite not being new). :)
In your mind, I guess.
Definitely not! But at least with respect to my personal preferences, I’m pretty good at identifying those which are good or bad and having the comittment (willpower?) to change them if they’re bad.
More than the character in the thought experiment who is unwilling to try the broccoli, I suppose.
I’ll take stock of your comments in any case and think more about this.